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Abstract
After the end of World War II, the world entered an even more turbulent period as it faced the
beginnings of the Cold War, during which the prospect of mutually assured destruction between the
world's largest nuclear weapon states was ever-present, and often provoked tense confrontations.
Although fears of a nuclear holocaust significantly subsided after the dissolution of the Soviet Union
in 1991, the world faced a potentially more dangerous prospect: the proliferation risks associated with
the insecurity and unauthorized acquisition of Soviet-era nuclear warheads. Although all Soviet-era
weapons were eventually acquired by Russia, concerns about the excessively large weapons
stockpiles of the United States and Russia, combined with the goal of nuclear disarmament, led to the
Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA). During the Cold War, the US and the
Soviet Union respectively produced approximately 100 and 150 metric tons of weapons-grade
plutonium (WGPu). Under the terms of the PMDA, both nations formally each agreed to irradiate 34
MT of excess military plutonium in the form of mixed oxide fuel (MOX) in nuclear power reactors.
One of the major issues of concern associated with this agreement relates to the verification measures
that will be implemented to ensure actual WGPu disposition. Additionally, despite a commitment
(Article VII.3 of the PMDA) to engage and consult with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) to establish arrangements to monitor its plutonium disposition process, a formalized IAEA
role within a potential multilateral verification regime has yet to be determined.
In this work, the ability of the US to achieve the goals of its plutonium disposition campaign
by 2018 is assessed. The suitability of the IAEA as an objective party to a multilateral verification
regime under the auspices of the PMDA is also analyzed. In an attempt to aid the IAEA with such
expected verification procedures, the applicability of antineutrino detection as a potential monitoring
technology which could significantly enhance current monitoring procedures is considered. Although
there has not yet been a formal demonstration of this technology under the auspices of the PMDA, the
technology has been successfully fielded and nonintrusively operated at US and Russian reactors for
years at a time, with the explicit aim of demonstrating potential relevance to a range of safeguards
and verification tasks. The sensitivity of an antineutrino detector to antineutrino count rate
measurements was analyzed through a hypothesis testing procedure which sought to identify
statistically significant differences between the count rate evolutions of a designated baseline and
potential diversion scenarios. With a specified set of parameters, the test demonstrated that the
detector was capable of identifying the replacement of 7 WGPu MOX fuel assemblies with
conventional LEU fuel assemblies within 360 days of the fuel cycle operation at a >95% true positive
rate and a 5% false positive rate limit. These results were essentially still maintained even with a non-
reactor-based antineutrino event background signal as high as 25%. Although pitfalls with regard to
systematic uncertainty and operator malfeasance were revealed, potential solutions to such issues are
also presented and discussed. All in all, the results obtained in this work confirm the potential
efficacy and viability of antineutrino rate based measurements for a range of reactor safeguards and
verification tasks.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard C. Lanza
Title: Senior Research Scientist, Nuclear Science and Engineering
2
Acknowledgements
We can rejoice, too, when we run into problems and trials, for we know that they help us develop
endurance. And endurance develops strength of character, and character strengthens our confident
hope of salvation.
Romans 5:3-4
With the completion of this thesis, I would like to acknowledge and appreciate the overwhelming
support I have received from many individuals and organizations throughout this undertaking.
To begin with, I would like to thank my research advisor, Dr. Dick Lanza, for generously sharing
his invaluable and endless expertise and perspectives. He has gone well beyond the duties
exemplified by a typical thesis and research advisor; supplying not only scientific idealism and
integrity with regard to my research endeavors but unwavering support, patience, and guidance in
the classroom and beyond.
In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Richard Lester who has been an extremely valuable professor
and reader of this thesis as well as a noteworthy asset and advocate on my behalf. Through his
tireless editing and insightful suggestions, Dr. Lester has ensured the high quality expected of an
MIT thesis.
I would also like to recognize the countless contributions of Dr. Adam Bernstein, who was
immensely instrumental in the development and concise definition of this thesis regarding one of
the many applications of antineutrino detection-monitoring and verifying the disposition of excess
weapons-grade plutonium via antineutrino detection. Dr. Bernstein was extremely helpful in the
editing process, continually pointing out key issues of concerns to be addressed.
Regarding the policy implications associated with antineutrino detectors, I would like to
acknowledge the expertise gained in various aspects of this thesis by Matthew Bunn and Olli
Heinonen of the Harvard Kennedy School, Julian Whichello of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, and Guy Lunsford and Dwight Williams of the U.S. Department of Energy. To Thomas
Downar and Andrew Ward of the University of Michigan as well as Anna Hayes of Los Alamos
National Laboratory, thank you for the allocation of data toward this work.
I would also like to thank my parents, siblings, family, and friends, whose love and encouragement
has kept me grounded and continually striving to reach limits I may have perceived as
inconceivable. In addition, "Red Bull," thank you for your continual support and energy that have
proven essential in making this paper a reality; especially during times of extreme mental and
psychological fatigue.
I would like to thank my colleagues and the faculty and staff affiliated with the Nuclear Science and
Engineering Department and Technology and Policy Program as well as members of the Office of
the Dean for Graduate Education for their genuine concern and endless support throughout my
graduate tenure at MIT.
To my big bro at MIT, Isaac Matthews, as well as to my little bros of Chocolate City, thank you all
so much for the continual uplift and sharing of common experiences. You all have been a true
blessing and I look forward to our continued friendship.
Many thanks to the Lemelson Foundation for the financial support during my first year.
In closing, I present this thesis as my contribution to nuclear science and technology policy, with
the hope that this work will not only benefit the reader in developing his/her knowledge, but may
also aid in a worldwide aspiration toward Global Zero of nuclear weapons.
3
Table of Contents
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... 2
ACKNOW LEDGEM ENTS.................................................................................................... 3
TABLE OF FIGURES................................................................................................................... 6
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... 8
LIST OF ACRONYM S ............................................................................................................... 10
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... 12
1.1 M OTIVATION........................................................................................................................ 12
1.2 THESIS OBJECTIVE ............................................................................................................... 12
1.3 BACKGROUND...................................................................................................................... 14
1.3.1 Goals Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons................................................... 14
1.3.2 Nuclear Weapons-Grade Materials ......................................................................... 15
1.3.3 The US and Russian Plutonium Landscape .............................................................. 17
1.4 PLUTONIUM M ANAGEMENT AND DISPOSITION AGREEMENT........................................... 21
1.4.1 Early Developments .................................................................................................. 22
1.4.2 Spent Fuel Standard.................................................................................................. 23
1.4.3 Verification under the PMDA .................................................................................. 24
1.5 THESIS ORGANIZATION...................................................................................................... 26
CHAPTER 2: W GPU M OX FUEL USE IN THE US.............................................................. 28
2.1 VIABLE CUSTOMERS ......................................................................................................... 28
2.1.1 Virginia Electric Power Company & Duke Energy Carolina, LLC ........................ 29
2.1.2 Tennessee Valley Authority ....................................................................................... 31
2.1.3 Energy Northwest..................................................................................................... 33
2.2 OVERVIEW OF US CONSIDERED REACTOR TYPES............................................................... 33
2 .2 .1 P W R .............................................................................................................................. 3 3
2 .2 .2 B W R .............................................................................................................................. 3 4
2.3 MOX PRODUCTION AND USE IN SELECTED CUSTOMER REACTORS ................................ 35
CHAPTER 3: VERIFICATION UNDER A MULTILATERAL REGIME ....................... 39
3.1 THE TRILATERAL INITIATIVE............................................................................................. 40
3.1.1 Considered Verification Objectives ......................................................................... 40
3.1.2 Verification Techniques andAssociated Technologies............................................. 43
3.1.3 Challenges Faced and Implementation Failures ..................................................... 44
3.1.4 Accomplishments .......................................................................................................... 45
3.2 UK-NORWAY INITIATIVE.................................................................................................. 46
3.2.1 An Additional Stakeholder in the Disarmament Process: NNWS............................. 47
3.2.2 The Inspector Challenge ........................................................................................... 48
3.3 INFLUENCE ON THE PM DA AND BEYOND ......................................................................... 49
CHAPTER 4: SAFEGUARDS REGIM E IN THE US.......................................................... 52
4.1 U.S-IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT ................................................................................ 52
4.2 LW R SAFEGUARDS ........................................................................................................... 53
4.3 M OX FUEL SAFEGUARDS .................................................................................................. 55
4.4 UM S AND RSI...................................................................................................................... 58
4.4.1 Successful UMS: Antineutrino Detection at L WR ...................................................... 61
CHAPTER 5: ANTINEUTRINO DETECTION .................................................................. 62
5.1 OVERVIEW OF ANTINEUTRINO DETECTION PHYSICS .......................................................... 62
5.2 DETECTOR FIELD TRIALS..................................................................................................... 64
5.3 EXPECTED ANTINEUTRINO SIGNAL ESTIMATION ............................................................ 65
5.3.1 Reactor Fission Reaction Rates ................................................................................ 66
4
5.3.2 Acquiring the Estimated Antineutrino Spectrum........................................................ 72
5.3.3 Acquiring the Antineutrino Estimated Expected Signal............................................. 73
5.4 SOURCES OF NON-ANTINEUTRINO EVENTS....................................................................... 75
5.5 RELEVANT PMDA VERIFICATION CRITERIA MET WITH ANTINEUTRINO DETECTION ....... 75
5.5.1 Antineutrino Rate Measurement................................................................................. 76
5.5.2 Antineutrino Rate Measurement and Initial Isotopic Inventory................................ 77
5.5.3 Antineutrino Rate Measurement and Reactor Thermal Power.................................. 78
5.5.4 Antineutrino Energy Spectrum Measurement ............................................................ 79
CHAPTER 6: WILL IT WORK (A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS)................... 80
6.1 MODEL SELECTION FOR ANTINEUTRINO COUNT RATES..................................................... 80
6.1.1 Validity for Quadratic Response Function............................................................... 81
6.1.2 Set-up for Testing of Diversion Activities ................................................................ 82
6.1.3 Residual Analysis of Selected Approximations ......................................................... 83
6.2 T ESTING PRO CEDURE......................................................................................................... 83
6.2 .1 S ta tistica l E rror............................................................................................................ 8 4
6.3 C A SES C ON SIDERED ........................................................................................................... 85
6.4 R O C C URVE A NALYSIS ..................................................................................................... 87
6.5 EFFECT OF NON-REACTOR BASED ANTINEUTRINO EVENTS............................................ 89
6.6 EFFECT OF MEASUREMENT DURATION ............................................................................ 90
6.6.1 Sensitivity A nalysis .................................................................................................... 91
6.7 EFFECT OF SYSTEMATIC UNCERTAINTY AND OPERATOR MALFEASANCE....................... 94
CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE WORK............................. 99
7.1 THESIS SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................. 99
7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK ......................................................................... 102
REFERENCES........................................................................................................................... 104
APPENDIX A: THE WGPU MOX CONVERSION APPROACH ...................................... 112
A. 1 ASSOCIATED TECHNOLOGIES AND CONSTRUCTION STATUS........................................... 112
A.2 BENEFITS OF MOX CONVERSION APPROACH .................................................................. 113
A.3 PITFALLS OF MOX CONVERSION APPROACH ................................................................... 114
A .3.1 N uclear P roliferation R isks ....................................................................................... 114
A .3.2 Safety and H ealth R isks ............................................................................................. 116
A .3.3 Costs and Econom ic Feasibility ................................................................................ 117
APPENDIX B: DATA, FUNCTIONS, AND SIMULATORS................................................ 120
B .1 D A T A ................................................................................................................................. 12 0
B .2 F U N C T IO N S ........................................................................................................................ 124
B .2.1 Exp ected Counts F unction ......................................................................................... 124
B .2.2. O bserved Counts F unction ....................................................................................... 125
B .2.3 Trajectory F unction ................................................................................................... 126
B.2.4 Trajectory with Background Function....................................................................... 128
B.2.5 t-Test of Evolution Coefficients Function .................................................................. 130
B .3 S IM U LA TO R S ..................................................................................................................... 13 1
B.3.1 ROC t-Test of Fitted Coefficients Simulator.............................................................. 131
B.3.2 ROC t-Test of Fitted Coefficients with Background Simulator ................................. 135
B .3.3 D etector Sensitivity Sim ulator ................................................................................... 139
B.3.4 Relative ROC t-Test of Fitted Coefficients Simulator................................................ 143
5
Table of Figures
Figure 1.1: Global Plutonium Stockpiles by Country................................................................ 17
Figure 1.2: United States Weapon Grade Plutonium Production .............................................. 18
Figure 1.3: Russia's Estimated Annual Production of Weapon-grade by Site .......................... 21
Figure 2.1: MFFF Planned Production Schedule for MOX fuel assemblies .............................. 29
Figure 2.2: Annual and Cumulative US WGPu Disposition Estimate ....................................... 30
Figure 3.1: Multilevel Verification Levels for Dismantlement and Disposition Process........... 41
Figure 5.1: Inverse p-decay Reaction in Antineutrino Detector................................................. 63
Figure 5.2: SO N G SI D etector. ................................................................................................. . 64
Figure 5.3: LEU Fuel Assembly Configuration......................................................................... 68
Figure 5.4: LEU Assembly Isotopic Fission Reaction Rates..................................................... 69
Figure 5.5: M OX Fuel Assembly Configuration ....................................................................... 69
Figure 5.6: MOX Assembly Isotopic Fission Reaction Rates .................................................. 70
Figure 5.7: Fission A ntineutrino Spectra .................................................................................... 72
Figure 5.8: Energy Dependent Inverse p-decay Cross-section................................................... 73
Figure 5.9: Energy Dependent Isotopic Antineutrino Interaction Spectra................................. 74
Figure 6.1: Antineutrino Count Rate Evolutions for Varying MOX Core Concentrations ........... 86
Figure 6.2: Antineutrino Count Rate Evolution and Measurements.......................................... 87
Figure 6.3: ROC Curves for Baseline:Diversion-Scenario Case Comparison........................... 88
Figure 6.4: ROC Curve for 77:70 Case Comparison at Varying Background Rates.................. 90
Figure 6.5: Sensitivity Analysis for 77 MOX WGPu Assemblies (90 days)............................. 92
Figure 6.6: Sensitivity Analysis for 77 MOX WGPu Assemblies (493 days)........................... 93
Figure 6.7: Sensitivity Analysis for 0 MOX WGPu Assemblies (90 days)............................... 93
Figure 6.8: Sensitivity Analysis for 0 MOX WGPu Assemblies (493 days)............................. 94
Figure 6.9: Relative Antineutrino Count Rate Evolution and Measurements ........................... 96
Figure 6.10: Relative Antineutrino Count Rate Evolution and Measurements .......................... 96
6
Figure 6.11: Relative Antineutrino Count Rate Evolutions........................................................ 97
7
List of Tables
Table 1.1: Estimated Total Nuclear-Weapon Stockpiles as of 2010 .......................................... 15
Table 1.2: Excess Weapons Grade Plutonium (MT) by Site ......................................................... 19
Table 2.1: Viable Customer Reactors ......................................................................................... 35
Table 2.2: Potential Customer Reactors..................................................................................... 37
Table 5.1: Core and Fuel Assembly Parameters ......................................................................... 67
Table 5.2: LEU Fuel Assembly Configuration Details.............................................................. 68
Table 5.3: MOX Fuel Assembly Configuration Details ........................................................... 70
Table 5.4: Initial Isotopic Masses (kg) for Each Fuel Assembly Type...................................... 70
Table 6.1: Isotopic Antineutrino Conversion Factor .................................................................. 81
Table 6.2: C ontingency Table.................................................................................................... 85
Table 6.3: ROC Curve Analysis Results for Baseline:Diversion-Scenario Case Comparisons .... 89
Table 6.4: ROC Curve Analysis Results for Baseline:Diversion-Scenario Case Comparisons at
V arying B ackground R ates............................................................................................................90
Table 6.5: ROC Curve Analysis Results for Baseline:Diversion-Scenario Case Comparisons at
V arying M easurem ent D urations ................................................................................................ 91
Table 6.6: Relative to Beginning of Cycle evolution count rate Change at Specified Measurement
D uration P eriod s ............................................................................................................................ 9 8
Table 7.1: Reactor Characteristics and Detector Parameters for Previous Antineutrino Detection
E xp erim ents ................................................................................................................................. 10 3
Table A.1: Changes in Estimated Operating Dates for Savannah River Site Facilities............... 112
Table A.2: 2002 DOE WGPu Disposition Option Completion Date Estimates.......................... 113
Table A.3: 2002 DOE Total Life-Cycle Cost Estimates.............................................................. 118
Table A.4: Escalation of DOE Total Life-Cycle Cost Estimates................................................. 118
Table B.1: LEU Assembly Fission Reaction Rates (cm-s')...................................................... 120
Table B.2: LEU Assembly Fission Rates (s-1) ............................................................................. 121
Table B.3: MOX Assembly Fission Reaction Rates (cm-3-s 1) ................................................... 122
Table B.4: MOX Assembly Fission Rates (s-)............................................................................ 123
8
[This Page Left Blank Intentionally]
9
List of Acronyms
BWR Boiling Water Reactor(s)
CISAC Committee on International Security and Arms Control
CoK Continuity of Knowledge
DCS Duke Cogema Stone and Webster
DOE Department of Energy
GAO Government Accountability Office
HEU Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
INL Idaho National Laboratory
IWG Interagency Working Group
LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory
LEU Low Enriched Uranium
LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LTA Lead Test Assembly(s)
LWR Light Water Reactor(s)
MFFF MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility
MOX Mixed Oxide Fuel
MT Metric Ton(s)
NAS National Academy of Science
NDA Non-destructive Analysis
NNSA National Nuclear Security Agency
NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Committee
NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration
NNWS Non-nuclear Weapon State(s)
NWS Nuclear Weapon State(s)
PDCF Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility
PDI Person-Day(s) of Inspection
PEIS Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
PFPF Plutonium Fuel Processing Facility
PMDA Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement
PPRA Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement
PWR Pressure Water Reactor(s)
RGPu Reactor-Grade Plutonium
ROD Record of Decision
RSI Remote Safeguards Inspection(s)
S&S Safeguards and Security
SFS Spent Fuel Standard
SORT Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
S/RSAC State and Regional Systems of Accounting and Control
SNF Spent Nuclear Fuel
SNL Sandia National Laboratory
SQ Significant Quantity(ies)
SRS Savannah River Site
START I Strategic Arms and Reduction Treaty of 1991
10
START II Strategic Arms and Reduction Treaty of 2009 (New START)
TVA Tennessee Valley Authority
UMS Unattended Monitoring System(s)
VHLW Immobilization through Vitrification with High Level Waste
WGPu Weapons-Grade Plutonium
WSB Waste Solidification Building
11
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) I & II and the Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty (SORT) between the United States and Soviet Union are considered by
many to be the largest and most complex arms control treaties in history; ultimately
seeking to limit the number of deployed strategic weapons delivery systems and deployed
strategic nuclear weapons, respectively. Although the START and SORT treaties have been
the backbone of joint US and Russian efforts toward nuclear disarmament, the treaties have
not addressed the discontinuation of weapons-grade fissile material production and
disposition of excess weapons-grade materials. The ratification of the 1997 Plutonium
Production Reactor Agreement' (PPRA) between the US and Russia signaled a move to
cease production of plutonium for weapons production; further strengthened by the
included provisions for monitoring [1]. However, Russia still operates nuclear reactors,
previously slated as plutonium production reactors, in order to generate heat and electricity
for its country. As a result, plutonium volume within the country continues to rise.
During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union respectively produced
approximately 100 and 150 metric tons (MT) of weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu). In an
attempt to design a verification system of significantly reducing these immensely large
stockpiles of WGPu-primarily resultant from a Cold War mentality of mutual assured
destruction-the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Russia, and the US
launched the Trilateral Initiative2 [2]. However, because of US and Russian suspicions
regarding their counterparts' technical capabilities, the initiative was slow to develop. With
the conclusion of a separate bilateral agreement in 2000 between the US and Russia known
as the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement 3 (PMDA), the Trilateral
Initiative was eventually terminated due to diminishing attention and political backing from
the two weapons states. The PMDA endeavors to ensure that the US and Russia
transparently convert their respective surplus WGPu stocks into a physical form that makes
it inherently difficult to recover and reuse the material for any military purpose. Although
the PMDA shared a common target with the Trilateral Initiative in developing verification
techniques, this target was compromised in order to achieve the agreement's primary goal
of plutonium disposition.
1.2 Thesis Objective
The actual title of the agreement is The Agreement between the Government of the United States ofAmerica
and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation Regarding Plutonium Production
Reactors. The agreement prohibits the resumption of operations at 14 shutdown US plutonium reactors and
13 shutdown Russian plutonium reactors. Under the agreement, both the US and Russia are permitted to
conduct monitoring visits once each year at the other's shutdown reactors to monitor the non-weapons use of
2 This initiative was a six-year (1996-2002) endeavor aimed at developing a verification system in which
Russia and the US could submit classified forms of weapons-origin fissile material to IAEA verification and
monitoring in a irreversible manner for an indefinite period of time.
This actual title of the agreement is The Agreement Between the Government of The United States Of
America and the Government of The Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of
Plutonium Designated as no Longer Requiredfor Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation.
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Contemporary policy concerning military plutonium disposition in the United
States, as reflected in the PMDA, lacks detailed steps and metrics for verification. As
previously noted, one of the major concerns associated with the PMDA is how monitoring
and inspection activities will occur in each state. The target of US verification strategy
should be a mutually agreed upon verification mechanism that ensures the integrity of each
respective parties' WGPu disposition activities, both from a bilateral and multilateral
perspective. Another concern is that despite a US and Russian commitment, as stated in
Article VII.3, that "each Party, in cooperation with the other Party, shall begin
consultations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at an early date and
undertake all other necessary steps to conclude appropriate agreements with the IAEA to
allow it to implement verification measures with respect to each Party's disposition
program," the US has yet to engage in detailed discussions with the IAEA of facility
safeguards as they relate to the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility or plutonium disposition
designated reactors selected to irradiate WGPu mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel4.
In an effort to counter these two concerns with a potential technological solution,
the prospects and capabilities of antineutrino detection as a solution will be analyzed as the
objective of this thesis. Antineutrino detectors have the ability to estimate fissile content
through rate measurements and/or provide independent power measurements of LEU and
MOX-fueled reactors. Current experiments show that these detectors are capable of
measuring event rates of hundreds to a few thousand events/day at approximately a 25-
meter standoff from the core of a 3 GWt civil power reactor with an active detector volume
of approximately one cubic meter. Collected measurements have been used to specify
thermal power at the 2-3% level in one week, relative to a known initial value [3]. Absolute
power estimates are also possible at the 10% level with detectors of simple design, or better
with more complex detectors. With longer durations of data accumulation, anomalous
reactor operations, including malicious diversion scenarios as low as the replacement of 82
kg of plutonium with uranium, have the potential to be detected by antineutrino detection
[4]. Antineutrino detectors with such capabilities currently cost approximately $200K-
$400K [5], and can readily be reduced through value engineering and modest economies of
scale. The capabilities of these detectors for purposes of reactor monitoring are being
investigated by the US Brazil, and France with the SONGS1 and SONGS2 projects, the
Angra Project, and the Nucifer Detector, respectively [5].
Although antineutrino measurements have demonstrated their potential to assist the
IAEA in safeguarding reactors operating with LEU under their unattended monitoring
systems (UMS) strategy [3], less research has been done on the potential of antineutrino
detection for effectively monitoring other fuel cycles (i.e. MOX, thorium). The attributes
and advantages of antineutrino detection in monitoring reactors operating with partially
loaded WGPu MOX fuel cores, as designated by the PMDA, will be examined here,
incorporating core simulations provided by researchers at Lawrence Livermore National
Laborator (LLNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and the University of
Michigan . Furthermore, potential diversion and misuse scenarios will be investigated in
4 The inclusion of the IAEA in the PMDA differs significantly from the Trilateral Initiative, in that the IAEA
was an equal party in the latter rather than a party synonymous with an expert consulting aid like that of the
former.
5Successful incorporation of these detectors into a safeguards regime will require further analysis, including
additional reactor simulations.
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order to quantify the effectiveness of antineutrino measurements. This thesis also seeks to
determine the practicality of seamlessly and effectively incorporating this technology into
the contemporary verification procedure of the plutonium disposition campaign.
1.3 Background
1.3.1 Goals Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons
On April 5, 2009, before a crowd of world citizens gathered at Hradcany Square in
Prague, President Barack Obama declared "America's commitment to seek the peace and
security of a world without nuclear weapons. I'm not naive. This goal will not be reached
quickly-perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too,
must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change [6]." He further pledged to
"reduce the role of nuclear weapons in [US] national security strategy" and to "put an end
to Cold War thinking."
Albert Einstein's discovery of the mass-energy equivalence principle brought about
a revolution in the way mankind conceived the notion of matter and energy production as
well as destruction and devastation. This, in part, yielded the gift of nuclear physics;
providing the world with the valuable ability to harness the power of the atom as well as a
converse; the development of nuclear weapons of mass destruction and the possible demise
of mankind. The Nobel Prize winning Swedish Physicist Hannes Alven made the great
analogy that the "peaceful atom" and the "military atom" are intimately linked like
"Siamese twins" [7]. As countries developed expertise in nuclear physics, a global race
began to rapidly develop nuclear arms; one in which nine countries developed the means
for a nuclear arsenal. In historical order, they are the United States, Russia, the United
Kingdom, France, China, Israel 6 [8], India, Pakistan and North Korea [7]. US and Russian
nuclear stockpiles, which account for approximately 95% of the world's nuclear-weapon
stocks, peaked at approximately 30,000 for the United States in 1965 and 40,000 for Russia
in 1985 [9].
World leaders have committed their countries to designated steps in order to
strengthen the notions of a nonproliferation regime in a universal endeavor to prevent the
potential catastrophes associated with nuclear terrorism. The possibilities of terrorist groups
and hostile states buying, stealing, or building nuclear weapons pose the most immediate
and extreme threat to global security. Not only is the protection and security of nuclear
weapons essential, so is the security of the hundreds of MT of fissile materials spread
around the world at various sites. Unfortunately, many of these sites lack adequate security.
As little as 22 kg of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) or 5 kg of WGPu is enough to fashion
a nuclear device that could easily be smuggled into a state and detonated [10].
Although there is no evidence that terrorist groups or hostile states have either
acquired a nuclear weapon or the weaponizable fissile material needed to manufacture one,
both terrorists and states have attempted and continue to attempt to attain such items.
6 Israel has not publically revealed testing of a nuclear weapon, however, Western intelligence experts believe
Israel conducted an underground nuclear test in the Negev in 1963, and that preparation of nuclear material
for assembly into nuclear weapons began soon thereafter. The main suspected test, however, is a nuclear
explosion that took place in the atmosphere of the coast of South Africa on September 22, 1979, where a US
Vela satellite reported a flash resembling a clandestine nuclear detonation in the southern Indian Ocean.
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According to the IAEA, there were more than 400 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in
materials that could be used in nuclear terrorism between 1993 and 2004, and 21 that
involved material that could be used to produce a nuclear bomb [11]. If successful, the
international community could be faced with a terrifying future.
In order to combat such threats, world leaders have proposed two major initiatives:
a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty (FMCT) and an internationally controlled reactor fuel
bank coupled with an enforceable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. An FMCT would
prohibit the production of materials that can be made into nuclear weapons. For example,
an internationally controlled reactor fuel bank coupled with an enforceable Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), would significantly reduce the likelihood of more states
becoming nuclear powers. Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),
establishing more intrusive inspections by the IAEA, and burdensome penalties for
irresponsible withdrawal, as well as continual reductions and protections of "vulnerable
nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide" as designated by the
Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) are essential in order to safeguard nuclear
weapons and nuclear-ready materials [10].
There have been significant recent reductions in the nuclear weapon arsenals of
nuclear weapon states (NWS); however, in order to make significant strides toward global
zero, both NWS and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), and more specifically the US and
Russia, must continue to reduce their nuclear arsenals (See Table 1.2).
Table 1.1: Estimated Total Nuclear-Weapon Stockpiles as of 2010
Country Number of Nuclear Warheads
United States ~9,100 A
Russia -1 1,OOOB
France <300
United Kingdom <225
China -240
Israel 100-200
Pakistan 70-90
India 60-80
North Korea <5
Courtesy of Global Nuclear Weapon Inventories, 1945-2010 [12]
A Currently approximately 5,100 are deployed and 4000 are awaiting dismantlement.
B A large fraction is awaiting dismantlement (however, there are large uncertainties associated with the
number of warheads awaiting dismantlement) [13]
1.3.2 Nuclear Weapons-Grade Materials
Although the isotopes 233U, 2 3 7Np, and 24 1Am are able to sustain a nuclear chain
reaction, and argued to be weapons-grade fissionable materials [14] capable of being
fabricated into a nuclear weapon, all known fission-based nuclear weapons tested have
primarily made use of two materials: highly-enriched uranium (HEU)7 and weapons-grade
7 Although HEU is uranium with a 235U isotopic concentration of 20% or greater, sometimes denoted as
weapons-usable, HEU is used in this context to be weapons-grade which possesses an 235U isotopic
concentration of 85% or greater.
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plutonium (WGPu)8 . The International Panel on Fissile Material (IPFM) estimated the
global HEU stockpile in 2010 to be approximately 1475 ± 125 MT (enough for more than
60,000 weapons) [13]. The large uncertainty in the estimate is due to undeclared Russian
HEU produced prior to its production termination in the late 1980s. The US, which ended
production in 1992, has published an official history of its HEU production [15]. The NPT
NWS-US, Russia, UK, France, and China-account for about 98% of all HEU material,
with the largest HEU stockpiles being held by Russia and the US Although it is believed
that India and Pakistan are the only producers of HEU, maintaining relatively small-scale
programs, HEU global stockpiles are shrinking as the US and Russia blend down HEU
declared excess to military needs to low-enriched uranium (LEU) for power reactor fuel at
a rate of over 30 MT/year with reduction agreements like that of US-Russia HEU Purchase
Agreement. Non-NPT NWS-India, Pakistan, and North Korea-account for
approximately 20 MT of HEU; most of this material was provided to them as research
reactor fuel by NPT NWS.
The IPFM estimated the global stockpile of separated plutonium in 2010 to be
approximately 485 ± 10 MT9 [13]. About half of this stockpile was produced for military
purposes, while the other half is resultant of NWS civilian programs. The NWS account for
about 98% of all separated, where more than 10 MT of plutonium are in NNWS, most of
which exists in Japan (the only NNWS with a large plutonium-separation program).
Unlike HEU, the stockpiles of separated plutonium for military purposes continues
to increase due to continued production in Israel, India, and Pakistan [9]. Only the United
States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, North Korea 0 , and China (unofficially) have
officially announced an end to their production of plutonium for weapons. Commercial
reprocessing programs, on the other hand, like those in France, Russia, India, and the
United Kingdom as well as currently planned reprocessing programs expected in China
[16] and Japan's upcoming Rokkasho plant (estimated to begin operations in late 2012)
[17] will dwarf the comparatively small-scale weapon plutonium production programs.
However, the growth of the global civilian plutonium inventory has slowed down to less
than 5 MT/year temporarily due to shutdowns and delays of reprocessing centers
worldwide". Current estimates of global plutonium stockpiles by countries can be seen in
Figure 1.1 below.
8 WGPu, in this context, is plutonium with an 240 Pu:239 Pu isotopic-ratio no greater than 0.1 (Some sources
estimate WGPu to have a maximum 240Pu concentration of 7%). Supergrade Plutonium (<4% 24 0Pu) is used in
US Navy weapons stored in proximity to ship and submarine crews, due to lower radioactivity. US
demonstrations incorporating less than weapons-grade quality plutonium (comparable to reactor-grade
plutonium) have also been demonstrated.
Estimates for separated plutonium stockpiles is not offset by the fabrication of excess Russian and US
weapon plutonium into reactor fuel.
10
Reportedly declared an inventory of separated plutonium of 37 kg as part of its 2007 agreement to end its
nuclear program.
11 A shutdown at the Thorp reprocessing plant in the U.K. due to an accident as well as continued delays in
Japan's Rokkasho reprocessing plant.
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Figure 1.1: Global Plutonium Stockpiles by Country
Courtesy of Global Fissile Material Report 2010 [13]
Civilian stocks are based on the most recent January 2010 INFCIRC/549 declarations (listed by ownership,
not location) were used for civilian stock calculations. Excluding the US and U.K. who have provided
declarations, the military stockpiles were calculated using non-governmental estimates (hence uncertainties
on the order of 10-30% exist for China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, and Russia). "Strategic" is used to
categorize India's separated plutonium from spent heavy-water power-reactor fuel has and 6 MT of WGPu in
Russia has not been declared excess, but has been deemed to not be used in weapons manufacturing.
1.3.3 The US and Russian Plutonium Landscape
1.3.3.A United States
The US has published official historical records of their plutonium production, uses,
and stocks, as of the end of 1994, based on data in the national Nuclear Material
Management and Safeguards System, in the report Plutonium: The First 50 Years [18],
which is expected to have an upcoming update associated with more recent history [19].
The US had produced and acquired an estimated total of approximately 110 MT of
plutonium 2 , where approximately 47 MT of WGPu and 15 MT of non-WGPu13 have been
declared "excess to its national security needs [20, 21]."
Although the US has reduced its WGPu plutonium stocks' 4 , there is still a
12 The US had used about 10 tons of this total stockpile resulting in a remainder of approximately 85 MT of
WGPu and 15 MT of non-WGPu but weapon-usable plutonium.
13 7.6 MT of this plutonium is in unreprocessed government-owned spent fuel form.
14 Unlike the obsolete gun-type designed nuclear weapons previously employed by the US, contemporary
nuclear weapons are designed as two-stage explosive systems with plutonium (~4kg WGPu) in a fission pit
and tritium-HEU in a fusion-fission secondary pit.
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Figure 1.2: United States Weapon Grade Plutonium Production
Courtesy of Plutonium: The First 50 Years [18]
Declared historical plutonium production in the United States via the Hanford (blue accumulation) and
Savannah River Sites (red accumulation) producing a total of approximately 91 MT of WGPu.
Figure 1.2 shows the declared historical production of plutonium at the two US
production sites-the Hanford Site and the Savannah River Site. According to the
production records, the Hanford reactors and the Savannah River reactors produced
cumulatively 55 MT 15 and 36 MT of WGPu, respectively [19].
A total of 38.3 MT of WGPu remains available for nuclear weapon use [19] in the
forms of: weapons; "reserve" pits stored at the DOE's Pantex warhead
assembly/disassembly plant in Texas [22]; experiments at LANL, where plutonium R&D
and pit production is carried out; and for criticality experiments in the high-security Device
15 The Hanford reactors produced 67 MT of plutonium, however, approximately 12 tons were not WGPu but
were considered weapons-usable (4 MT was never separated from irradiated fuel).
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Assembly Facility (DAF) on the Nevada Test Site (See Table 1.2).
Table 1.2: Excess Weapons Grade Plutonium (MT) by Site
Location Metal Oxides Reactor Irradiated Other Total
Fuel Fuel Forms
Pantex/Future 21.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A 21.3
Dismantlements
Rock Flats 5.7 1.6 N/A N/A 4.6 11.9
Hanford Site <0.1 1.0 N/A 0.2 0.5 1.7
LANL 0.5 <0.1 <0.1 N/A 1.0 1.5
Savannah River 0.4 0.5 N/A 0.2 0.2 1.3
INL <0.1 N/A 0.2 0.2 <0.1 0.4
Other Sites <0.1 N/A N/A <0.1 <0.1 0.1
TotalA 27.8 13.1 00.6 6.4 38.2
Courtesy of Plutonium: The First 50 Years [18].
A Totals may not add due to rounding to the nearest tenth of a MT.
Most of the excess WGPu is still in the forms of warheads and pits at the Pantex
Plant in Amarillo, Texas16 where it will remain until plutonium extraction capabilities are
achieved at the Savannah River Site. At the Savannah River Site, at least 34 MT of the
excess US separated WGPu, including that from excess pits, is to be manufactured into
MOX fuel for commercial nuclear power reactors as agreed under a US-Russian PMDA
[23]. A MOX fuel-fabrication plant is currently being built for this purpose 7 [24].
The plutonium in spent fuel is to be disposed of eventually with other spent fuel in a
deep underground repository and plutonium in dilute waste is being shipped to the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico [25]. About three MT from the former Rocky
Flats pit production facility have already been deposited there [24].
The remainder of the plutonium that has been declared excess is being shipped to
the former K-production-reactor building at DOE's Savannah River Site (SRS), which has
been converted into an interim plutonium-storage facility. Four MT of plutonium from the
Zero Power Plutonium Reactor, currently at the Idaho National Laboratory, have been
declared excess for weapons use but some of this plutonium may be shipped to the DAF at
the Nevada Test Site [26].
1.3.3.A Russia
Although Russia has not published a comprehensive account of its military-use
fissile-material production during its Soviet and post-Soviet periods, non-governmental
analysts have made estimates of the state's WGPu volume based on power history
publications [27, 28] and historical documents and memoirs on the designs and operation
16 US warheads are assembled and disassembled at this site.
17 Some impure plutonium may be reprocessed in the "H-canyon," where the HEU "driver fuel" of the
Savannah River production reactors was formerly reprocessed. The extracted plutonium would either be used
as feed for the MOX plant or vitrified and disposed of in canisters of solidified radioactive waste that are
being produced from high-level reprocessing waste there.
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[29] of former production reactors. Based on available public information, such analysts
estimated that Russia has produced 145 ± 818 MT of WGPu [30] (See Figure 1.3). This
includes 15 MT of plutonium produced after September 1994, when production for
weapons ended, by three plutonium-production reactors that continued operating to supply
district heat and electricity to the Siberian cities of Tomsk and Zheleznogorsk. Under the
PPRA, the Russian government committed that this plutonium would not be used in
weapons; storing this resultant plutonium in oxide form on-site, subject to bilateral
transparency measures in order to provide assurance that it is not intended for military
purposes.
Upon successful disposition of its 34 MT of surplus WGPul9 as designated by the
PMDA, a resultant Russian WGPu stockpile of 88 ± 8 MT will still be available for
military use. Note, this is much more than the US active stockpile of 38 MT and much
more than the 25 MT or so needed to sustain the stockpile of about 4,600 operational and
active reserve warheads that Russia is believed to retain [31].
Almost all Russia's plutonium was produced in fourteen graphite-moderated water-
cooled production reactors , each built around cylindrical stacks of graphite blocks [32]:
six at the Mayak Production Association in Ozersk (formerly Chelyabinsk-65) near
Chelyabinsk in the Urals, five at the Siberian Chemical Combine in Seversk (formerly
Tomsk-7) near Tomsk, and three at the Mining and Chemical Combine in Zheleznogorsk
(formerly Krasnoyarsk-26) near Krasnoyarsk.
18 The estimates of the Russian WGPu stockpile is uncertain due to the lack of knowledge pertaining to the
power levels of the individual production reactors and the assumed durations of their operation at those power
levels. The IPFM identifies that the most important uncertainty is associated with the rates the reactor powers
were increased above original design schematics; estimates were made under the assumptions that first and
second generation reactors (A, AV and 1) power ramp-up processing was 6-12 years and third generation
reactors power ramp-up processing was 3-5 years leading to ± 5 MT uncertainty in plutonium production.
The assumption that upgraded reactor power levels is ± 5 %, yields another ± 6 tons uncertainty. Further
assumptions assuming that the uncertainties are random/uncorrelated results in a total uncertainty of Russia's
cumulative production of WGPu at approximately ± 8 MT. Approximately 17 MT of Russia's weapon-grade
plutonium are estimated to have been used in nuclear-weapon tests, lost in waste, or lost in warheads in three
submarines that sank.
19 Under the PMDA, the Russian Government has committed that 25 MT of the military stock plus 9 MT of
its post-September-1994 stock will be fabricated into fuel for Russia's demonstration breeder reactors.
20 12 were designed to produce plutonium and 2 to produce tritium and other isotopes.
21 Four additional heavy-water-moderated production reactors were operated at the Mayak site.
20
5000 -
4500 1
4000
__ 3500
3000
2500
E
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Fiscal Year
Figure 1.3: Russia's Estimated Annual Production of Weapon-grade by Site
Courtesy of Global Fissile Material Report 2010 [30]
Estimated historical plutonium production in the Russia via the Mayak (blue accumulation), Tomsk-7 (red
accumulation), and Krasnoyarsk-26 (green accumulation) sites producing a total of approximately 145 ± 8
MT of WGPu.
1.4 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement
The PMDA is an agreement between the largest NWS designed to demonstrate
arms reductions in an irreversible manner such that the US and Russia could ensure
transparent disposition of WGPu attained from weapons designated surplus to each state's
defense program into a form in which the plutonium could never be reused for military
applications. As acknowledge, both states agreed to dispose of no less than 34 MT of
WGPu via conversion into fuel to be irradiated in civil reactors for electricity production.
Although a minimum of 34 MT of WGPu disposition is required by both states, the PMDA
also endorses additional WGPu declared surplus as arms reductions progress should also be
disposed of in the same or comparable transparency terms.
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Although the agreement, and its endeavors, appears promising toward a global
aspiration of nuclear weapons disarmament and disposition, several unresolved issues are
still present even after the 2010 update that may threaten the prospects for successful
implementation of the agreement. For example, the design of the MOX fuel fabrication
facility (MFFF) and reactor modifications require technical investigation. Furthermore,
verification and monitoring/inspection regimes, negotiation of liability provisions, and total
funding acquisition for program operation have yet to be fully resolved. All of which serve
as key implementation issues with the agreement [33].
1.4.1 Early Developments
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) I & I and most recently, the New
START Treaty, between the United States and Russia are considered by many to be the
largest and most complex arms control treaties in history, seeking to limit the number of
deployed strategic weapons delivery systems and deployed strategic nuclear weapons,
respectively 22 . The international security issues that arose as a result of increasing nuclear
weapons stockpiles from dismantlement programs led to a March 1992 request to conduct a
full-scale study of plutonium management and disposition options by the National
Academy of Science2 3 (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control
(CISAC) [34, 35].
The US Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy24 was issued in 1993 to address
the domestic commitment to undertake a comprehensive management approach to the
growing accumulation of fissile materials to the increasing fissile materials stockpiles
resultant from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons [36]. This was followed by the Joint
Statement Between the United States and Russia on Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Means of Their Delivery [37] in 1994, which sought: to secure nuclear
materials in the former Soviet Union; to ensure safe, secure, long-term storage and
disposition of surplus fissile materials; to establish transparent and irreversible nuclear
reductions; to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime; and to control nuclear
exports. A 1995 US announcement demonstrated its commitment to these objectives by
designating 200 MT of domestic fissile materials, of which approximately 38.2 MT was
WGPu, would be declared surplus to US nuclear defense needs.
As identified in the Moscow Nuclear Safety Summit [38], the G-8 endorsed the
need to render surplus plutonium in Russia and the US as proliferation resistant as possible
22 Under START and subsequent unilateral initiatives, approximately 10,000-20,000 each in the US (and a
greater number in Russia) have been declared surplus to national security needs. Although the START
treaties had been the backbone of joint US and Russia efforts toward nuclear disarmament, the treaties did not
addressed the discontinuation of weapons-grade fissile material production and disposition of excess
weapons-grade materials.
23 NAS later formed the Panel on Reactor-Related Options for Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium in
November of 1992.
24 As stated in the policy, the US was directed to: "(I) Seek to eliminate, where possible, accumulation of
stockpiles of highly enriched uranium or plutonium, and to ensure that where these materials already exist
they are subject to the highest standards of safety, security, and international accountability and (II) Initiate a
comprehensive review of long-term options for plutonium disposition, taking into account technical,
nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary and economic considerations. Russia and other nations with
relevant interests and experience will be invited to participate in the study."
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and that the threat of diversion and the safe, secure, irreversible, and expedited removal of
excess Pu from weapons programs should be the major criteria for consideration of
disposition options [39]. There is a significant nuclear threat posed by surplus fissile
material due to the number of sites at which it is stored and associated management
difficulties which, some argue, yields a much more dangerous environment than the
nuclear tensions of the Cold War era. For this reason, the world audience is extremely
concerned the adequacy of safeguards and security (S&S) for WGPu, the dangers
associated with the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons, and with the potential for
adverse environmental, safety, and health consequences if surplus fissile materials are not
properly managed.
In both the 1994 and 1995 NAS reports, CISAC and the Panel on Reactor-Related
Options for the Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium concluded that two plutonium
disposition alternatives were the most promising: use as MOX fuel (without reprocessing)
in nuclear reactors and immobilization through vitrification in combination with high-level
radioactive waste (VHLW). Although both methods were identified as promising 25, the
MOX fuel approach was judged to pose greater proliferation risks than the vitrification
option. It was also recommended that the US and Russia jointly pursue these alternative
disposition strategies, which was later done in 199626. All parties recommended pursuit of
both the MOX and immobilization approaches in their respective final reports.
1.4.2 Spent Fuel Standard
The DOE engaged in an environmental impact analysis regarding long-term storage
and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials. The primary goal of disposition is to
render weapons-usable fissile materials inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use while
protecting human health and the environment. In order to achieve this task, NAS
recommended that plutonium disposition strategies should seek to attain the Spent Fuel
Standard (SFS)27 .
DOE revised the SFS definition, with a more explicit focus on material
attractiveness, a concept implicit in the NAS definition. The SFS does not imply that
conversion of plutonium to spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is the only way to achieve the
nonproliferation objective, but that disposition approaches should provide an equivalent
level of proliferation resistance as SNF. Achieving SFS provides increased proliferation
25 Through their analyses comprised of assessments of each alternative based three proliferation-risk factors:
risk of theft, risk of reversal, and impact on arms reduction
26 Many collaborative studies resulted such as the US-Russian Independent Scientific Commission on
Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, US-Russian Plutonium Disposition Steering Committee, and Joint
US-Russian Working Group on Cost Analysis and Economics in Plutonium Disposition
27"We believe that options for the long-term disposition of weapons plutonium should seek to meet a "spent
fuel standard"-that is to make this plutonium roughly as inaccessible for weapons use as the much larger
and growing quantity of plutonium that exists in spent fuel from commercial reactors;" See NAS
Management and Disposition of Excess Nuclear Plutonium, 1994. This definition was later revised by DOE,
"The surplus weapons-usable plutonium should be made as inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use as
the much larger and growing quantity of plutonium that exists in the spent nuclear fuel from commercial
power reactors," See DOE Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials and Final
Programmatic Impact Statement, 1996.
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resistance by transforming surplus fissile materials into a less accessible form; it leads to
decreased reliance on institutional barriers to protect the material from theft or diversion.
Consistent with 1994 and 1995 NAS reports, the US and Russia each agreed to
dispose of 34 MT of surplus military plutonium into a more proliferation-resistant form via
MOX irradiation and VHLW over a twenty-year period under the terms of the original
2000 PMDA. Although the options for the most effective proliferation-resistant disposition
method for WGPu have been discussed and debated for more than 15 years, both US and
Russian authoritative reports have always primarily focused on the two aforementioned
options towards disposition [40]. However, maintaining consistency with their original SFS
definition coupled with strong encouragement from Russia, MOX irradiation was solely
chosen as the method of disposition for all 68 MT of WGPu under the modified 2010
PMDA. As designated for both parties under the Annex on Technical Specification of the
PMDA, the SFS corresponds to a "radiation level from each spent plutonium fuel assembly
[of] no less than 1 sievert per hour one meter from the accessible surface at the centerline
of the assembly 30 years after irradiation has been completed."
1.4.3 Verification under the PMDA
As designated by the PMDA's Annex on Monitoring and Inspection, the purpose of
verification through monitoring28 and inspection29 under the PMDA is:
In accordance with paragraph 1 of Article V1130 of the Agreement,
monitoring and inspection activities shall be designed and implemented to
ensure that the monitoring Party has the ability independently to confirm
that the terms and conditions of the Agreement with respect to disposition
plutonium3 ', blend stock32, conversion product3 , spent plutonium fuel, and
disposition facilities are being met."
28 Monitoring, as defined in the PMDA, means a set of measures and activities, including inspections, use of
special equipment, and review of documents (records and reports), that together provide data to the
monitoring Party on disposition plutonium, blend stock, conversion product, spent plutonium fuel, or
disposition facilities.
29 Inspection, as defined in the PMDA, means a monitoring activity conducted by the monitoring Party on-
site at a facility in order to obtain data and make observations on disposition plutonium, blend stock,
conversion product, spent plutonium fuel, or disposition facilities.
30 "Each Party shall have the right to conduct and the obligation to receive andfacilitate monitoring and
inspection activities in accordance with this Article and the Annex on Monitoring and Inspections, which is
an integral part of this Agreement, in order to confirm that the terms and conditions of this Agreement with
respect to disposition plutonium, blend stock, conversion product and spent plutonium fuel, and disposition
facilities are being met."
31 The 34 tons of Pu slated for disposition.
32 Any plutonium other than disposition plutonium-and possibly including reactor-grade plutonium-which
may be used as part of the disposition campaign.
33 Disposition plutonium which, prior to its irradiation in a reactor, may or may not have been mixed with
blend stock, has been received at an entrance of a fuel fabrication facility, and has no properties that are
considered by the United States of America as classified information or by the Russian Federation as state
secret. In addition to the above specifications, the agreement states that the ratio of 240 Pu/239Pu in the
conversion product must not exceed 0.1.
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Currently, each party is working to fulfill their remaining requirements to bring the
PMDA, as amended by the 2010 protocol, into force. Both Russia and the United States
plan to begin disposition activities by 2018. In December 2010, the US Deputy Secretary of
Energy and the Russian Director General for the State Corporation Rosatom issued the
Joint Statement on the Results of the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security Working Group
Meeting. The Statement identified concrete steps for the near term as a result of the
34Working Group meeting
Although the verification task of disposition primarily aims to satisfy US and
Russian interests, the goals of the PMDA are to eventually involve the IAEA in the
development and implementation of verification measures under a multilateral regime, as
was reaffirmed with the amendments of the 2010 protocol in Article VII.3:
Each Party, in cooperation with the other Party, shall begin consultations
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) at an early date and
undertake all other necessary steps to conclude appropriate agreements
with the IAEA to allow it to implement verification measures with respect to
each Party's disposition program.
However, specific verification arrangements have yet to be finalized. The joint
letter to IAEA Director General, Yukia Amano, signed by both Russia and the US requests
that "the IAEA engage in all necessary efforts to undertake this important verification role,
with the goal of preparing the necessary legally-binding verification agreements in 2011
[41]." Actual disposition will not begin until 2018. Given the significance of irreversibility
to nuclear disarmament efforts and the need for transparency highlighted in the Final
Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, ensuring effective verification under the
auspices of the PMDA will be essential to the ultimate success of the process and its wider
impact on the NPT regime [42].
Nonetheless, although each state, and ultimately the IAEA, possesses the inherent
right to conduct monitoring and inspection measures to confirm the success of disposition
procedures pursued by the other state, the PMDA states that:
The number, intensity, duration and timing of inspections, and the intensity
of other monitoring activities, shall be kept to the minimum consistent with
the effective implementation of agreed monitoring activities... [where]
procedures for monitoring shall be designed so as to minimize, to the extent
possible, interference with the operation offacilities, and to avoid affecting
their nuclear safety or the safety of inspectors.
With a targeted goal of minimal and effective mechanisms of inspection and
monitoring, the parties still seek to agree upon specific and detailed measures and
procedures for monitoring and inspections of disposition plutonium, blend stock,
conversion product, spent plutonium fuel, and disposition facilities. In order to aid in
34
These steps included ensuring entry into force of the amended PMDA and associated liability provisions as
soon as possible; and considerations of a set of milestones as envisioned by the amended PMDA with a view
to reach an agreement by the end of February 2011.
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mitigating this task as well as engage the IAEA as the ultimate verification party for this
endeavor, we argue that antineutrino detection should be used as a monitoring tool for
some of these verification responsibilities due to its effectiveness and noninvasive nature as
an unattended monitoring system (UMS).
1.4.3.A Verification Prospects with Antineutrino Detection
As acknowledged, the PMDA confers to each party the right to verify that the
disposition plutonium, conversion product, and spent plutonium fuel all have particular
attributes at various stages throughout the disposition campaign. Although the agreement
specifies that some of these attributes are to be verified at MFFF, others could potentially
be verified onsite at the reactor by antineutrino detection. We argue that, in likely order of
applicability, these are (1) confirmation of burnup, (2) confirmation of conversion product
mass and isotopic composition, (3) confirmation of annual WGPu irradiation volume, and
(4) maintenance of continuity of knowledge (CoK) [43].
1.5 Thesis Organization
Chapter 2 explores the current US attempts to identify customer reactors to irradiate
manufactured WGPu MOX fuel assemblies as part of the US plutonium disposition
campaign.
Chapter 3 discusses the underlying policy and technical concepts in achieving a successful
verification multilateral regime through a brief case analysis of relevant strategies for
verification under a multilateral regime. The implications of the findings as they related to
the PMDA are concluded.
Chapter 4 provides an overview, from a policy context, of the relationship between the US
and IAEA which is used in an attempt to consider how the PMDA verification regime will
look within the US upon full inclusion of the IAEA.
Chapter 5 provides an overview of antineutrino detection physics as well as proposed
practical detector operation in aiding the PMDA in achieving some of the aforementioned
tasks at hand. This chapter also prefaces the statistical analysis of Chapter 6 with the
designated assumptions and procedures followed in order to attain the estimated
antineutrino signal used in the simulation.
Chapter 6 outlines the model selection, testing procedure, and cases considered for a
simulation in which a statistical analysis is performed in order to test the quality of the
antineutrino detection as a tool used for monitoring under the PMDA.
Chapter 7 summarizes the findings of the report, discusses the implications of the findings,
and presents recommendations for future work.
Appendix A provides an associated background on manufacturing technologies and
construction statuses, benefits, and pitfalls of the US WGPu MOX conversion strategy.
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Appendix B provides the data, functions, and simulators used for the analysis in this thesis.
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Chapter 2: WGPu MOX Fuel Use in the US
The MOX approach for WGPu involves fabrication of the mixed oxide fuel by
combining PuO2 powder with natural uranium oxide powder similar to the commercial
process implemented in Europe for the fabrication of fuel from reactor-grade plutonium
(RGPu). WGPu MOX requires an extra step, in which the WGPu is transformed from its
original form (weapon pit or metal) into pure PuO 2 power with the removal of any
impurities35 associated with its original form [39]. Once the MOX fuel assemblies have
been irradiated in commercial reactors, the plutonium is expected to be no longer readily
available for nuclear weapons use-fulfilling its PMDA burnup requirement 36 . The MOX
fuel fabrication process is important in maintaining US efforts to minimize the proliferation
risks associated with nuclear weapons, while simultaneously generating electricity for
citizens [44]. In this chapter, we explore the current US efforts to identify customer
reactors to irradiate such WGPu MOX fuel assemblies as part of the US plutonium
disposition campaign. For additional information regarding associated manufacturing
technologies and construction status, benefits, and pitfalls of the WGPu MOX conversion
strategy, see Appendix A.
2.1 Viable Customers
As of the writing of this thesis, the expected production schedule for the fabrication
of WGPu MOX fuel assemblies has been established by the NNSA [45]. Production is to
begin in 2018 with 8 WGPu MOX fuel assemblies, increasing to a maximum of 151 fuel
assemblies by year 2023, to create a total of 1,700 fuel assemblies (with an approximate
WGPu mass of 20 kg per assembly) designed for pressurized water reactors (PWR) during
its 15-year operation lifetime (See Figure 2.1). Once a reactor is approved to aid in the US
plutonium disposition campaign, the reactor licensee would collaborate with Shaw AREVA
MOX Services to test the MOX fuel through initial operations with a few lead test
assemblies (LTA) for at least two operating cycles3 7 . Upon successful review of LTA
performance by the NRC, the full employment of WGPu MOX fuel could begin in the
selected reactors [46].
This includes plutonium-gadolinium alloys as well as trace amounts of other materials.
36 In Section 1.2-3 of the PMDA's Annex on Technical Specifications, it states that, "each spent plutonium
fuel assembly is [to be] irradiated to a fuel bum-up level of no less than 20,000 megawatt days thermal per
metric ton of heavy metal; [where] the radiation level from each spent plutonium fuel assembly is such that it
will become no less than 1 sievert per hour one meter from the accessible surface at the centerline of the
assembly 30 years after irradiation has been completed."
37 Lead test assemblies are tested in the reactor in order to verify the ability of the models to predict fuel
performance and the applicability of the European database to the US MOX fuel.
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Figure 2.1: MFFF Planned Production Schedule for MOX fuel assemblies
Courtesy of GAO, DOE Needs to Address Uncertainties with and Strengthen Independent
Safety Oversight of Its Plutonium Disposition Program [45]
Given the general specifications of the PMDA, many US LWR are capable of
incorporating WGPu MOX fuel into their fuel cycles. At the disposition campaign's
infancy, DOE obtained expressions of interest from 18 utilities (totaling approximately 38
reactors) for using WGPu MOX fuel in their reactors [47]. Unfortunately, the current
customer landscape is much dire, where many of the DOE-identified customer reactors are
no longer interested. Nonetheless, we review the most viable customers below; which
include likely parties, although they may be no longer interested.
2.1.1 Virginia Electric Power Company & Duke Energy Carolina, LLC
In 1999, DOE awarded a contract to the consortium Duke Engineering & Services,
COGEMA Inc., and Stone & Webster (DCS) to aid in the US plutonium disposition
campaign as designated by the PMDA through reactor irradiation of WGPu MOX fuel at
Virginia Electric Power Company's North Anna Nuclear Station (2 PWR) as well as Duke
Power's (now known as Duke Energy Carolina, LLC) Catawba and McGuire Nuclear
Stations (4 PWR) 38 [48, 49]. Under this conceived Mission Reactors Irradiation Plan, DCS
was to dispose of WGPu MOX in these six selected reactors3 9 which would demonstrate
the feasibility of disposing of surplus plutonium between 2007-20224 . In determining the
feasibility of these mission-specified reactors completing the task, Clark et al. [50]
38 Duke Power and Virginia Electric Power determined a fuel management strategy coupled with fuel cycle
studies to verify that the core designs developed could accomplish the program objectives and meet all of the
assumptions and constraints. Duke Power performed its nuclear analyses using the CASMO-4 and
SIMULATE-3 MOX computer codes, whereas Virginia Power performed its nuclear analyses using the
MCNP and PDQ computer codes (at the time, these analytical methods were consistent current nuclear
analyses methodologies used by utilities).
39 Then referred to as mission reactors. A Mission Reactors Licensing Plan was also developed in order to
designate a specified approach to obtaining NRC approvals needed to carry out the Mission Reactors
Irradiation Plan.
40 Created prior to the 2010 Plutonium Disposition Protocol update to the 2000 PMDA.
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conducted an analysis using two baseline MOX fuel assembly designs 4 1, where after
several transition cycles, the plants achieved "equilibrium" partial MOX fuel cores with
42
close to a 40% MOX fuel core . It was ultimately shown that the core design analysis
performed demonstrated that 34.8 MT of WGPu could be disposed of under this planning
through the burning of 1743 WGPu MOX fuel assemblies in the six reactors (See Figure
2.2).
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Figure 2.2: Annual and Cumulative US WGPu Disposition Estimate
Courtesy of MOX Fuel Irradiation Program for Disposition of Surplus United States
Plutonium [50].
The core design analyses demonstrated that 51 planned operating cycles for the six mission reactors between
2007 and 2022 are capable of disposing of 34.8 MT of surplus weapons plutonium. This corresponds to 1743
MOX fuel assemblies in the six reactors. Plutonium disposition amounts by year, and cumulatively.
41 These were referred to as High MOX and Low MOX, which designated the amount of plutonium loaded
per fuel assembly.
42 "For McGuire and Catawba, the "equilibrium" partial MOX fuel cores would vary each cycle between 36
and 40 feed MOX fuel assemblies [out of 84 total feed (LEU + MOX) assemblies]. For North Anna, the
"equilibrium" partial MOX fuel cores would vary each cycle between 28 and 29 feed MOX fuel assemblies
[out of 68 or 69 total feed (LEU + MOX) assemblies respectively]."
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Unfortunately, however, Virginia Electric Power's involvement in the plutonium
disposition campaign ended soon thereafter, when Virginia Electric Power ultimately
abandoned its agreement with DCS. Jim Norvelle, then spokesman of the utility, stated that
this decision was "indicative of the changes that are occurring in the electric industry
today," and at the time of its decision to join DCS in the consortium, "it fit [the Virginia
Electric Power Company's] strategy. Today it does not," as the company merged with
Consolidated Natural Gas of Pittsburgh to concentrate on Midwest and Northeast, a region
that did not correlate with the MOX mission [51].
Upon the loss of Virginia Electric Power, Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC agreed to
the purchase up to 75% of MOX fuel produced at a discount relative to the price of normal
reactor fuel (LEU), to be disposed of in their seven nuclear reactors at the Catawba,
McGuire, and Oconee Power Sites in June of 2000 through a subcontract with NNSA. In
February 2003, Duke initiated the process to begin incorporating WGPu MOX LTA at
either Catawba or McGuire power plants4 3. In August 2008, Friends of the Earth and the
Union of Concerned Scientists revealed that the LTA used for testing in Duke's Catawba
Unit 1 reactor had failed due to abnormal fuel assembly performance44 and was pulled from
the reactor after completing only two of the then NRC-required three necessary 18-month
irradiation cycles [52].
Unfortunately, an official agreement was never negotiated with Duke Energy
Carolinas, LLC, and the original subcontract automatically terminated on December 1,
2008 [45]. The LTA failure at Catawba Unit 1 in conjunction with MFFF project and
construction delays and NNSA's inability to guarantee a reliable MOX delivery schedule to
Duke's power plants, may have been the overarching reasons for Duke's loss of interest in
supporting the US plutonium disposition campaign. Nonetheless, Duke has communicated
to MOX Services that it continues to support the objectives of the surplus weapons
disposition program and is interested in receiving a future proposal from MOX Services for
the use of MOX fuel [53]. However, future reactors seeking to use WGPu MOX fuel will
have to abide by the preliminary testing as designated by the NRC causing further
uncertainty, delays, and cost escalation.
2.1.2 Tennessee Valley Authority
According to NNSA, three utilities have responded to MOX Services' request and
have expressed interest in the MOX fuel program. Most notably, in February 2010, NNSA
and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) executed an interagency agreement "to evaluate
43 Duke filed a license amendment request to use four WGPu MOX LTA which was eventually restricted to
the Catawba Power Plant. This request was then followed by a file for a "Request for Exemption from Certain
Regulatory Requirements in 10 CFR 11 and 73 to Support MOX Fuel Use."
44 The LTA were analyzed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, however, information regarding the analysis of
these assemblies is not available. It is expected, however, that abnormal growth was seen in the LTA, which
offers broader safety implications. AREVA informed the NRC that the problem has yet to be determined,
although it may be related to an experimental alloy known as "M5" AREVA uses in the "guide tubes" where
the control rods that shut down the reactor are inserted; a problem that may indicate the inadequate NRC
licensing process.
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the irradiation of MOX Fuel in up to 5 TVA reactors4 5 [54]." Although TVA has not yet
formally decided to use MOX fuel, it will continue to cooperate with the DOE in
determining the preparation and review of specified sections regarding reactor operations
within the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement4 6
[55]. TVA's decision occurred somewhat as a response to Duke's decision to abandon the
program. TVA spokesman Terry Johnson stated, unlike what was communicated to Duke
Energy Carolinas, reliable fuel services would be part of the supply contract if the utility
decides to use MOX fuel in any of the three Brown's Ferry boiling water reactors (BWR)
or two Sequoya PWR. Nonetheless, TVA has been especially impressed with the expected
prices of WGPu MOX fuel-forecasted to be much cheaper than conventional LEU fuel-
resulting in a jointly signed letter of intent [56] by TVA and AREVA for MOX fuel use in
TVA's five reactors.
Although the more recent addition of TVA's five reactors appear promising for the
US plutonium disposition campaign, some issues arise with the incorporation of these
reactors. To begin with, the diversity of TVA's LWR reactors (incorporating both BWR
and PWR designs) is not well matched to NNSA's intent to produce MOX assemblies for
use in PWR only (i.e. those situated at the Sequoyah Site) [57]. However, MFFF's design
does offer the capability to switch between MOX fuel assembly production for PWR or
BWR in a 10-20 day conversion timeframe 4 7 . Furthermore, the utility's charter requires it
to support national defense initiatives, which may be inconsistent with the nonproliferation
aspects of WGPu disposition in commercial reactors48 [53]. In addition, the three BWR at
the Brown's Ferry Site might not be permitted to use WGPu MOX assemblies due to their
status as backup reactors in DOE's tritium production program49 [58]. Assuming NRC
licenses are secured for use of MOX fuel provided by MOX Services in Brown Ferry's
BWR reactors, operation would begin no earlier than 202550 [54]; much later than the
anticipated 2018 disposition start date. TVA's two Sequoya PWR, may also be needed to
aid in the DOE Tritium Readiness Program [59], perhaps complicating the use these
reactors PMDA MOX irradiation.
45 According to NNSA officials, using MOX fuel in five of TVA's reactors could account for up to 85
percent of the MFFF's output. These reactors are the three boiling water reactor units at the Brown's Ferry
Site and the two pressurized water reactors at the Sequoya Site.
46 DOE issued a revised Notice of Intent in September 2010 announcing revision of the scope of the Surplus
Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement and the additional 60-day public
scoping period. To the date of this thesis, no significant progress has been made towards NRC-licensing of
MOX fuel use by TVA.
47 However, even with these capabilities, additional testing for the operation of these MOX fuel assemblies in
BWR will still need to be conducted. Whether or not these additional tests and/or the MFFF's PWR/BWR
fuel assembly conversion timeframe will delay the MOX production schedule is still unclear.
48 Public scoping meetings conducted by TVA show that TVA is currently on track to have enough
information to make an official decision by 2012.
49 These reactors were slated for this program during there initial operations in 1974, 1975, and 1977 for
Units 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
50 The FY2012 NNSA budget request appears to appropriate funding for such activities and testing-
"qualification of MOX fuel designs for pressurized water reactors and boiling water reactors from multiple
fuel suppliers, and execution of fuel supply agreements with TVA and potentially other utilities."
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2.1.3 Energy Northwest
In February 2011, Friends of the Earth obtained DOE documents showing Energy
Northwest was "formally evaluating the potential use of MOX fuel [60]" in its Columbia
Generating Station reactor [61]. Energy Northwest spokesman Michael Paoli commented
that " It's no secret [Energy Northwest] plans to use MOX, we've been looking at MOX
since the mid-1990s [53]." Apparently, the current plan by Energy Northwest and DOE
calls for the irradiation of 10-20 fuel pins (fabricated by Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory5 1) to commence sometime between 2013-15 followed by further testing with 8
LTA around 2019 [62]. However, considering NRC stipulations for LTA use to occur for at
least two successful fuel irradiation cycles, official MOX fuel use would not begin until at
least 2023. Energy Northwest does not plan to incorporate MOX fuel use into its fuel cycle
until the evaluations have proven successful with the "unique characteristics of the
Columbia reactor [53]." In addition to the technical risks, operational changes, licensing
issues, and fuel specifications, Energy Northwest wants the fuel needs to be competitively
priced as well in order to sign on with the program, and refuses to pay for "MOX fuel that
costs more than what [they're] paying now [53]."
2.2 Overview of US Considered Reactor Types
2.2.1 PWR
Typical PWR are composed of a mixture of fuel assemblies (usually LEU) that are
either in their first, second, or third cycle of irradiation. These reactor cores are designed
and shuffled to yield the maximum energy output with minimum fuel costs5 2
PWR implementing MOX fuel require analytical methods capable of accurately
modeling mixed cores53 [50]. Because the control rod worth in MOX fuel assemblies is
smaller in comparison to LEU fuel assemblies (where such differences are considerably
decreased by decreasing moderator temperature, increasing burnup, and increasing rod
internal pressures), core designs need to be adjusted to account for these differences. MOX
fuel, as compared to LEU, tends to burn at higher powers, higher fuel temperatures, and
higher cladding temperatures when assembly burnup is increased. These drawbacks,
coupled with higher transient fission gas releases, further increase the defect probability of
MOX fuel above a certain burnup threshold. Therefore, MOX fuel typically does not reach
the same burnup levels as conventional LEU fuel. Nonetheless, both MOX and LEU fuel
rods of identical designs share the same defect threshold in the case of a potential Loss of
Coolant Accident (LOCA) [63].
51 Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNL), under DOE jurisdiction, will aid Energy Northwest in
evaluating its options for MOX fuel use. Engineers performing analyses for MOX fuel use in this reactor
estimate that up to 30% (229 fuel assemblies) of the BWR's 764 fuel assemblies could potentially be replaced
by MOX fuel.
52 The designs of cores are constrained by many factors (energy requirements, cycle length, individual
assembly and fuel rod peaking limits, reactivity coefficient limits, soluble boron limits, burnup limits, and
maximum enrichment limits) where loading patterns, enrichments, and integral and lumped burnable poison
are all manipulated in order to obtain designs that maximize economic feasibility and practicality while
meeting specified constraints.
53 This is inclusive of the neutron flux gradients between LEU and MOX fuel assemblies.
33
Of the viable reactors for potential WGPu MOX fuel use, the only PWR identified
from the contemporary environment are those provided by TVA. TVA's Sequoya Power
Plant has 2 PWR units built by Westinghouse implementing a wet, ice condenser (PWR-
ICECND) reactor/containment type and a Westinghouse 4 Loop nuclear steam system
supplier and design type. These reactor types have four steam generators, four reactor
coolant pumps, and a pressurizer. Both units can produce a power output of 3.455 GW, and
1.199 GWe. These reactors54 have 193 fuel assemblies arranged inside of their reactor
vessels (with an internal diameter of 173 inches) with the fuel pins in each fuel assembly
arranged in a 17x17 array [64].
2.2.2 BWR
MOX fuel implemented in BWR has little impact on its performance. Because there
are large water gaps between bundles, the thermal flux is able to recover and yields
unchanged control rod worth. For this reason, the core is usually distributed with scattered
MOX fuel assemblies-usually one or two MOX assemblies assigned to each control rod.
Negative moderator temperature and void coefficients have an extreme effect on the cold
shutdown reactivity balances, transients with coolant pressure increases, and moderator
cool-down. Because of the higher concentrations of Pu in WGPu MOX as compared to
typical RGPu MOX, a shift to less negative values of the void coefficient may result.
However, all in all, MOX fuel has a generally small impact on BWR transients and does
not restrict reactor operations under circumstances of licensed MOX ratios for these
reactors [63].
Of the viable reactors for potential WGPu MOX fuel use, the only BWR identified from
the contemporary environment are those provided by TVA and Energy Northwest. The
TVA's Brown's Ferry Power Plant has 3 BWR units built by GE implementing a wet,
MARK 1 reactor/containment type55 and a GE Type 4 nuclear steam system supplier and
design type. All three units can produce a power output of 3.458 GWt with Unit 1 having
an electrical power of 1.125 GWe and Units 2 and 3 of 1.155 GWe 5 . Modern reactors of
this type have around 80057 fuel assemblies (about 4 m long) arranged in the reactor core,
each with approximately 74-100 fuel rods within zirconium alloy cladding [65].
Energy Northwest has recently identified themselves as a viable customer for
WGPu MOX disposition in their Columbia Generating Power Station. The BWR at this
station is built by GE implementing a wet, MARK 2 reactor/containment type and a GE
Type 5 nuclear steam system supplier and design type with a potential power output of
3.486 GWt and 1,190 GWe. This reactor shares the common characteristics of any modern
BWR as previously stated.
54 Reactors of the four-loop design in the US are Braidwood 1 and 2, Byron 1 and 2, Callaway, Comanche
Peak 1 and 2, D. C. Cook 1 and 2, Diablo Canyon 1 and 2, Indian Point 2 and 3, McGuire 1 and 2, Millstone
3, Salem 1 and 2, Seabrook, South Texas Project 1 and 2, Vogtle 1 and 2, Watts Bar 1, and Wolf Creek.
This is similar to the reactor types and styles that were damaged as a result of the Fukushima Daiichi
accident, where both reactors 2 (784 MWe with 548 fuel assemblies in the reactor each with 60 fuel rods) and
3 (460 MWe with 400 fuel assemblies in the reactor each with 60 fuel rods).
56 TVA plans to increase the capacity of all three reactors to 1.280 GWe pending NRC approval.
57 The number of fuel assemblies in a specific reactor is based on considerations of desired reactor power
output, reactor core size and reactor power density.
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2.3 MOX Production and Use in Selected Customer Reactors
All in all, NNSA has had trouble finding and sustaining customers for its WGPu
MOX fuel. Based on publically released statements, the current viable customer reactors
(including design type and license expiration date) are shown in Table 2.1 below.
Table 2.1: Viable Customer Reactors
Plant Name (Unit #) Reactor and Containment Type Operating
(Design Type) License
Expiration Date
Sequoyah Nuclear PWR-ICECND (WEST 4LP) 9/17/2020*
Plant (1)
Sequoyah Nuclear PWR-ICECND (WEST 4LP) 9/15/2021*
Plant (2)
Browns Ferry BWR-MARK 1 (GE 4) 12/20/2033
Nuclear Plant (1)
Browns Ferry BWR-MARK 1 (GE 4) 6/28/2034
Nuclear Plant (2)
Browns Ferry BWR-MARK 1 (GE 4) 7/2/2036
Nuclear Plant (3)
Columbia Generating BWR-MARK 2 (GE 5) 12/20/2023*
Station (2)
Reactor Types provided by the NRC: Appendix A: US Commercial Nuclear Power
Reactors, vol. 22 [66]
*Renewed Operating License has yet to be issued.
The Sequoyah and Browns Ferry Nuclear Plants are licensed to TVA while the Columbia Generating Station
is licensed to Energy Northwest.
Given this current viable customer landscape, unless renewed operating licenses are
issued, half of these reactors will have only begun initial irradiation of WGPu MOX fuel
before being decommissioned 58. Additionally, with the NRC-designated MOX core
concentrations for each reactor being 40%, it is highly unlikely that the US will be
successful in achieving and maintaining the required disposition rate of 1.3 MT/year, as
stated in Article IV of the PMDA. Furthermore, given the diversity of these reactor types 59,
timely delivery of MOX fuel may not be as realistic as initially perceived based on the
original proposal for MFFF fuel assembly production. NNSA claims that the fuel assembly
type conversion factor, the number of customer-specified fuel designs 60, availability of feed
material at the plant, and fuel outage plans, all serve as reasoning for expected low
production rates of MOX fuel at MFFF [53]. Despite the majority of the current customer
landscape consisting of BWR, NNSA has failed to provide an updated estimate and
58 This is assuming a best-case scenario that such reactors will have had successful LTA performance prior to
the official launch of the US plutonium disposition campaign in 2018 as outlined by the PMDA.
59 There are two types of fuel assemblies MFFF can manufacture, BWR and PWR. They have different
configurations, and a one-third change out of conventional for MOX fuel for each type involves a different
number of fuel assemblies, and fuel material, for each reactor type.
60 Customer demand would be determined by core replacement rates for the specified reactor, with none
exceeding 50% of the total number of fuel assemblies.
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forecast than their original proposal of 34 MT of WGPu disposition via 1,700 PWR MOX
fuel assemblies. Given these and the previously discussed issues, maintaining the timeline
forecasted by NNSA in Figure 2.1 is highly unlikely. For these reasons, it will prove
beneficial that NNSA continue to seek more customer reactors.
The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted interviews at utility
companies and found that despite NNSA incentives, as of October 2009, the majority
expressed little or no interest in becoming MOX fuel customers. However, GAO found
through their interviews that what potential utility company customers found to be most
attractive was [45]:
" Knowledge that the MOX program would have consistent congressional
funding,
* timely delivery of MOXfuel,
" timely delivery of a backup supply of uranium fuel,
* a lower WGPu MOXfuel cost compared to standard reactor fuel, and
the opportunity to test MOXfuel in their reactors prior to full-scale use.
Successful disposition of WGPu remains important; it is one of the largest expenses
of the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program as of the NNSA FY2012 budget
request6 l [67]. Although they have already separated themselves from the US plutonium
disposition campaign, the previously identified viable customers, or as we will refer to
them here, the potential customers (See Table 4.2 below), remain the strongest prospective
customer base (given their previous acknowledged interests in the disposition campaign) if
NNSA adapts changes, such as those identified by the GAO. The benefits in the acquisition
of former customers, like these identified in Table 2.2, is a solely PWR customer-base
consistent with MFFF's original production targets and much longer operational lifetimes
given their later license expiration dates.
61 NNSA asked for $645,721,000 for the Fissile Materials Disposition related activities [60% of the funding
($385,172,000) would be allocated to MFFF]. Although the budget request is smaller than previous years
requests (most likely due to FY2011 budget cuts), MOX related expenses still account for a quarter of the
$2.5 billion that NNSA has requested for its Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program.
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Table 2.2: Potential Customer Reactors
Reactor Types provided by
Reactors, vol. 22 [66]
the NRC: Appendix A: US Commercial Nuclear Power
Potential is used rather than viable since, although these customers have identified themselves to no longer be
customers of the WGPu MOX program from a current perspective, given the potential changes as outlined by
GAO, interests could potentially be reignited. For this reason, total neglect should not be given to these
facilities, especially since they once considered supporting US endeavors associated with the WGPu
disposition campaign. The Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee Nuclear Stations are licensed to Duke Energy
Carolinas, LLC and the North Anna Power Station is licensed to Virginia Electric & Power Company.
Although there is no US, let alone global, experience in irradiating WGPu MOX
fuel in the LWR fuel cycle, there is massive experience using RGPu MOX fuel in LWR on
the international landscape. MOX fuel was first irradiated in a reactor in 1963, however, it
was not used commercially until the 1980s. As of 2006, approximately 180 MT of MOX
fuel has been burned in over 30 reactors in Europe alone, and a total of approximately 2000
MT of MOX fuel has been fabricated and loaded into power reactors globally [68].
Currently, MOX is integrated in LWR fuel cycles throughout Europe (Belgium,
Switzerland, Germany, and France) and Japan, where about 50 reactors can use MOX fuel.
These licensed reactors generally use MOX fuel for about 33%62 of their core, however,
some use up to 50%63. More novel advances in LWR designs plan to implement 100%64
62 France seeks to have all of its 900 Mwe and Japan seeks to have all of its reactors implementing a 33%
MOX fuel core in the near future.
63 The operating characteristics of a reactor do not change when implementing a 50% of MOX fuel load,
however, the reactor must be designed or slightly modified (more control rods) to withstand such loads.
Reactors requiring core loads exceeding 50% MOX must be adapted significantly with reactor needs designed
accordingly.
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Plant Name (Unit #) Reactor and Containment Type Operating
(Design Type) License
Expiration Date
Catawba Nuclear PWR-ICECND (WEST 4LP) 12/5/2043
Station (1)
Catawba Nuclear PWR-ICECND (WEST 4LP) 12/5/2043
Station (2)
McGuire Nuclear PWR-DRYAMB (WEST 4LP) 6/12/2041
Station (1)
McGuire Nuclear PWR-DRYAMB (WEST 4LP) 3/3/2043
Station (2)
Oconee Nuclear PWR-DRYAMB (B&W LLP) 2/6/2033
Station (1)
Oconee Nuclear PWR-DRYAMB (B&W LLP) 10/6/2033
Station (2)
Oconee Nuclear PWR-DRYAMB (B&W LLP) 7/19/2034
Station (3)
North Anna Power PWR-DRYSUB (WEST 3LP) 8/21/2040
Station (1)
North Anna Power PWR-DRYSUB (WEST 3LP) 2/6/2033
Station (2)
MOX fuel cores. However, there are also interests for the potential design adaptations for
100% MOX cores in existing LWR, with feasibility studies for BWR6 s [63, 69] and PWR
that have determined core designs capable of successfully implementing 100% MOX core
loads while meeting licensing requirements; allowing for increased amounts of irradiated
plutonium at a reduced level of heterogeneity of the core. The experience gained from core
loadings of contemporary levels as well as the knowledge of MOX impacts on neutronic
design and safety aspects, confirms that modem design codes can implement current
plutonium levels and offers basis for even higher plutonium concentrations and increased
discharge bumups.
International MOX use in LWR supports NRC's contention that MOX fuel could be
used in domestic LWR. The NRC claims that since domestic reactors were designed to use
RGPu MOX, the incorporation of WGPu MOX fuel should pose no threat. Upon the
successful operation of LTA in the reactor for "at least two operating cycles [46]," and
verifying the ability of the models to predict fuel performance, reactor licensees would be
allowed to implement a maximum MOX fuel core of 40%66 [70, 71].
64 Japan plans to develop a 1383 MWe reactor with a complete fuel loading of MOX at their Ohma plant in
late 2014, with other advanced LWR like the EPR or AP1000 able to accept complete fuel loadings of MOX
if required) soon to follow.
5 An ABWR to be constructed in Japan will be the first plant with an in-built 100% MOX core capability.
66 Although no WGPu core concentrations have been formally specified by any of the customer reactors,
some knowledge can be gained regarding the expected MOX concentrations in PWR and BWR from initial
estimates provided by current and former customers. During Duke's interest in WGPu MOX fuel, experts
estimated that up to 40% of the core would need o be replaced during an outage with WGPu MOX fuel. PNL
engineers and evaluators working with Energy Northwest estimate that up to 30% of the reactor can be
comprised of WGPu MOX fuel.
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Chapter 3: Verification Under a Multilateral Regime
The PMDA's transparency and monitoring provisions are the most extensive and
informative official groundwork available. They illustrate the complexity and sensitivity of
transparency and monitoring procedures for weapons-grade material from the perspective
of these leviathan nuclear weapon states. CISAC acknowledges key attributes to note in the
passages of this agreement are: (a) the extensive attention given to how monitoring can be
accomplished while protecting information about the composition of each country's WGPu
(which remains classified to varying degrees on both sides) and (b) the delicate and
ambiguous interplay of bilateral versus multilateral (IAEA) responsibilities and privileges
in the verification process-leaving unresolved the question of what the IAEA role actually
will be [72].
Although the IAEA's primary role, as designated by the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty (NPT), is the verification of the non-proliferation commitments of all NPT
signatories, Article III.A.5 67 of the treaty outlines the potential for the agency to play a role
in assisting signatories in the verification of nuclear disarmament. This role is consistent
with the expectations of the agency outlined in the amended PMDA.
Ensuring that the disposition of 68 MT of WGPu and beyond can be verified in an
effective and unbiased manner will be essential in order to convince the international
community that this material will remain "permanently" outside the realm of defense
programs; a task that may only be achieved through verification procedures managed under
IAEA inspection and monitoring. Despite the promising nature of IAEA verification
involvement, involving NNWS-which logically applies to international organizations like
the IAEA which is comprised of personnel from both NWS and NNWS-in dismantlement
verification is especially problematic as it risks breaching the NPT's ban on the sharing
and/or transfer of proliferative material between NWS and NNWS [73].
Nonetheless, multilateral verification arrangements are necessary to ensure credible,
unbiased verification that: (1) the material subject to disposition was weapon grade, (2)
disposition actually took place, and (3) the material will not be fabricated into a weapon(s).
Although virtually no progress has been made in negotiating specifics of such monitoring
arrangements, based on the it's past experience with the verification of weaponization
activities68 , research for disarmament verification, and actual disarmament verification (in
South Africa in the 1990s) [73], the IAEA is well-equipped to engage with verification
activities beyond safeguards and non-proliferation [74]. It is clear that further efforts to
develop and clarify the legal and political aspects of any such 'other' activities, like
disarmament, are needed if a verification regime of this capacity is to fall within its
jurisdiction.
In this chapter, we perform a case analysis on relevant multilateral verification
endeavors like the Trilateral and UK-Norway Initiatives in an attempt to gain insight
regarding successful implementation of multilateral verification arrangements in the
PMDA.
67 Allows the IAEA the right to apply safeguards "to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the
request of a state, to any of that state's activities in the field of atomic energy."
68 Relevant to disarmament in terms of the secrecy concerns.
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3.1 The Trilateral Initiative
In the efforts of designing a successful verification regime for WGPu disposition,
knowledge can be gained from the experience of the Trilateral Initiative. The intent of this
initiative was to broaden the scope of IAEA monitoring to include classified items such as
WGPu and HEU (acquired from nuclear warheads, warhead components, pits, or
secondaries) in a manner that ensured permanent safeguarding of these items69 . The US and
Russia needed a unique system, different from the IAEA safeguards system which was
insufficient for monitoring military nuclear materials and facilities; a framework which not
only ensured US and Russian obligations under Article 170 of the NPT [75] but also
shielded classified information. As noted in the Initiative's experience, although a system
was proposed, designing such a system had proven to be quite difficult because of the clear
need to restrict IAEA's access to information, in order to prevent the dissemination of
nuclear secrets [2].
Toward the concluding exercises of the Initiative, all parties determined that new
agreements were needed in order to bring this newly proposed verification system into
force with the IAEA voluntary offer safeguards agreements between the Russia and the US
Some of the main issues of concern noted regarding any potential multilateral verification
system of this kind were:
(1) Insufficient resource allocation to such a system coupled with the
system's inconsistencies with obligatory verification requirements would
limit the prospects of voluntary offer agreements;
(2) Such a system would require US and Russian declarations of classified
WGPu submitted to the regime despite compromising not only their
obligations to Article I of the NPT, but also their respective national laws
associated with declarations of classified materials; and
(3) Because of the classified/state-secret nature of the submitted material,
limited measurements and analyses could only be performed; significantly
differing from typical IAEA safeguard procedures that allow for unrestricted
measurements and analyses of samples' nuclear characteristics in order to
attain the highest standards of precision and accuracy [76].
3.1.1 Considered Verification Objectives
In construing the scope of the verification procedures to be implanted under the
proposed regime for the Trilateral Initiative and in an endeavor to increase global
confidence of successful disarmament and disposition, four verification scenarios were
69 In 1993, 10 MT of HEU and 2 MT of plutonium were submitted to voluntary IAEA safeguards by the US
under the condition that they could be withdrawn at will.
70 Essentially prohibits NWS signatories to the NPT from assisting, encouraging, or inducing any NNWS to
manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons; an obligation which is inclusive in IAEA operation or any other
multilateral entity. This requirement is also codified in the US Atomic Energy Act.
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investigated and ranked in order of intrusiveness (as identified by Shea [2]):
Level 1: Initiative is to only accept unclassified materials; successfully
preventing reuse of these selected materials;
Level 2: Initiative is to accept classified forms of fissile material without
attempting to verify the origin of the materials (nuclear warhead, specified
weapons components, etc.);
Level 3: Initiative is to verify the origin (nuclear warhead, specified
weapons components, etc.) of presented classified materials including
specific model identifications;
Level 4: Initiative is to begin monitoring at the site of the state's weapons
dismantlement program (or subsequent stages) in order to attest to the
validity of warhead removal from delivery systems.
A pictorial representation of these verification scenarios as they fit within
the disarmament procedure can be seen below in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Multilevel Verification Levels for Dismantlement and Disposition Process
Courtesy of Verified Warhead Dismantlement: Past, Present, Future [77, 78]
NOTE: DNLEU alludes to depleted, natural, low-enriched uranium.
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Although never officially implemented and posing significant challenges, the
participants involved in the Initiative selected Level 2 as the most practical and achievable.
Level 1, it was argued, would not have required a new framework from contemporary
procedures and would have involved significant delays costs as classified materials were
converted to unclassified forms. Levels 3 and 4 were synonymous with previously
conceived verification scenarios proven unsuccessful in the mid-1990s by the DOE
Dismantlement Study Group through Storage Monitoring and Chain-of-Custody
techniques7 1 , which employed continuous monitoring of the existence or presence of items
deemed accountable under specified treaties.
This Storage Monitoring and Chain-of-Custody combined system, deemed "Option
1" by the study group, was identified as the most effective and lowest cost option (through
an evaluation procedure consisting of seven criteria 7 2) with prospects of becoming
operational in a year's time and an expected routine cost of $120,000. The level of
intrusiveness of this option depends on the measurement system(s) instituted and
restrictions of measurement information provided to the inspectors. The primary target was
inspectors' ability observe the actual dismantlement process either remotely or directly [77,
79]. Ultimately, these levels proved to be unpractical because of acknowledged and
significant security concerns and challenges that would arise due to the need for
authentication of warhead templates that could be used by the IAEA [78].
The steps required in Level 2 for the verified conversion of fissile materials from
classified to unclassified forms to eventual disposition was given significant consideration.
IAEA monitoring would begin with the arrival of classified material at the entry point of a
conversion facility and would then measure all fissile material containers leaving the
conversion facility using normal IAEA safeguards procedures. Seals would then be placed
on containers prior to their storage or transport to fuel processing facilities. Initiative
participants felt that if such a scheme were to work successfully, conversion facilities in
which IAEA verification took place would need to be based on standard architectural plans.
However, no further discussion of such plans took place.
In regards to the CoK challenges associated with the chain-of-custody problem,
Initiative participants perceived the ideal solution to be implementing unattended
monitoring of all items en-route to storage. However, agreement was only reached on the
verification of the stored inventory according to a sampling plan, making assumptions on
what constituted a 'strategic change' in the inventory. The outcome became known as the
"one percent solution7 3 [77]."
71 A concept determined by the Dismantlement Study Group, established by the DOE, which was composed
of technical experts from its own Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, the Office of Defense
Programs, the Office of Security Affairs, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the Los
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), the Sandia
National Laboratories (SNL), the Pantex plant, and Y-12.
72 These criteria were: level of confidence; negotiability (or likely acceptability to the Russians); inadvertent
loss of classified information; impact on normal plant operations; amount of preparation needed; cost to
prepare and host the initial inspection; and routine cost of hosting each inspection thereafter.
73 A break-out involving on the order of one per cent of the monitored inventory could portend a strategic
change. This solution was never formally adopted, but served as the de-facto reference for determining the
subsequent sample plan.
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3.1.2 Verification Techniques and Associated Technologies
The Trilateral Initiative developed the "template" method and the "attribute"
method for identifying and confirming the authenticity of a nuclear weapon 7 4 . The template
method proposed identifying a nuclear weapon or weapon component by matching certain
characteristics (i.e. radiation signatures) to the characteristics of a weapon or component
that is known or believed to be authentic. It was perceived that for potential treaty
applications, the authorization of reference signatures coupled with the storage and
retrieval of templates would pose a difficulty. The attribute method, on the other hand,
sought to employ a designated set of characteristic requirements (i.e. features of radiation
signatures) to identify the authenticity of nuclear weapons and/or components. Propositions
for a system employing a combination of the strengths of template and attribute methods
have proven to be the best strategy, one where, as identified in Arms Control and
Nonproliferation Technologies: Technology R&D for Arms Control "data gathered for a
template, for example, could be analyzed to determine whether the object contains certain
general characteristics or attributes.. .such as the presence of a certain minimum amount of
weapon-grade plutonium metal [80]." Although these methods were considered for
purposes of the Initiative's Level 4 verification procedure (which was not considered to be
the practical and achievable by Initiative participants) with prospects for the inclusion of
information barriers75, we consider them here because many of the technologies explored in
this endeavor correlate with the confirmation of the 2 4 0 Pu/2 39Pu ratio76 in the conversion
product as outlined in the PMDA:
The monitoring Party shall have the right to confirm the mass and relevant
isotopic composition of the conversion product (even if it contains United States
"sensitive" information or Russian Federation "konfidentsial'naya"
information), using agreed measurement procedures, without the application of
"yes/no" techniques or information barriers.
74 During the Initiative, the US and Russian nuclear weapon laboratories performed considerable
collaborative work to develop both approaches for arms control purposes and have produced several
prototype systems to identify both nuclear weapons and weapon components. Both approaches require
measuring an agreed set of characteristics. Most of the template and attribute systems that have been
developed use measurements of the radiation (gamma rays and neutrons) emitted during the natural
radioactive decay of plutonium and uranium isotopes.
75 An information barrier, as considered by the Initiative, would contain the detector system, computer
system, and template storage, so to impede the leakage of sensitive data, transmission of electronic signals, or
other surreptitious access to the sensitive data contained inside the verification technology. An example of
such a system would be one which produces a "yes or no" response or "green or red" light if an object
matches or doesn't match the specified template or attributes of the comparable object within specified
tolerances, respectively. Countries were to build the systems used to inspect their own weapons, so they could
be sure there were no hidden transmitters or storage devices or intentional flaws in the information barrier.
Because information barriers prevents access to the data and the analysis upon which the results of an
inspection are based, the inspecting party must authenticate the system.
76 As stated in the PMDA, "The monitoring Party shall be allowed to confirm, using an agreed method, that
the Pu-240/Pu-239 ratio of the conversion product is no greater than 0.10. Confirmation of this ratio shall
occur using agreed methods based on measurement of the isotopic composition of the conversion product
upon its receipt at a fuel fabrication facility."
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For purposes of this thesis however, we focus on the potential applications of
antineutrino detection in confirming the mass and isotopic composition of the conversion
product, which do not include information barriers. The elimination of the prospects of
augmenting verification technologies with information barriers from the Trilateral Initiative
to the PMDA may have proven extremely beneficial in that authenticating that such an
information system will produce accurate results of the inspected entities without any
clandestine or concealed features that could prevent, interfere, or bypass proper analysis by
the verification technology was a difficult, if not impossible, feat.
3.1.3 Challenges Faced and Implementation Failures
As noted, Article I of the NPT provided the greatest hindrance to the development
of a verification regime for the disposition of surplus WGPu under the PMDA. Although
these challenges are perplexing, they were not solely faced by the Trilateral Initiative but
are common to many potential arms control and arms reduction treaties and agreements 77
[80].
Furthermore, many additional reasons were acknowledged for the Initiative's
failure into being brought into force. One of the prime reasons was the US desire for Russia
to submit roughly the same amount of WGPu in roughly the same forms as the US78 . A
second reason was the lack of authorization gained within each of the legislative processes
of the US and Russia79 [2].
A decision of whom should be the creator of verification technology augmented
with information barriers, the inspector or the inspected state, was also undetermined. The
inspected-state argument contends that it should develop its own systems for weapons or
weapons materials inspection; therefore, confidence would be established that the
information wouldn't be flawed or tampered with [81]. However, this poses a one-sided
perspective in favor of the inspected state. In order to develop confidence for the inspector,
and the world audience at large, it was argued that the inspected party should, upon
decision of the design of the verification technology to be used, build multiple identical
units that could be examined by the inspecting party (including removal of selected
components for testing). Upon authentication by the inspecting party, "tamper-revealing
seals" could potentially be placed onto prime locations-preventing any and all attempts at
altering or modifying the technology [81]. However, this argument posed to be
unconvincing by the inspected NWS.
These include future agreements involving transparency in warhead dismantlement procedures, US
inspections of the Russian Mayak Fissile Materials Storage Facility, and, of course, plutonium management
and disposition within the US and Russia as designated under the PMDA.
78 The US wanted all WGPu under direct verification, whereas Russia wanted to blend/melt their pits into
two kilogram spheres; leading to dissension amongst the two states and requiring continual IAEA intrusion
for the maintenance of the pace of the development of activities.
79 Another sticking point was a lack of authorization. Ambassador Mikhail Ryzhov, Russia's former IAEA
Governor, attempted to gain Moscow's approval to engage in negotiations of a Trilateral Initiative Agreement
with the IAEA, in which he failed. With new administrations in the US and Russia at this time, both holding
different agendas and priorities than their predecessors, interest in the Initiative waned, where the focus was
directed toward the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement.
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3.1.4 Accomplishments
The Trilateral Initiative served as the first, official endeavor for the development of
international verification procedures for WGPu disarmament and disposition. The yielded
documents from the initiative were done "in confidence," with a limited distribution
network to key officials only involved in the process. Although nearly a decade has passed
since the conclusion of the initiative, little information has been released to the public,
mostly focusing on the technical aspects of the initiative, which focused on authentication,
inventory monitoring, and verification of the conversion of classified fissile material to
unclassified forms.
All in all, the accomplishments and potential future steps of the initiative can be
summarized from the following excerpts of the 2002 Final Report of the Joint Working
Group to the Trilateral Initiative [2]:
Excerpt 1: "Over the course of six years, the Joint Working Group
addressed the technical, legal and financial issues associated with
implementing IAEA verification of weapon-origin and other fissile material
released from defense programs and can now recommend the successful
completion of the original task. The enabling technologies developed under
the Initiative could be employed by the IAEA on any form of plutonium in
nuclear facilities, without revealing nuclear weapons information. The
Working Group found no technical problem that would prevent the IAEA
from undertaking a verification mission in relation to such fissile materials
released from defense programs, and believes that many of the technical
approaches could have broader applicability to other forms of fissile
materials encountered in conjunction with nuclear arms reductions."
Excerpt 2: "On the basis of the technical, legal and financial work
completed, the Joint Working Group believes that each State may now
proceed to negotiate a verification agreement with the IAEA in accordance
with its national programs for managing weapon-origin and other fissile
material released from its defense programs. Further work remains to
prepare for such inspections, and the Joint Working Group recommends
that technical work continue in relation to inspection procedures and
authentication and certification methods applicable to possible future IAEA
verification of weapon-originfissile material with classified properties."
Although not likely, given the event that the US and Russia decided to transition
into a bilateral agreement under the stipulations of the PMDA, the IAEA or future
verification regime could still play an integral role in the verification procedures. This is
based on the IAEA's role to actively gather evidence regarding weaponization. In addition,
80 It would have been possible in 2002 for the Russian Federation and/or the United States to conclude
separate verification agreements based upon the Model Verification Agreement of November 2001. The
details of implementation would still require further work to resolve but, from a legal perspective, the Model
Verification Agreement was essentially finished and the Trilateral Initiative has been ready for
implementation since September of 2002. As indicated in Excerpt 1, all the technical work focused on
verifying plutonium in classified components.
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the IAEA may be given or even unintentionally 'come across' evidence arguing
development of a nuclear weapon(s). Note in Article VIII.A of the NPT, member states are
allowed to provide the IAEA with information that they deem potentially beneficial to the
IAEA 1 .
At the conclusion of the Initiative, many important questions still remain
unanswered-from both a technical and political perspective. These included: How will
one (i.e. inspector) authenticate that the equipment he/she is to use has not previously been
tampered/altered with prior to its implementation? In addition, if an anomaly is detected,
how would it be resolved and during this resolution phase, what would be the status of the
remaining items?
Although no solutions were inherently identified for the latter question, the
Working Group identified two potential solutions for the former question: (1) an equipment
system produced by the IAEA and reviewed by the US and Russia 8 2 or (2) multiple
equipment systems produced individually by the US and Russia and reviewed by the
IAEA. Solution 2 was deemed to be the more reliable solution by the Group [2] and
apparently consistent with what is transpiring with the research associated within this thesis
as well as beyond.
3.2 UK-Norway Initiative
Since the establishment of the NPT, there has been deep division between NWS and
NNWS; a division which resulted in the failure of an adoption for a final outcome of an
agreed upon document at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. This conference revealed that
this divide must be conquered in order to make the NPT truly viable in accomplishing its
goals, especially in realizing its third pillar8 3 of nuclear disarmament [82, 83]. In order to
tackle this divide, the United Kingdom and Norway constructed the UK-Norway
Initiative8 4 which was the first of its kind to engage a NWS (the UK), a NNWS (Norway),
and the IAEA in a joint-endeavor toward nuclear dismantlement verification [77, 84, 85].
Although the UK-Norway Initiative had a distinct focus on more upstream
verification metrics comparable to the Trilateral Initiative's Level 3 or 4 verification
procedures-which, of course, is much further up the verification procedural chain than the
prospects of aid gained from antineutrino detection-the UK-Norway Initiative's
investment in acknowledging NNWS as a vital stakeholder and potential inspector in the
disarmament process may provide key insight in regards to the contention associated with
81 Note that contemporary IAEA practices to search for clandestine fuel cycle activities could potentially
result in evidence regarding the nuclear weapon development activities, even if the IAEA is not specifically
performing them for this purpose.
82 One problem with this approach, however, was that any such review might take as long as 18 months.
83 Experts in the field argue that the goals outlined in the NPT are based on the "three main pillars system"
which, in descending order of importance, are: (1) nonproliferation, (2) peaceful use of nuclear technology,
(3) nuclear disarmament. Although an implicit balance is expected for all three of these goals within the
treaty, perusal of the treaty reveals that there is an extreme unbalance amongst all three pillars further
perpetuated by the title of the treaty which has an overwhelming focus on the prevention of nuclear
proliferation.
84 From this initiative, a Norwegian study group was established to explore the technical basis for
disarmament and nonproliferation and to identify areas where nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states
could collaborate to enhance the goals of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.
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IAEA involvement in the PMDA disposition process due to its potential legal definition as
a NNWS associated with its composition of personnel from both NWS and NNWS as
discussed earlier.
3.2.1 An Additional Stakeholder in the Disarmament Process: NNWS
Through their collaborations under the umbrella of this Initiative, two discussion
papers were published on the perspectives of disarmament verification from both NNWS
and NWS, respectively [84, 85]. Discussion Paper 2 [84] acknowledges the problem that
"[verification technologies] has been largely restricted to government scientists in NWS."
Furthermore, Norway argued that it is "extremely important to involve NNWS in the
development of information barrier technology at an early stage." Even if and when a
technology had been deemed useful and effective, a lack of trust in its actual verification
activities may spur simply because of the lack of input from the NNWS community.
Nonetheless, the peer group also posed questions, which they felt should be further
clarified in future discussions prior to initial trials for dismantlement. These included:
What size of defect must the authentication process be able to detect?
How can information relevant to authentication but obtained from other
sources (e.g. by ensuring CoK) be used in the verification process?
Can a necessary degree of assurance be provided without recourse to 'high
tech' information barrier systems?
Although historically NWS have insisted that they must be the sole developers and
manufacturers of verification equipment that is to be used on their weapons, the UK-
Norway Initiative sought in real-time the places where a NNWS can and should be
involved in the selection of verification methodologies/technologies already at hand as well
as aiding in the development of verification methodologies/technologies not yet conceived
that are much needed in order to combat specified verification goals. Through the Initiative,
the UK sought to enlighten the NNWS community on the complexities involved in a
nuclear weapons disarmament process [77, 84].
Although nuclear disarmament can only be accomplished by states with nuclear
arms, consistent with the goals of nuclear disarmament under the NPT, it should be done so
in a method that establishes assurance amongst its NPT NNWS signatories. The research
being performed on the application of antineutrino detection for safeguard purposes
demonstrates the capabilities and benefits of NWS and NNWS jointly collaborating to
enhance the verification of peaceful nuclear activities within nuclear reactors and offers
prospects in extreme detection capability, CoK maintenance, and assurance without
information barriers. Since WGPu disposition, as outlined in the PMDA, will take place
through irradiation at commercial reactors during the disposition cycle, this poses a
significant location for verification as well as joint research collaborations for both NWS
and NNWS to determine optimal solutions for this endeavor. As outlined within the IAEA
Final Report: Focused Workshop on Antineutrino Detection for Safeguards Applications
[3], the IAEA, in collaboration with expert personnel from both NWS and NNWS, outlined
"applicable inspection needs" and the usefulness/effectiveness of antineutrino
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detection/monitoring in meeting these needs8 5. There have already been completed
independent demonstrations depicting the application of antineutrino detection through the
Rovno Project, SONGS1 Project, and KASKA Prototype in Russia, the US, and Japan,
respectively. Future demonstrations are actively being sought to provide further
information of the effectiveness of antineutrino detection for safeguards purposes in France
(Nucifer Project), Brazil (Angra Project), the US (SONGS2, SONGS3, and EARTH
Projects), and Russia (DANSS Project) 8 6 . Although still relatively in its infancy, it was
concluded that "antineutrino detectors have unique abilities to non-intrusively monitor
reactor operational status, power and fissile content in near real-time, from outside
containment" with completed demonstrations showing "robust, long-term
measurements.. .at operating power reactors [3]."
3.2.2 The Inspector Challenge
The UK-Norway Initiative focused on on-site inspections simulations, which,
although represents a prime component of any verification regime and successfully
provided much knowledge on this concept that had not previously been encountered by
other initiatives and efforts, it failed at accomplishing other key traits of the verification
process. For example, the link between the information barrier and detector technology"7
were not acknowledged. In addition, although discussed at several meetings, the Initiative
failed to sufficiently acknowledge issues associated with equipment authentication-an
issue which was also not resolved during Field Test 3488 [86] or the Trilateral Initiative.
How is the inspecting party to know that a given verification technology has not been
altered or manipulated prior to its use? However, as already stated, some experts reiterate
the notion that the inspected party should "produce the [verification] equipment in multiple
85 There was particular focus on the implementation of safeguards for reactor facilities. Interesting scenarios
for monitoring and implementation already posed include power and fissile inventory monitoring at both
power and research reactors, providing demonstrations for these scenarios as well as expected timelines for
completion and relative costs for planned demonstrations of antineutrino capabilities at these scenarios.
86 Countries currently researching the application of antineutrino detection for power reactor monitoring of
fissile content (specifically for MOX fuel cycles and WGPu disposition) are the US, Brazil, and France.
These detectors, which will need to implement state-of-the-art neutrino detection capabilities, will seek to
provide accurate measurements of the fissile content with neutrino rate measurements and independent power
measurements.
87 In particular, the UK-Norway Information barrier concept did not address the sensitive link between the
barrier and the sensor itself. It is generally assumed that the detector will always provide a complete picture,
which poses a nonproliferation risk, in that the full picture can provide pathways for reverse-engineering of
weapons through alteration of the detector so that information can be attained prior to being protected and
disguised by information barrier software.
88 In the summer and fall of 1967, the US conducted an investigation designated as Field Test 34 based on a
theoretical 'basic concept' of demonstrated destruction involving three principal stages: (1) weapon
introduction; (2) weapon disassembly; and (3) component disposition. The Test involved 40 nuclear weapons
scheduled for normal retirement as well as 32 fakes. Inspection teams, of different sizes levels of access (and
including members of the Soviet Union), monitored the destruction of the weapons presented to them and
assayed the fissile material contained therein. Evidence was then gathered relating to the amount of classified
information revealed and the credibility of the dismantlement process. Toward the conclusion of the Test, it
was noted that the disposition of fissile materials presented "a number of potential difficulties" because it
"offered subtle possibilities for the disclosure of sensitive information," despite prime opportunities to assure
inspectors that weapons are indeed being destroyed.
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copies [where] the inspector can then take a sample away for review." Similar to the
Trilateral Initiative, sufficient attention was not yielded to the establishment and
maintenance of a credible and robust chain of custody 89. Although an extremely
challenging problem, it is not a irresolvable one, and can be potentially resolved through
further research of technologies and methodologies already developed.
Once again, as acknowledged in similar inspection exercises, a balance must be
identified between the inspecting party's need or access and the inspected party's need for
confidentiality. The nonproliferation risks associated with the process of verification
disarmament could be potentially large dependent on the access given90 ; a danger that
needs to be fully addressed, especially in instances involving NNWS, given the
nonproliferation obligations of NWS as outlined in the NPT. However, NWS will need to
accept some level of intrusiveness in order to establish a culture of risk management with
sensitive information in order to enhance the global nuclear disarmament goals. The UK-
Norway Initiative, in addition to the Trilateral Initiative, have found that considerable
access can be given to an inspecting party while simultaneously protecting classified
information of the inspected party. For purposes of this thesis, we argue that antineutrino
detection can provide considerable access and insight to the NNWS audience through joint
collaborations in the technologies development and operation as well as simultaneously
protecting the classified nature of US and Russian WGPu due to its placement further down
the verification process. All in all, it must be acknowledged that the inspecting and
inspected parties have "competing interests," they both share common priorities in
demonstrating compliance and developing a successful verification regime [77]. Future
exercises, especially between IAEA and the US and Russia in regards to the PMDA, should
seek to identify the "optimal intersection" between the inspector's demand for information
and the inspected party's willingness to supply. As the former UK Minister of Defense Des
Browne said, "[it is] of paramount importance that verification techniques are developed
which enable us all-nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states-to have
confidence that when a state says it has fully and irrevocably dismantled a nuclear warhead,
we all can be assured it is telling the truth [87]."
3.3 Influence on the PMDA and Beyond
The PMDA acknowledges that the IAEA should be the verifier for WGPu
disposition between the US and Russia, where the US and Russia are expected to begin
"early consultations" with the IAEA in order to develop such verification procedures. As
acknowledged in the predecessor to the PMDA, the Trilateral Initiative determined that
although the safeguards and verification of unclassified forms of plutonium should mirror
89 The chain of custody "demonstrates that an unaltered or uninterrupted custody or control of an item has
been maintained by the owner or inspector, depending on the monitoring protocol, that provides confidence
that deceptions have not been introduced." The chain begins with entry of the warhead into the dismantlement
facility and ends with its placement in an extracted pit within a monitored storage facility, as identified by the
UK-Norway Initiative. For applications to the PMDA in the US, this should extend all the way through until
the WGPu has achieved the spent fuel standard.
90 Chillingly, the UK Study Series acknowledge that it is possible to reverse engineer design information
from raw radiometric data. Field Test 34 showed that some design secrets were exposed even at the lowest
access levels and the Trilateral Initiative essentially discovered that the proliferation/security risks associated
with monitoring arms reductions were "too high for comfort."
49
contemporary safeguards for NNWS, due to the siting of such unclassified forms within US
and Russian nuclear weapons complexes, site security restrictions may pose a major hurdle
for normal safeguards implementation [76].
Based on the notions learned from previous endeavors to determine verification
procedures as well as the early negotiations surrounding the PMDA, it is important to
reiterate the significance of coordination amongst the verification technologies identified
by the US and Russia. The US has initiated unilateral openness initiatives striving to
increase transparency of its nuclear activities91 . Informal international cooperation between
the US and Russia has also arisen with lab-to-lab cooperation on scientific projects and
bilateral cooperation for the acquisition and accounting of nuclear materials. In addition,
open visits between both countries to their respective nuclear sites have aided in improving
understanding of one another's nuclear activities. Although further nuclear transparency is
still sought from both countries, intense opposition from each country's respective nuclear
security bureaucracies often counters it. Nonetheless, in recent history both countries have
sought to limit the access to potentially sensitive site and information as Russian security
services reassert their control and US security services retrench and reclassify previously
open materials in response to the September 1 th attacks.
Nonetheless, international cooperation between both countries, as well as partners
beyond, will be essential to successfully verifying nuclear weapons disarmament and
disposition. It has been argued that transparency between the US and Russia serve as the
"greatest obstacle" in strengthening cooperation between both countries and one of the
"principal barriers to reducing the danger that [nuclear explosive materials] will fall into
the hands of terrorists, agents of proliferant states, or black marketers who would sell to
either [88, 89]." In order to combat this potential danger, agreements regarding the
appropriate balance between secrecy and openness of information relating to each nation's
respective national security interests should be determined and enforced9 . The reciprocity
associated with potential declarations of information from one party in order to gain
information from the other party may have an ultimate beneficial effect in establishing
clear and agreed upon measures for better transparency. Nonetheless, in defining
information that should be revealed to global partners in the endeavor of weapons
disposition, it is important to be conscience of the advantages and disadvantages of
information exchanges whether it be bilaterally between the US and Russia, multilaterally
with the IAEA, amongst other NWS, amongst all NPT parties, or the public in general.
Lab-to-lab cooperation will indeed be an important step in establishing the future
verification technologies that are credible, legitimate, and salient to the US and Russia. In
1994, US and Russian laboratories began joint endeavors to develop and demonstrate
transparency technologies 93 ; where laboratory exports began working directly together
demonstrating successful technologies and promoting government-to-government
91 This includes declassification of radiation experiments on humans, US nuclear tests, as well as open visits
to nuclear facilities to the public and even Russian representatives. Although the declassified information is
not complete, the nuclear-related information released by Russia is not comparable (although significantly
more transparency than the Soviet Union era).
92 This includes access provided to each nation's facilities
93 An initial endeavor was the joint effort for remote monitoring technologies, where video cameras used to
monitor material storage (minimizing the on-site inspection requirements) were installed to monitor HEU at
the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow, and at Argonne National Laboratory-West in Idaho, with the images and
data uplinked via satellite.
50
agreements while simultaneously establishing trust and developing a constituency to
expand similar programming [90]. Since then, joint research endeavors continue with
collaborative projects on a range of technologies applicable to confirming warhead
dismantlement without revealing sensitive information9 4 (and to other transparency and
monitoring tasks) and detection of explosives and of nuclear materials for counterterrorism
purposes [91].
With the PMDA serving as one of the introductory steps towards global zero, it is
necessary to reiterate that the world audience is and will be an extremely important
stakeholder in proving the verification of plutonium disposition in both countries.
Verification technologies upstream, closer towards the weapons dismantlement processes,
are difficult to include the parties of the global audience due to confidentiality issues
regarding NWS defensive strategies as well as stipulations regarding communication
between NWS and NNWS as outlined in the NPT. Nonetheless, scientific collaboration
between NWS and NNWS should continue to be both a sensible and achievable goal. Cliff
et al. note that benefits are accomplished for all included stakeholders of this global issue.
NWS laboratories are able to escape the "intellectual confines of their classified
environment [77]," while on the other hand, NNWS are allowed to "grasp the many
intellectual and practical problems [77]" that NWS face. These benefits essentially spill
over into the global audience by allowing "the public to gain some idea of the many
scientific, technical and procedural steps, and obstacles, that lie ahead [77]."
Ultimately, establishing world confidence of the irreversibility of US and Russian
nuclear weapons is essential as a first-step towards global nuclear disarmament; one that
will benefit from a multilateral regime rather than simply a bilateral one. Successful
reductions of the two largest weapons stockpiles would potentially spur weapons
reductions initiatives of other NWS. In order to be prepared for such a future, it is vital that
an international monitoring operation with systematic mechanisms be already established
to take on these potentially large future challenges; one that should fall within the
jurisdiction of the IAEA (based on its nature, experience, credibility, and capabilities)
rather than some new multilateral verification institution. In order for the IAEA to take on
such a role, it would need to be strengthened in the area of weapons-grade material
safeguarding 5 requiring increased funding substantiated not just by the US and Russia, but
all IAEA member states interested in verified weapons disarmament and disposition (which
should be independent of current identified interests within the IAEA budget).
94 These included approaches implementing template and attribute procedures to confirm the presence of
nuclear warheads or specified nuclear material in containers.
95 The IAEA's responsibilities in recent decades have begun expanding into safeguards for civil nuclear
material and detection of clandestine nuclear weapon programs.
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Chapter 4: Safeguards Regime in the US
4.1 U.S-IAEA Safeguards Agreement
In 1967, during preliminary NPT negotiations, Japan and European NNWS opposed
the NPT provision that requires only NNWS signatories to the Treaty to accept IAEA
safeguards in all of their peaceful nuclear activities. In an effort to break that impasse and
allay the concerns embodied in the impasse, President Johnson stated that the US was not
asking any country to accept safeguards that the US was unwilling to accept and that,
"when such safeguards are applied under the Treaty, the United States will permit the
International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the
United States--excluding only those with direct national security significance [92]."
The result of this endeavor was the US-IAEA Safeguards Agreement 6 which is a
voluntary agreement between the US and IAEA for the application of international
safeguards on US nuclear material. Under the agreement, the US is expected to provide
data on declared nuclear material to the IAEA, which determines whether or not the nuclear
material has been diverted for weapons development [93]. The US currently has 265
facilities (of which approximately 240 are NRC licensees) which are eligible for selection
of IAEA inspection based upon a need to verify information provided by the licensee [94].
This flexible agreement, upon its conception, is expected to continue to be a crucial
agreement for shaping US nonproliferation and arms control policy throughout the next
century, especially with regards to the multilateral verification regime expected to fall
under the PMDA [92]. The agreement was further strengthened by the Additional Protocol
in 1998, which called for strengthened safeguards on US nuclear material and expanded
access rights of selected facilities by the IAEA [94]. The US Additional Protocol is based
on the Model Additional Protocol 97, with the exception of the National Security
98Exclusion
96 It was submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors for the Board's approval in 1976. Upon submission to
the US Senate, its advice and consent to ratification was given unanimously, with understandings, on July 2,
1980 and entered into force on December 9, 1980. Also referenced as the Voluntary Offer since the US was
under no obligation to accept safeguards on its nuclear material based on the stipulations of the NPT, this
agreement was signed to demonstrate to NNWS that the implementation of safeguards presented no economic
disadvantages
97 In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreements
between the States and the IAEA, and the IAEA Department of Safeguards immediately began negotiating
"Additional Protocols" to the States' safeguards agreements. This was a by-product of the IAEA Program
93+2, which sought to provide the most effective and efficient overall approach to strengthen safeguards
through new measures while simultaneously reducing the frequency of other measures and thereby saving
costs.
98 In Article 1.B of the US-IAEA Agreement Additional Protocol it states, "The United States shall apply,
and permit the Agency to apply, this Protocol, excluding only instances where its application would result in
access by the Agency to activities with direct national security significance to the United States or to
locations or information associated with such activities." Hence, the US, since it is an acknowledged NWS
under the NPT, is entitled to exclude from declaration and deny access to locations, activities, and
information it determines to have, or be associated with, direct national security significance.
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4.2 LWR Safeguards
As stated in Article III.2.a-b of the amended 2010 PMDA, the United States is expected to
dispose of their designated WGPu through irradiation in a minimum of four LWR while
Russia is to dispose of their designated WGPu through irradiation in their BN-600 and BN-
800 fast reactors. In this section, we explore and examine the potential safeguards and
security environment, from both a domestic (NRC) and international standpoint (IAEA),
for the US selected LWR under the PMDA. All IAEA safeguards implementation is
fundamentally regulated by the IAEA Statute 9 and by the Safeguard Agreements. The
IAEA currently has safeguards programs implemented on more than 160 LWR" 0 in the
US, where their technical objective at the LWR is the "timely detection of the diversion of
significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes
unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by risk of early detection... [seeking to]
provide credible assurance not only about the declared nuclear material in a State but also
about the absence of undeclared material and activities [93]." The IAEA safeguards
approach primarily focuses on Item Accountancy and Containment and Surveillance (C/S)
Measures to achieve inspection goals through three main elements (physical protection,
materials control, and materials accountancy) [3, 95]:
Item accountancy: This includes item counting, serial number
identification, book auditing, annual evaluations of nuclear material
balances, examination of operating records, reconciliation with accounting
records, non-destructive analysis (NDA) and other qualitative
measurements, and examinations to verify the continued integrity of the fuel
assembly prior to core loading.
Containment and surveillance (C/S) measures: These are used to
complement the accountancy verification methods for safeguarding the core
fuel and spent fuel through monitoring technologies. LWR cores are usually
not opened more than once per year, and for this reason, surveillance
systems are vital in surveying the area where spent fuel is store stored;
providing the IAEA with the capabilities of detecting undeclared
movements of nuclear material as well as potential tampering with
containment and/or IAEA safeguard technologies.
99 In paragraph 2 of The Structure and Content of Agreements Between The Agency and States Required in
Connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons [INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)], the
model for safeguards agreements, stipulates more specifically that safeguards will be applied "...for the
exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices..."
100 Reactor safeguards are implemented at about 200 power reactors and at several hundred more research
reactors worldwide.
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The inspection goal for a facility consists of a quantity component01 and a
timeliness componenti 2, where the IAEA strives for the full attainment (criteria relevant to
the material types and categories present at the facility) of both components [95]. In
addition to the aforementioned tasks, the IAEA has emphasized that, "safeguards inspectors
will increasingly need not only to be knowledgeable about traditional and advanced fuel
cycles and plant operations, but also to possess sophisticated analytical skills in the
detection of early signs of weapons development [96]."
In addition to the economic, technical, legal, security, safety, environmental and
other burdens faced by reactor licensees, the IAEA believes safeguards should be a
precaution that should not add additional strain to reactor operators, especially in the case
for those specified for WGPu disposition. Historically, IAEA safeguards at nuclear power
plants have been applied mainly to existing or already designed plants, hence, its
implementation at designated US WGPu LWR should not pose a major hindrance from this
standpoint. However, a couple of the specific developments affecting the application of
safeguards to nuclear power plants are "the use of MOX fuel in some reactors [and the] use
of remote interrogation of installed safeguards equipment, leading to more efficient
safeguards coupled with fewer on-site inspections [93]." Nonetheless, with the
incorporation of a safeguards regime for an LWR, the IAEA seeks to: (1) minimize the
burden on plant operations; (2) promote better understanding of safeguards operations and
needs by reactor designers; (3) ensure the effectiveness of the safeguards regime and
promote advances in the quality, methods of acquisition and integrity of safeguards data;
(4) minimize the cost of safeguards, including the burden on IAEA inspection resources;
(5) improve, for both operators and inspectors, the conditions under which inspections are
carried out; and (6) take advantage of advances in safeguards technologies [93].
Prior to IAEA inspections commencing at a US LWR, they must first engage with
the NRC who is responsible for notifying the selected facility that it must submit to IAEA
safeguards. The NRC is the US domestic safeguards entity responsible for "ensuring that
special nuclear material within the United States is not stolen or otherwise diverted from
civilian facilities for possible use in clandestine fissile explosives and does not pose an
unreasonable risk owing to radiological sabotage [97]." Domestic safeguards serve as part
of a nation's internal security activities where key parts of their activities incorporate many
of the physical protection, materials control, and materials accounting procedures similarly
performed by the IAEA's international safeguards system 03. Although they share many of
the same traits and the IAEA may advise the NRC on the results of its observations made
during normal safeguards activities, either informally or by request, the IAEA has "no
responsibility either for the provision of a State's physical protection system or for the
101 The quantity component relates to the scope of the inspection activities necessary in order to provide
assurance that there was no diversion of a significant quantity (SQ) of nuclear material over a material
balance period (MBP).
102 The timeliness component relates to the periodic inspection activities necessary to provide assurance that
no abrupt diversion has taken place.
103 As noted in the IAEA's INFCIRC/225: The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, "the objective of the
State's physical protection system should be: (1) To establish conditions which will minimize the possibilities
for unauthorized removal of nuclear material or for sabotage, and (2) To provide information and technical
assistance in support of rapid and comprehensive measures by the State to locate and recover missing nuclear
material."
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supervision, control or implementation of such a system [98]." The key challenge for any
domestics safeguards program is detecting and identifying potential threats, both externally
(thieves, terrorists, hackers, etc.) and internally (employees, contractors, etc.).
Unfortunately, internal threats present the most commonly encountered threat4 4 ,
accounting for 41% of crimes committed against assets [99, 100]. As it relates to the
intentions of the PMDA, the internal threat of diversion scenarios associated with a
perceived US interest in maintaining WGPu volume, may also serve as a credible threat
from the perspective of those outside the US. For this reason, collaboration between the
NRC and IAEA onsite at US LWR will be essential in ensuring confidence of WGPu
disposition at this section of the plutonium disposition chain.
The NRC is to provide technical assistance to the IAEA, supporting US initiatives
to extend and enhance international safeguards and other verification programs, as
described in the PMDA. The reactor/facility operator, IAEA, and NRC10 are then to
negotiate the terms of the inspection all guided by the terms described in the NPT, the US-
IAEA Safeguards Agreement, and the Additional Protocol [94]. However, upon IAEA
requests to access facilities associated with the DOE security interests, DOE is to assume
responsibility for implementing the Additional Protocol at the facility. Because of the
managed access clause, any activity, component, process or otherwise proprietary
information deemed sensitive by the government can be concealed/excluded during the
inspection visit 1 06 -however, assuming the IAEA is to play a multilateral role in the
verification of WGPu disposition under the PMDA, means of verifying actual disposition
should not fall under this clause. In addition, although the disposition of the fuel will take
place in LWR, the WGPu MOX fuel still falls under DOE jurisdiction and hence, both
parties will have to work with IAEA regarding inspections and verification measures at the
reactors designated for the irradiation of the WGPu MOX fuel. For this reason, we briefly
investigate the WGPu MOX fuel safeguards landscape, which is expected to mimic normal
MOX fuel safeguards protocols, by examining the collaborative exercises expected to take
place between the DOE and IAEA.
4.3 MOX Fuel Safeguards
In this section, we explore the potential safeguards environment, both domestically
and internationally, for the WGPu MOX fuel to be irradiated in US LWR as defined by the
PMDA in an attempt to examine the security landscape incorporating the collaboration of
the IAEA and NNSA 1 7 .
MOX fuel poses more of a safeguards risk than conventional LEU fuel due to its
plutonium content. For this reason, facilities implementing MOX fuel programs under
IAEA safeguards require monthly verification inspections through item counting, serial
104 This may be due to insiders having access to the knowledge of operations and security plans and
unescorted access.
105 The NRC's participation is intended to protect proprietary, sensitive, or classified information at the
location.
106 The licensee must, however, make a reasonable effort to allow for the collection of necessary data through
other possible means.
107 Although initially acknowledged as falling within the jurisdiction of DOE, DOE interests related to the
"management and security of the nation's nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor
programs," are all to fall within the NNSA, a separately organized agency within DOE.
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number identification, and seal verification (assuming that the MOX fuel is received from
an IAEA safeguarded facility). Although not applicable to the expected practices associated
with WGPu MOX fuel that will be received from MFFF (which is expected to also fall
under some sort of IAEA-NNSA monitoring regime), in specific cases where fresh MOX
fuel is received from unsafeguarded facilities, additional NDA measurements are
performed 08 [95]. Contemporary NDA techniques of MOX fuel includes relatively
straightforward use of portable detection equipment, optical and/or neutron plus gamma
surveillance system, and monitoring systems to detect movements of the assemblies after
they have been placed in dedicated locations in the pool for MOX fuel storage (dry storage
presents an easier safeguard pathway than wet storage). We envision the addition of
antineutrino detection to contemporary NDA techniques as a means of strengthening MOX
fuel safeguards; for purposes of the PMDA and eventually beyond to the more global
safeguards environment. Since MFFF is expected to fabricate the number of MOX fuel
assemblies consistent with customer demand, storage should be relatively nonexistent,
which is desirable from a safeguards perspective [93].
In 1998, fresh MOX fuel was loaded into 14 reactor cores, where 6 plutonium
conversion and MOX fabrication plants were under IAEA safeguards. This required 10,000
person-days of inspection (PDI) effort; of which, 25% of this workforce was strictly
devoted to facilities using unirradiated plutonium. Because of the massive costs associated
with inspection personnel, the IAEA has sought means of reducing its inspection costs
while still maintaining credible assurance 09 that plutonium is not diverted from MOX
conversion facilities, fabrication facilities, and reactors using MOX fuels [101] in a global
environment where MOX use is expected to increase dramatically in Europe and Japan. It
can safely be assumed that a similar perspective is also given to the US and Russian
plutonium disposition campaign of the PMDA.
The IAEA's current approach in combating this hydra of a problem is through
concentration of NDA verification activities at MOX fuel sites by maintaining CoK on
fresh MOX during shipment, storage, and core loading at LWR using conventional C/S
techniques 1 0 [102]. Verification of the category change of MOX fuel (from unirradiated to
irradiated direct-use material) is of prime concern is also of prime concern, where the
108 If kept in dry storage, the fuel is monitored through seals, and if kept in wet storage, it is monitored
through surveillance. Seal verification and/or surveillance evaluation is also carried out on a monthly basis in
addition to the usual accountancy verification methods.
109 With posing issues of costs associated with increased staffing, it is vital that the IAEA continue to attract
and retain high-quality professionals required to complete these highly specialized missions of maintaining
peaceful, global nuclear use.
110 Consistent with contemporary safeguard practices, MOX shipping containers are sealed by metal cap
seals and/or Canberra VACOSS seals, where until core loading, fresh MOX fuel is monitored through digital
surveillance devices such as the All in One System (ALIS) and the Digital Multi-Channel Optical
Surveillance (DMOS) system. VACOSS seals are removed at the reactor by an IAEA inspector prior to
placing the fuel into storage. The ALIS is an intelligent camera system for safeguards surveillance
applications that enables the user to perform a quick set-up of the system as required for a specific
surveillance application without additional equipment. The DMOS system was designed to replace the analog
multi-channel system used for safeguards, bringing digital processing capabilities to analog systems currently
in use. The system is designed for unattended safeguards operations, but can easily be adapted for remote
monitoring operations.
56
current practice is simply surveillance mechanisms"' used to confirm the transfer of
individual MOX fuel assemblies to the core and to monitor the movement of these fuel
assemblies until the core has been closed [95]. In addition, the seals on reactor cores are
directly verified for proper operation quarterly during IAEA inventory verification
exercises, and serve as the best method for maintaining verification knowledge of reactor
core fuel during inspections associated with inventory verification exercises. Although this
serves as the best means for verification knowledge maintenance, some reactors pose issues
with access to seals, either because it is located in an area of high radiation dose rate (thus
not accessible during reactor operation) or because there is a high risk of contamination in
the area surrounding the seal. Optical surveillance of the reactor vessel sited within the high
radiation area then serves as the only means of maintaining verification to meet the
specified timeliness goals. Regardless of the methods used, ascertaining that all fuel
assemblies are placed into the core and that none are removed, concealed as a dummy, or
discharged as spent fuel, still appear to be credible risks to the contemporary MOX
safeguard practices.
The IAEA falsely finds these approaches justifiable since safeguarded reactor areas
are constantly under surveillance beginning when the detachment of the reactor vessel
containment seal 1 2. The weakness with these core verification approaches, however, is that
knowledge of the reactor core following such verification exercises are strictly maintained
through an optical surveillance system. This system, unfortunately, is incapable of
detecting all transfers of fuel between the core and spent fuel pool' 1 3
For these reasons, potential design mechanisms that could be implemented, as
identified by the IAEA, that would significantly aid in safeguards of MOX fuel in the
reactor core include [93]:
1. Suitable, accessible reactor core sealing systems which are simple to
install and damage-resistant
2. Surveillance equipment capable of monitoring reactor operations during
opening of the reactor vessel
3. Underwater illumination coupled with sufficient water clarity-this would
aid inspectors' abilities to physically count fuel assemblies and read their
identifiers
4. Means of monitoring reactor fuel while simultaneously minimizing the
radiation exposure to inspectors and reactor staff
This can be provided through two flavors: human surveillance (presence of inspectors during relevant
operations) and/or unattended video surveillance (underwater cameras). Dependent on the reactor type, the
human surveillance option requires a verification effort of 20-30 PDI (where the surveillance option typically
requires 6-10 PDI).
112 The assumption here is that spent fuel was transferred directly from the core to the spent fuel pool (and no
spent fuel transport container movements were detected) and replaced with fresh fuel. Fresh fuel assemblies
recently loaded into the fuel core are usually distinguishable from irradiated once-used and twice-used fuel
assemblies that are to remain in the fuel core.
113 Possible propositions that have been made to resolve this issue include the design/implementation of a
more robust surveillance system capable of monitoring the movement of items into and out of the reactor core
itself. Potential diversion strategies at this level, in which the IAEA seeks to combat, include instances where
the plutonium-rich irradiated fuel are substituted by fresh/dummy fuel where it is assumed that the diverted
irradiated fuel may be potentially removed from the spent fuel pool under "contrived surveillance failure."
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Although (1) and (3) serve as vital needs in strengthening IAEA MOX safeguards,
mechanisms (2) and (4) can be successfully achieved via unattended monitoring systems
(UMS) and remote safeguards inspections (RSI).
4.4 UMS and RSI
As already stated above, the classical safeguards approach at LWR consists of a
combination of routine interim and physical inventory verification inspections
incorporating nuclear material item accountancy, containment and surveillance, and other
measures required to establish confidence that no unsafeguarded nuclear activities have
taken place. The push to deploy UMS began in the late 1980s and increased dramatically
with the introduction of Program 93+2114; rapidly advancing along with technological leaps
in the capability and reliability of hardware, firmware, and software designed to improve
LWR safeguards [95].
A UMS is defined as any automated monitoring system, permanently installed in a
nuclear facility, with a single/multiple set(s) of sensors 15 capable of maintaining CoK
about the content and location of all nuclear material of interest in a facility 24 hours/day
and 365 days/year without the need for human interaction. The intent is that the system
may provide the necessary assurance for the IAEA to draw rapid, comprehensive and
definitive conclusions that nuclear material is not being diverted from peaceful use which
directly relates to goal quantity and conversion times and abrupt and protracted diversion.
There are currently more than 130 UMS around the world, with the majority based off of
radiation, thermo-hydraulic, and process-monitoring designs [33].
The IAEA believes the introduction of UMS will yield significant cost savings
(inspector worldwide travel), reduced inspection effort (either announced or unannounced)
and on-site activities (unattended assay, monitoring systems with data collection, and
review/evaluation at remote locations), 100% verification with reduced levels of
intrusiveness to the operation of nuclear facility, minimized interruption to facility
operations, and reduced radiation exposures 16 to IAEA inspectors and plant operating staff
[102]. Although massive costs reductions have been observed with the integration of UMS,
a cost-benefit analysis on a case-by-case basis is needed, where all boundary conditions,
state-specific factors, capital costs, and human resource requirements for its
implementation and maintenance are all considered prior to its application [103].
A high level of reliability is vital to efficient LWR safeguards verification; loss of
114 In response to Iraq successfully circumventing IAEA safeguards by exploiting the agency's system of
inspection and monitoring activities limited to facilities or materials explicitly declared by each state in its
safeguards agreement with the agency, the IAEA established the safeguards improvement plan known as
"Program 93+2" which sought to eliminate this "undeclared facilities" loophole. The plan's name reflects the
fact that it was drafted in 1993 with the intention of being implemented in two years.
115 It may use a variety of sensors such as radiation, pressure, temperature, flow, vibration, optical, and
electromagnetic fields to collect qualitative or quantitative data.
116 Exposure control methods are generally well known to reactor designers because of the desire to minimize
radiation exposure of the operations staff. The trend towards greater use of remote monitoring for safeguards
purposes is helpful from this perspective; one in which design measures should include mechanisms to
minimize such exposures and to provide the necessary radiation protection supplies and services such as
protective clothing, dosimeters, and showers for IAEA inspectors.
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CoK requires extensive efforts to reestablish inventories of safeguarded material and can
cause concern if such inventories cannot be reestablished. Redundancy, diversity, and
quality assurance are key conceptual approaches used to achieve high reliability in nuclear
power plants [93]. These concepts can be coupled with RSI while transitioning to
Information Driven Safeguardsm. Verification and monitoring through RSI are required to
satisfy IAEA's requirements for authenticity' 1, completeness 19, and correctness ". RSI
aim to join and extend remote monitoring with potential novel opportunities for enhanced
cooperation for optimized safeguard approaches. They provide a very promising pathway
for potential optimization and joint effort while still maintaining credible safeguards
practices; one which signals a mindset transition from one of a "passive tolerance of
safeguards implementation by most S/RSAC and operators" to one of "an active and
enhanced support role.. .promot[ing] peaceful use of nuclear energy [103]."
It should be noted that the RSI approach does not target to eliminate the need for
on-site inspections but merely to reduce its frequency beyond present levels shifting
resources from routine to non-routine activities 121 . Nonetheless, IAEA capacities to draw
its own conclusions based on information provided by State and Regional Systems of
Accounting and Control122 (S/RSAC) and the operator should be established in order to
validate their information are also vital; one in which the RSI concept aims to increase
beyond present levels. Article 7 of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement states that
the IAEA should acknowledge its technical effectiveness of a State's system by avoiding
duplication during its verification and inspection efforts. The IAEA should seek enhanced
cooperation with an effective, technically competent and independent S/RSAC partner
during joint inspections [103].
UMS employing RSI are extremely important in nuclear facilities with highly
automated capabilities and where access to nuclear material is virtually impossible; high
neutron/gamma radiation fields limit human inspection time where RSI could play a vital
role in overcoming these limitations. Approximately 8,000 PDI of IAEA effort is spent
globally per year-a place where considerable savings through UMS complimented by RSI
(using randomized, unannounced inspections) could be implemented. LWR implementing
MOX fuel programs, like PMDA-selected US LWR, provide further areas where further
potential in savings could be realized [103]. Although US experience with MOX fuel is
dated and scarce, IAEA experience with a typical LWR implementing a MOX fuel
117 IDS applies enhanced analysis of all information available to the IAEA together with physical verification
using up-to-date equipment and methodologies, complemented with, to ensure that States have fully complied
with their non-proliferation undertakings. It is designed to provide an uncompromised level of assurance of
non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a
State.
118 Authenticity of data is a pre-requisite to ensure a valid interpretation of the collected data.
119 Completeness essentially means no gaps in the data which provides assurance that all items are
monitored.
120 Correctness of data is necessary for qualification and quantification of the verified and monitored nuclear
items.
121 These include complementary access activities, unannounced inspections, validation or authentication of
operator's data, other activities in order to increase the assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities, and activities related to resolution of the specific safeguards concerns.
122 This term is used here to denote all US domestic safeguards practices, which, as acknowledged may
reside within the terms of the NRC or NNSA depending on the facility or process considered.
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program requires an inspection effort of approximately 200 PDI compared to "normal"
LWR, implementing conventional LEU fuel cores, which requires only approximately 10
PDI. As noted, MOX use is expected to increase dramatically, especially with the targets of
the US and Russia plutonium disposition campaign. Because a proportional increase in
budgetary resources is unexpected and highly unlikely, transitions from routine field
activities towards RSI would prove beneficial in decreasing inspectors' inspection burden
and the complex information evaluation process 23 [103].
Although RSI aims to potentially minimize inspections at the reactor site, it does
not seek to eliminate them. Domestic and international safeguards inspections are seen as
"interruptions" to the nuclear facility operator's routine activities124 [95]. As already
acknowledged, attaining customer reactors to aid in the US plutonium disposition
campaign has been tumultuous endeavor; one which may prove to be even more difficult
with customer knowledge that increased inspections would be resultant WGPu MOX use.
For this reason, we argue that the application of UMS should be the primary focus sought
in order to make future safeguard measures more considerate for the desires of nuclear
facilities operators. Overall success in the application of safeguards, from both the
inspector and inspected party perspectives, will be realized by minimizing routine
inspection activities, making better use of inspector's time in seeking to detect undeclared
nuclear material and activities, delivering more timely safeguards data coupled with quick
feedback/instructions for follow-up action to the field inspectors [103].
Nonetheless, further developmental and deployment strategies are essential for
continued success of UMS, which serve as the foundation for RSI. Field trials at various
facilities have been initiated and already demonstrated, seeking to investigate the feasibility
and practicality of deploying RSI in developing a coherent model for its implementation. In
addition, preparations for future field trials may reveal areas where revisions in current
policy [104] are necessary and the proposed revisions could be tested during the field trials
under an adaptive management mindset. It should be noted, however, that adaption of a
regime strengthened by UMS coupled with RSI will require endeavors for negotiated
agreements between the IAEA and S/RSAC authority, defining all of the operational
conditions 25 [103]. Future UMS developments should lack extensive user training and
expensive equipment logistics and should be completely compatible with current-use
safeguard instrumentation and seek standardization/modularization of equipment.
Additionally, future UMS developments should be familiar with the specified requirements
designated by the IAEA technical experts to enable IAEA independent verification and
monitoring capabilities intended for joint use by IAEA, S/RSAC, and other operators.
123 RSI will play an increasingly important and versatile role in aiding inspectors to make better use of their
time in the field with the assistance of technology that would provide them with improved data gathering and
enhanced analysis tools and that would connect them in near real-time with IAEA managers, safeguards
ex erts, and IAEA databases.
Questions of concern that have been asked to develop more considerate safeguard measures include: How
do facility operators regard safeguards inspections during a refueling outage when their time is heavily
occupied with maintenance and shutdown activities? How much time is involved for a normal routine
safeguards inspection?
125 This includes the technical agreement with the operators to implement the RSI measures, which should
also address security concerns of operators and S/RSAC towards the remote transmission of process data
beyond obligatory declarations.
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4.4.1 Successful UMS: Antineutrino Detection at L WR
In the 2010 protocol to the PMDA, the US and Russia agreed on a revision to seek
methods of placing their surplus WGPu under IAEA safeguards and monitoring [105]. In
September 2010, both nations submitted a joint letter to the IAEA requesting that the
Agency establish verification measures with respect to their excess weapon-grade
plutonium disposition programs' 2 6 [13]. The US, Russia, and the IAEA have set the goal of
preparing the appropriate verification agreements in the near future.
One of the most vital locations for safeguards and verification procedures to exist,
as they relate to the PMDA, will be located at point of the disposition chain where the
WGPu is to be transformed from a potential proliferation threat into its proliferation-
resistant disposed form. In the US, this point in the disposition chain occurs at the LWR
site127 when the WGPu MOX fuel is irradiated until it reaches a bumup level of at least 20
GWd/MTHM.
As noted, US LWR currently under safeguards implement item accountancy
supported by C/S. The application of antineutrino detection by a safeguard regime would
provide the ability to measure-in near real-time-the reactor operational status, power
history, and core fissile inventory; all of which are key aspects addressing many of the
inspectors needs [3]. In the case of measurements involving the antineutrino rate alone, a
product of fissile inventory and power is constrained throughout the cycle. By contrast,
measurement of the antineutrino energy spectrum allows both quantities to be constrained
independently, without knowledge of the other. In the context of plutonium disposition, it
is expected that the initial isotopic contents of fuel assemblies will have been verified
upstream by other means, and that a verified core map will be available to the inspectorate.
In this case, a rate-based measurement alone would constrain subsequent burnup and
isotopic content, without further operator input.
This technology's ability to provide insight into elemental and isotopic composition
of the reactor core should prove to be extremely advantageous. In addition, while the core
is operational, it meets a key safeguard interest of maintaining CoK at the reactor core as
discussed in Section 4.2. Such insight could be useful as an independent means of resolving
and/or detection shipper-receiver differences, or confirming the consistency of fuel
composition prior to and after refueling periods. Such successful prospects of antineutrino
detection as they relate to PMDA associated LWR monitoring are discussed in further
detail in the following chapter. Although beyond the scope of this thesis, for future LWR
designs, antineutrino detection should be considered as part of Safeguards by Design
simple, concise, formalized, and integrated approach to nuclear facility designs
incorporating principles of nonproliferation, international safeguards, and US national
safeguards [106].
126 Although the IAEA was an equal partner in the Trilateral Initiative, in the PMDA, a different team of US
officials carried out the bilateral negotiations, and the IAEA was informed of the PMDA for the first time
when the negotiations were essentially concluded. Because the agreement did not include provisions for
taking classified forms of fissile material into IAEA monitored operations, the process of engaging the IAEA
has appeared to be of minimal importance.
127 The Gas Turbine Modular Helium Reactor is also mentioned in the agreement as a potential reactor to be
used in aiding either the US or Russian plutonium disposition campaign. However, since plans of developing
such a reactor in the US in the near future is highly unlikely, it is not considered in this work.
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Chapter 5: Antineutrino Detection
5.1 Overview of Antineutrino Detection Physics
In 1914, Chadwick measured the energy spectrum of beta particles produced in the
beta decay reaction:
24Pb 3024Bi +p-82 83 /
The energy spectrum observed was continuous, and showed that the beta particles
produced had an energy, Ep, less than that of the difference between the rest mass energies
of the parent and daughter nuclei, E0. These observations contradicted the energy
conservation principle, which essentially states that if the nuclei are at rest (prior to and
following the decay process), every beta particle produced should have left the decay
reaction with an energy equal to Eo. However, this was not seen, and it was apparent that
there was energy unaccounted for-leading to the hypothesis of the production of another
particle [107, 108].
This particle was the neutrino, and in 1930, Wolfgang Pauli identified the existence
of this particle through the reconciliation of the energy conservation principle with the
process of beta decay [109]. He hypothesized that the neutrino was escaping the decay
reaction undetected with energy of Eo - Efi. This hypothesis was further developed into a
theory of beta decay by Fermi in 1934, which predicted that the probability of interaction
amongst neutrinos was extremely small [110]. Experimental confirmation of this theory
occurred approximately two decades later in 1956 by F. Reines and C. Cowan, who
discovered the production of neutrinos' antiparticles, antineutrinos, at the Hanford nuclear
reactor by measuring the elusive particles 12 8 [2]. Reactors of this period produced
antineutrinos at a rate of approximately 1019 particles/second, a large flux Reines and
Cowan thought necessary to overcome the barrier to detection of the neutrino posed by the
small cross section of the inverse beta decay process [107]. Although Reines and Cowan
were successful in providing evidence for the existence of the neutrino particle, conclusive
evidence of the particle wasn't observed until an improved experiment was conducted at
the Savannah River reactor site in 1958 [111].
Antineutrinos are produced when a nucleus undergoes beta decay. These decays
occur in fission products and their daughters in nuclear reactors, where, on average, each
fission event yields approximately six antineutrinos. The actual number and energy
distribution of these antineutrinos, however, is dependent upon the isotope undergoing
fission. The inverse beta decay reaction is the primary method used in the detection of
antineutrinos, and can occur either with a proton or a deuteron as demonstrated in the
equations below:
128 The difficulty in detecting antineutrinos arises from the fact that they are uncharged, nearly massless
leptons, and therefore are not affected by either the electromagnetic or the strong nuclear force. The only
force that significantly affects antineutrinos is the weak nuclear force, which has a shorter range and is much
weaker than the aforementioned forces.
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v+d * + n+n
However, for purposes of our detection mechanism of interest, we focus on the
proton-related equation. The produced positron, which carries away most of the
antineutrino energy, loses energy via ionization in the detection medium, and then quickly
annihilates with an electron in the medium, producing two simultaneous photon emissions.
The combined ionization from the positron, and from the Compton electrons generated as
the annihilation gammas scatter within the detection medium, is deposited within a few
nanoseconds. This very rapid energy deposition is referred to as the prompt signal. The
produced neutron is thermalized and is eventually captured by an absorbing nucleus.
Hydrogen capture is possible and does occur, but often a dopant is added to the detection
medium (i.e. Gd, Li, Eu, etc.)-which captures and then decays via a cascade of y-
emissions. The thermalization and capture time is determined by the medium and the
dopant. For example, with 0.1% doping of Gd in typical liquid scintillator media, a
significantly delayed (-30 ps) signal relative to the prompt signal occurs: this is sensibly
referred to as the delayed signal. Both of these energy depositions are identified via
coincidence detection, which dramatically suppresses backgrounds. Figure 5.1 below
illustrates this reaction as it may occur in a detector.
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Figure 5.1: Inverse p-decay Reaction in Antineutrino Detector.
Courtesy of [ 112].
Because the production of antineutrinos results from nuclear fission, many
applications of interest have to do with nuclear nonproliferation. The antineutrino
measurements of interest for nonproliferation applications are the antineutrino rate
produced by the reactor, the antineutrino energy spectrum, and the antineutrino direction.
63
5.2 Detector Field Trials
A successful recent application of near-field antineutrino detection is the SONGS 1
detector deployed by a research team from the LLNL and Sandia National Laboratory
(SNL) at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) in Southern California (See
Figure 5.2 below).
water,; polyethylene shielding Muon veto paddles
Figure 5.2: SONGS1 Detector.
SONGS 1 was used to non-intrusively monitor the operational status, relative
thermal power, and changes in fissile content of a 3.64 GWt reactor from 2004 through
2008 [113]. The detector had a mass of 640 kg and operated at a standoff distance of 24.5
m 129. It uses a proton-rich liquid scintillator detector doped with gadolinium to facilitate
inverse beta-decay interactions. The resultant traveling positron and the positron-electron
annihilation create a prompt scintillation flash, while the neutron-gadolinium interaction
induces a delayed scintillation flash. Both flashes are detected via photomultiplier tubes.
SONGS 1 has the ability to detect the reactor operational status (on or off) within 5 hours of
shut down or start up at the 99% confidence level and is able to measure the reactor power,
relative to a known initial value, with 3% accuracy in one week [113].
Although the SONGS1 detector has proven successful in its field trial, drawbacks
still exist with the technology. To begin with the detector is large: accounting for a
water/polyethelyene shield, the entire system weighs about 25 tons and has a volume of
about 25 M3 . Furthermore, the selected liquid scintillator is flammable, toxic, and
carcinogenic, requiring the unit to be transported as hazardous material-a perceptual if not
129 It operates approximately 10 m underground in an area known as the tendon gallery so that facility
personnel are not disrupted from day-to-day operations. This gallery also protects the detector from cosmic
radiation that can also produce antineutrino events. At this location, the detector has an antineutrino pass rate
of approximately 1 x 10- antineutrinos produced by the reactor. Of this probability, only an estimated 10%
will result in a detectable signature for this detector.
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actual safety problem for a technology with expectations for worldwide deployment. It
should be noted that at many reactors, large underground galleries exist which can
accommodate detectors of this size without significant interference with reactor operations.
This was demonstrated by the SONGS deployment campaign, which has operated for
nearly 8 years (including upgraded detectors) without interfering with plant operations at
the SONGS site. Moreover, owing to advances in the field of scintillation detector
development, there are now commercially available high performance doped liquid
scintillator formulations which have significantly improved safety characteristics, and in
particular which need not be transported as hazardous material. Additional research effort
can be expected to yield further improvements. For example, spectral measurements
providing a more robust constraint on the reactor evolution are also possible [114]. The
team has designed and fielded two additional prototypes, the SONGS2130 and SONGS3 131
detectors, which have mitigated the drawbacks of the SONGS1 detector by operating with
less hazardous material[ 113]. Current work relates to shrinking the detector footprint by
decreasing the amount of shielding material required to achieve a given level of sensitivity
[5].
SONGS and similar detectors like Brazil's Angra Project and France's Nucifer
Detector hold strong prospects as successful verification metrics for WGPu disposition
under the stipulations of the PMDA.
5.3 Expected Antineutrino Signal Estimation
Antineutrino detection for reactor monitoring exploits the relationship between (1)
the antineutrino count rate and energy spectrum and (2) the reactor power and the fissile
isotopic content of the core. As fuel is irradiated within the reactor core, the isotopic
masses and fission rates vary in time132 . This variation in fissionable isotope content also
results in the variation of antineutrino flux during the core evolution because of the
differences in the average number of antineutrino emissions per fissionable isotope.
130 SONGS2 uses a plastic, instead of a liquid, scintillator. Gd, which cannot be mixed with the plastic
because Gd compounds degrade the plastic's transparency, is mixed into a paint and applied on the walls of
plastic sheets which were then alternated with pieces of plastic scintillator in the detector design. The
detection mechanism implemented in this detector occurs when an antineutrino collides with a proton within
the plastic scintillator resulting in scintillation light while the resultant neutron travels randomly through the
plastic until it is captured by a gadolinium nucleus in the paint. Similar to the SONGS1 mechanism, the
neutron-gadolinium reaction produces y emissions resulting in additional scintillation light.
131 SONGS3 uses water mixed with gadolinium and measures Cerenkov light rather than liquid or plastic
scintillation devices as used in SONGS1 and SONGS2, respectively. Cerenkov light, predominantly
ultraviolet, occurs as a result of charged particles traveling faster than light through a specified medium, in
this case water. The detection process in this detector follows the same inverse beta decay reaction when an
antineutrino collides with a proton in the detection medium, yielding positron and neutron. The decelerating
positron emits Cerenkov radiation until its annihilation. The resultant neutron is captured in the Gd nucleus in
the water producing the familiar gamma-ray cascade which generate fast Compton-scattered electrons
resulting in a second flash of Cerenkov light. Although more benign than its former detector designs, the
interactions in the SONGS3 detector results in approximately a 100 times less light than the -SONGS 1 and
SONGS2 detectors. This detector design does boast, however, less attribution to background radiation since it
is impervious to high-energy neutron radiation caused by cosmic muons, which can mimic the antineutrino
signature in scintillator detectors.
132 This variation in turn causes a systematic shift in the antineutrino flux, known as the "burnup effect." The
effect has long been recognized and corrected in reactor antineutrino physics experiments.
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In order to estimate the expected antineutrino signal produced from a reactor based
on the specified parameters of interest, it is necessary to understand not only the absolute
efficiency of the detector, but also the number of antineutrinos expected to interact with the
detector from the reactor. Due to the lack of detectors operating with disposition plutonium
MOX, the antineutrino flux emerging from MOX reactors is estimated by modeling the
core and extracting the total fission reaction rates of the relevant isotopes. In order to
consolidate computational time, we concentrate on the fission reaction rates associated with
the relevant uranium and plutonium isotopes (235U, 238U, 2 39Pu, and 241Pu) because they are
responsible for virtually all of the thermal power (accounting for >98% of the thermal
power)133 and antineutrino emissions. Measurements of the antineutrino yield per fission
and energy spectra were adapted from [115-117]. The resulting absolute fission reaction
rates are then ultimately converted to an antineutrino spectral density. By acquiring this
spectrum in conjunction with estimated cross sections for inverse beta decay and
knowledge of the detector specifications (detector distance, volume, etc.) an estimation can
be made of the antineutrino interactions per day expected in the target mass of the detector.
The methods of these three aforementioned steps are discussed further below.
While not elaborated on in detail in the current work, it is important to distinguish
between methods involving absolute versus relative estimates of the number of antineutrino
interactions per day expected in the detector target [118]. An absolute estimate requires a
full accounting for all sources of experimental uncertainty, such as the precise number of
proton targets in the detection medium, the precise surveyed distance of each assembly
from the detector, and other systematic effects. However, for the verification methods
described here, a measurement relative to an initially calibrated value may suffice. This has
the effect of removing or greatly reducing many of the systematic uncertainties that enter
into the absolute measurement. For example, the SONGS1 experiment was able to specify
the count rate and the thermal power throughout the cycle to an accuracy of 3% relative to
a known initial value with one week of accumulated data, limited only by Poisson statistics,
provided the initial fuel loading was known. By contrast, the absolute uncertainty in the
SONGS1 measurement was closer to 20%, arising primarily from the poor knowledge of
the mass of scintillator in the active volume of the detector. With more careful engineering,
other experiments have demonstrated that the absolute uncertainty in the count rate can be
reduced to 4% level.
5.3.1 Reactor Fission Reaction Rates
5.3.1.A Referenced Data Benchmark Background
The dataset referenced for this analysis is supplied via the OECD/NEA and US
NRC PWR MOX/UO 2 Core Transient Benchmark [119] adopting a simplified 3D
geometry. In the model, the core was assumed to have had uniform fuel composition in
axial direction with an axial reflector13 4 of the same width as the fuel assembly pitch. In
their analysis, the authors design a core partially loaded with MOX up to approximately
133 Other plutonium isotopes like 20Pu and 242Pu are bred in the core but only contribute to an extremely
minute portion of the total fission reaction rate.
134 Axial reflector contains fixed moderator at the same condition as the core inlet and outlet for the bottom
and top axial reflector, respectively.
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25%135. We assume many of the same reactor and fuel characteristics as depicted in Table
5.1 below.
Table 5.1: Core and Fuel Assembly Parameters
Number of fuel assemblies 193
Power level (MWt) 3565
Fuel lattice (fuel rods per 17x17 assembly) 264
Active fuel length (cm) 365.76
Assembly pitch (cm) 21.42
Fuel Volume/Assembly (cm3) 47354.81
Pin pitch (cm) 1.26
Baffle thickness (cm) 2.52
Target cycle length (GWd/MTHM) 21.564 (18)
(months)
Capacity factor (%) 90.0
Target effective full power days 493
In our analysis, we assume a one-batch equilibrium cycle consisting of fresh LEU
(with adapted descriptions in Figure 5.3 and Table 5.2) and MOX (with adapted
descriptions in Figure 5.5 and Table 5.3) fuel types. The initial isotopic masses for each of
the analyzed fuel types can be found Table 5.4. From each of these assembly fuel types, the
isotopic fission reaction rates corresponding to the LEU (Figure 5.4) and MOX (Figure 5.6)
fuel assemblies were extracted across their respective burnup allocation and eventually
translated into a timescale of days. A tabulated form of the fission reaction rates can be
found in Appendix B. For more detailed descriptions regarding these, and other, fuel types
associated with different pin cell geometries, nonbumable materials, cross-section
modeling information, as well as other specificiations please see [119].
Given this concentration, they designate the following guidelines: "(1) No fresh MOX on the core
periphery, (2) No MOX assemblies facing each other, (3) No MOX assemblies in control rod position, (4)
Maximum 1/3 of the core loaded with MOX fuel, (5) No Integral Fuel Burnable Absorbers (IFBA) in MOX
assemblies, (6) A three-batch equilibrium cycle with once-burned fuel at an average bumup of 20.0
GWd/tHM and twice-burned fuel at an average burnup of 35.0 GWd/tHM."
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Figure 5.3: LEU Fuel Assembly Configuration
Table 5.2: LEU Fuel Assembly Configuration Details
Diagram Pin Type Number of Pins Density (g/cm 3) Isotopic/Material
(per assembly) Composition
LEU Fuel 160 10.24 4.2 wt% (235U)
95.8 wt% (23 1U)
LEU IFBA 104 1.69 ZrB 2
N Control Rod Guide Tube 24 1.84 B4 C
D7 Instrumentation Guide 1 1.84 B4 CTube
NOTE: Based on the published information associated with this benchmark, we assume an average cycle
burnup of 20.625 GWd/MTHM which correlates to the total analyzed cycle length of 493 days.
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Figure 5.4: LEU Assembly Isotopic Fission Reaction Rates
This figure depicts the estimated isotopic fission reaction rates for 235U (blue line), 238U (red line), 239PU
(green line), and 241Pu (purple line) yielded from the irradiation of a fresh LEU assembly over the course of
an entire cycle (493 days).
Figure 5.5: MOX Fuel Assembly Configuration
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Table 5.3: MOX Fuel Assembly Configuration Details
Diagram Pin Type Number of Pins Density (g/cm 3) Material
(per assembly) Composition
5.0 MOX 188 10.41 5.0 wt% (PU)a
95.0 wt% (U)b
3.0 MOX 64 10.41 3.0 wt% (PU)a
97.0 wt% (U)"
2.5 MOX 12 10.41 2.5 wt% (PU)a
97.5 wt% (U)"
WABA Pin 24 3.56 A12 0 3-B 4 C, 10.0 wt%
(B 4C)
Instrumentation Guide 1 1.84 B4C
Tube
NOTE: Based on the published information associated with this benchmark, we assume an average cycle
burnup of 17.5 GWd/MTHM which correlates to the total analyzed cycle length of 493 days.
a Isotopic Composition for Pu is 93.6 wt% (239Pu), 5.9 wt% (240Pu), 0.4 wt% (241Pu), and 0.1 wt% (242Pu);
note, this correlates to an estimated plutonium content of 4.56% of the total fuel mass (21.21 kg).
Isotopic Composition for U is 0.002 wt% (214U), 0.2 wt% (2 11U), 0.001 wt% (236U), and 99.797 wt% (238U)
10 r
9
3
2
1
U-235
- "mU-238
Pu-239
- " OPu-241
Ii 
_________________________
0 56 1M 156 26 256on 356 4 456 5W6
Th- 03Wu)
Figure 5.6: MOX Assembly Isotopic Fission Reaction Rates
This figure depicts the estimated isotopic fission reaction rates for 235U (blue line), 2 3 8U (red line), 239 Pu
(green line), and 2 4 1Pu (purple line) yielded from the irradiation of a fresh MOX assembly over the course of
an entire cycle (493 days).
Table 5.4: Initial Isotopic asses (ka) for Each Fuel Assembly Type
Isoto e LEU MOX
U 17.9556 0.8294
"'U 409.5531 413.8772
239Pu - 18.6564
2Pu -- 1.1760
241Pu - 0.0797
Total 427.5087 434.6187
~-~J -~r~
Isotopic Atomic weignts used intnis calculation courtesy of ISI measurements [120].
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For simplicity, Helios models only the fission reaction rate yielded for the assembly
given the initial fuel composition. We estimate the fission reaction rate by fabricating a fuel
core with specified numbers of LEU and MOX fuel assemblies based on the designated
core concentration case of interest. An equilibrium factor is also incorporated in the
estimated fission reaction rates of the two fuels such that the estimated power production of
the reactor remains essentially constant (within approximately ±1%) regardless of the core
concentration case to be analyzed. Although fission energies will vary slightly for different
cores due to neutron capture-with uncertainties ranging 0.30-0.47%-the estimated
fission energies, referenced from Kopeikin et al., associated with the isotopes 235U, 238U,
2 39Pu, and 4 Pu are 201.92 ± 0.46, 205.52 ± 0.96, 209.99 ± 0.60, 213.60 ± 0.65,
respectively136 [121]. Uncertainties in the model output can be separated into those
resulting from inaccuracy of the inputs and those intrinsic to the algorithm used by the code
itself.
5.3.1.B Irradiation Scheme
The distribution of fuel composition in a reactor will depend, among other things,
on the schedule for loading and unloading fuel and on the way the fuel is moved through
the reactor. During a power cycle, the fuel composition of both the LEU and MOX fuels
change as both uranium and plutonium isotopes are depleted and plutonium isotopes are
bred. Therefore, the total fission rate is a function of both the thermal power of the reactor
and the total burnup of the fuel in the core.
There are two main modes of irradiation: (1) batch irradiation and (2) continuous
irradiation. Continuous irradiation' 3 7 as it relates to LWR is not a practical mode, and
hence not considered in this analysis, since these reactors require shut downs in order to
replace fuel elements138 . Batch irradiation is a scheme in which the reactor is supplied with
either a complete or progressive replacement of fuel at the conclusion of the irradiation
period. In the former case, and the case considered for purposes of this analysis, all fuel
elements are removed at the conclusion of the irradiation period, sent to processing, and
replaced with fresh fuel elements' 39. In the latter case-and the case more consistent with
136 Approximately 5% of the referenced isotopic fission energies is disregarded as energy associated with
antineutrino emissions and, as such, not calculated into the thermal energy contribution.
137 The best scheme for neutron economy, this scheme implements a procedure where the reactor contains, at
any instant, a large number of fuel elements which vary in fuel-exposure time and fuel composition, but from
a general perspective, maintaining the distribution of exposure time at constant level as fuel moves through
the reactor. At some time during its irradiation history the fuel element will produce more neutrons than the
average fuel element in the reactor-because of its higher-than-average content of fissionable material-and
at other times the fuel element will absorb more neutrons than the average-because of its high content of
fission products. Arrangement of the fuel elements can occur in a mechanism to maintain the over-all
production and consumption rates of neutrons in equilibrium throughout the reactor. The addition neutron
absorbers or increased leakage, is unnecessary to keep the reactor in neutron balance.
138 Although impractical, this scheme is closely approximated (as far as neutron balance is concerned) when
an intermittent charging of fresh fuel elements every few weeks, and a discharge of spent fuel elements at
these intervals, occurs since the fuel-composition changes occur so slowly with time.
139 The composition of the fuel will change during the irradiation, due to fissionable isotope depletion, fission
product generation, and build-up of nuclides resultant from the non-fission capture of neutrons in fissionable
and fertile material. In order to maintain neutron balance during the reactor's irradiation history, it is
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the typical operation of LWR due to its advantage of obtaining extended individual fuel
element exposure time-the individual fuel elements have a varied distribution of exposure
times and are reloaded on a progressive schedule so that the reactor always contains some
fresh fuel elements with reactivity greater than the average and some nearly spent elements
with reactivity less than the average [122]. During a refueling cycle implementing a batch-
wise scheme with progressive replacement, approximately one third of the fuel elements
are replaced and the remaining elements are shuffled to optimize the heat production of the
core yielding fuel elements that arefresh, once-burned, and twice-burned.
5.3.2 Acquiring the Estimated Antineutrino Spectrum
As noted, the total fission reaction rates of the four primary isotopes were derived
from modeling the reactor core based on the designed core concentration case of interest.
The four fission reaction rates were then translated to their respective fission rates through
a procedure incorporating the total fissionable fuel volume. The tabulated calculated fission
rates can be found in Appendix B. The fission antineutrino spectra were acquired by
following a procedure outline by Miller [118]. The observed beta spectra were fitted to
hypothetical beta-branches using the calculated spectra for 2m5U, 239PU and 24 1Pu adapted
from [115, 116] and 238U adapted from [123]. In order to use the measured data more
conveniently, an exponentially fitted version of the data was used in order to attain the
isotopic fission antineutrino production as a function of energy. The results of this can be
seen in the Figure 5.7 below. As can be seen in the figure, 238U emits the most antineutrinos
per fission, whereas 239Pu emits the least; there is only a minute difference in the
antineutrino emissions resultant from the fissioning of 2 3 5U and 24 1Pu.
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Figure 5.7: Fission Antineutrino Spectra
Exponentially fitted function of the antineutrino spectra measurements resultant from the ab initio approach
as defined [124] by for the isotopes 23U (blue dashed line), 238U (red dashed line) , 239Pu (green dashed line),
and 241 Pu (purple dashed line) corresponding to a 12 hour, 12 hour, 1.5 day, and 1.8 day irradiation time,
respectively.
necessary to insert extraneous neutron absorbers (e.g. control rods) or allow increased leakage of neutrons at
some times during the irradiation cycle.
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5.3.3 Acquiring the Antineutrino Estimated Expected Signal
The acquired neutrino spectrum emitted by the simulated reactor (based on the core
concentration case of interest) must be translated into the expected positron spectrum in the
experiment. In order to conceive this calculation, three contributions to this calculation
must be considered [118]:
e the detector distance from the core
e the inverse beta decay cross section
e the number of protons in the detector volume
From the perspective of our analysis, we considered a detector placed
approximately 25 ± 1 m from the reactor core, based on the SONGS1 and San Onofre
LWR experiment and practice identified by Bernstein et al [5]. A further supporting point
for this assumption is the demonstration site's similarity to potential and former customer
reactors at the McGuire and Oconee generating sites [66], which should expect similar
detector implementation and operating requirements. Because the detector distance from
the core can be surveyed by plant personnel, it ultimately will not have a significant
contribution to the expected signal uncertainty.
The cross section for the inverse beta decay was adapted from [125]. Similar to
Miller's procedure, the lowest order cross section was modified for several effects (e.g.
neuron recoil, weak magnetism, and radiative corrections) resulting in an estimated
accuracy of 1%. The estimated energy dependent inverse beta decay cross section can be
seen below in Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.8: Energy Dependent Inverse P-decay Cross-section
Courtesy of [5, 123, 125].
In addition, because we are considering an antineutrino detector similar in design to
the SONGS 1 detector due to its successful demonstration, for purposes of this analysis, we
assume the number of protons in the scintillator detector target to be approximately
73
8.79x 1029 ± 1%140 based on the stated assumptions as designated by [118].
The energy dependent isotopic antineutrino interaction spectra are then calculated
for the detector target, given these assumptions, in Figure 5.9 below.
x11
I i
2 3 4 5 6 7 3
F-nt ObV)
Figure 5.9: Energy Dependent Isotopic Antineutrino Interaction Spectra
The estimated antineutrinos per fission expected to interact with the detector target, when assuming the
energy dependent detector efficiency remains constant at 100%, can be seen for the respective isotopes: 2U
(blue dashed line), 2 3 8U (red dashed line) 141, 239Pu (green dashed line), and 24 1Pu (purple dashed line).
The expected antineutrino signal measured by the detector as a function of time, or
burnup step, can than be predicted as
N dNt
41cD2 dt
dNf E(E-)- o(E-)- " dE-f " dE-- fission v
where N, corresponds to the number of protons in the detector target and D corresponds to
the detector distance. The term d "" corresponds to the isotopic fission rate in the core,dt
as a function of time, where the index i corresponds to all of the considered isotopes 235U,2 3 8 U, 2 39 Pu, and 2 4 1Pu. The terms E(E-) 142 and a-(E-) correspond to the detector
140 The number of protons estimated in the detector target were actually approximated to 10.45 x 1029 ±
1.3%, which includes not only protons in the scintillator (8.79x 1029 ± 1%) but also protons in the acrylic
tanks that hold the detector (1.66 x 1029 ± 5%). Although the acrylic cells housing the scintillator offer some
efficiency for antineutrino interaction to be detected, it is difficult to identify the detection contribution
attributed to the surrounding housing, and hence only concern ourselves with scintillator protons. Uncertainty
for the scintillator proton count is attributed to the filling and mixing of the liquid, mass of the liquid,
knowledge of the chemical composition of the scintillator, and generalization of the liquid as primarily
composed of hydrocarbons (CnH 2n+ 2). Uncertainty for the acrylic protons count is attributed to acrylic cell
dimension estimates and density estimates from acrylic samples.
141 The absolute contribution from 238U is much lower after the accounting of relative fission rates.
142 The detector efficiency is assumed to be 1.
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efficiency, defined as the ratio of detected to interacting events in the detector target, and
inverse beta decay cross-section, depending on the antineutrino energy. The term
dNU
" corresponds to the isotopic fission antineutrino spectrum in units of events
dE- - fissionV
per MeV and fission. In the above equation, the sum corresponds to all fissioning isotopes
(2 35U, 2 38 U, 239Pu, 241Pu) and the integral over the antineutrino energies (1.8-8 MeV). It is
evident that the produced antineutrino rate is heavily dependent on the isotopic fission
rates, which is related to the reactor operating thermal power. Through this relationship, it
becomes clear that the energy spectrum of the antineutrinos can be further exploited to
extract or constrain the individual isotopic masses throughout the cycle.
5.4 Sources of Non-Antineutrino Events
An additional important factor to consider when estimating the antineutrino signal
measured by the detector, is the contribution associated with false positives, or those which
produce a signal which is not resultant from antineutrinos produced by the reactor. The
aspects of such non-reactor related antineutrino events are discussed further in the
statistical analysis performed for cases of interests. An example of such non-antineutrino
events is the background radiation related to cosmic muons, which must be shielded since a
product of one of their decay chains is the antineutrino as seen in the decay scheme below.
Fortunately, active shielding around the antineutrino detector can significantly reduce the
143
background signal contribution to antineutrino detection experiments
P- e -+v,+v
Neutrons are another source of false positive measurements, where the neutron can
cause detector protons to recoil in a scattering interaction resulting in scintillation light.
Partially following the procedure under inverse beta decay detection, the neutron can then
be absorbed by a Gd nucleus in the detection medium, resulting in secondary scintillation
light. An interacting neutron following this procedure can be mistaken for the prompt and
delayed signals of an antineutrino absorption through coincidence detection.
5.5 Relevant PMDA Verification Criteria Met with Antineutrino Detection
In this section, we analyze the specific applicability of antineutrino detection for
PMDA verification. As pointed out in Chapter 1, we argue that antineutrino detection will
aid in such verification endeavors, in likely order of applicability, through the (1)
confirmation of burnup, (2) confirmation of conversion product mass and isotopic
composition, (3) confirmation of the amount of WGPu irradiated in each cycle, and (4)
maintenance of CoK [43].
143 Early detector designs implemented Geiger-Muller tubes around the active detector volume. Modem day
detectors, however, implement an active shield design composed of plastic scintillator panels.
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As noted, both the US and Russia have the right to confirm the required burnup
levels 14 4 of one another's WGPu MOX fuel after irradiation in their specified reactors. In
the US, this required burnup level for each WGPu must be at least 20 GWd/MTHM. In
addition, each party also has the right to confirm that the conversion product used in the
fuel is still designated as WGPu, defined as plutonium with an 240pU:23 Pu isotopic ratio of
no more than 10%. Article IV of the PMDA requires that each state dispose of a minimum
of 1.3 MT annually. The US annual disposition volume can be confirmed via verification
of the disposition LWR MOX core concentration; potentially serving as an element of
accountancy that is needed in order to verify that total inventory and throughput were in
accordance with US specifications. Finally, although not mentioned in the agreement,
maintenance of CoK is not only likely to be desired by each party through bilateral
verification measures, but will be vital toward the Agreement's intended goals of ultimately
submitting to multilateral verification in conjunction with the IAEA. As noted in Chapter 4,
from a LWR and MOX safeguards perspective, CoK maintenance at the reactor core and
during the reactor's operation is also essential 4 5 . In addition, such maintenance will be
fundamental to confirmation of conversion product mass and isotopic composition as well
as annual WGPu irradiation volume.
As discussed in earlier sections, antineutrino rate measurement and energy spectrum
data provide a range of measurement abilities capable of successfully achieving each of the
applicability goals outlined above, either alone or in combination with another verification
activity. Such prospects are discussed in the following sections.
5.5.1 Antineutrino Rate Measurement
An antineutrino rate measurement alone has already demonstrated the capability of
monitoring the thermal power of an operational reactor [126]. This feat can be translated
into antineutrino detection prospects of CoK maintenance regarding operational status at
the designated LWR aiding in the plutonium disposition campaign.
An antineutrino rate measurement alone can provide continuous knowledge that the reactor
used for disposition is operational. Bernstein argues that using a simple antineutrino
detector, similar in design to the SONGS 1 detector and calibrated only with radioactive
sources or natural background radiation, and without any additional knowledge (e.g. initial
isotopic inventory) the absolute thermal power of the selected LWR can be estimated to
approximately 10-15% 146. Unfortunately, antineutrino rate measurements alone are unable
to address the other three stated applicability goals. Further inputs, such as the initial
verified fuel inventory, would be required.
144 Russia's required burnup level, as designated by the PMDA, is 3.9-5% HM atoms depending on the
reactor type and commissioning stage. For purposes of this thesis, however, we only concern ourselves with
the disposition procedure followed in the US.
145 As already acknowledged, antineutrino detection may aid in establishing CoK in the event of reactor shut-
down or in situations when contemporary safeguard procedures of reactor seals and/or C/S techniques are
compromised. Although not sufficient justifications for antineutrino implementation, such aforementioned
benefits of this technology are innate.
146 The uncertainty is yielded due to the numerous combinations of fuel composition and thermal power that
is also capable of resulting in identical antineutrino emission rates.
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5.5.2 Antineutrino Rate Measurement and Initial Isotopic Inventory
An antineutrino rate measurement coupled with an independent verification of the
input isotopic declaration within the reactor core would allow for the attainment of an
additional applicability goal, confirmation of the burnup. Both the fissile isotopic mass and
position of all the fuel assemblies (including both LEU and WGPu MOX) within the core,
we argue, could potentially be independently verified prior to irradiation in the reactor and
at the beginning of the cycle via contemporary domestic or international safeguard
mechanisms implemented further up the disposition procedural chain. Following the same
mechanisms outlined in the preceding section, the antineutrino rate could be measured
continuously throughout reactor operation, where the detector could be calibrated with
radioactive sources or natural background radiation in order to gain insight about the
detector efficiency. Given this initial knowledge regarding the detector efficiency, initial
isotopic declarations, and the antineutrino rate measurements, the total core burnup and
isotopic masses at later times in the cycle can be determined following the latter portion of
the procedure and equation described in section 5.3.3 in conjunction with a reactor core
simulation. Iterative steps of this procedure over the entire fuel cycle duration should result
in the estimated end of cycle burnup (and isotopic inventories) for each assembly.
Following the procedure described above, both CoK of the WGPu MOX fuel during
its time within the reactor core is maintained and confirmation that the WGPu fuel
assembly reached its designated minimum burnup requirement of 20 GWd/MTHM is
achieved 14 7 . This method provides continuity of knowledge on the presence of MOX fuel
in the core, and, provided a validated core model is used to assign burnup values *to
individual assemblies, a measure of the burnup of each MOX assembly. As noted,
antineutrino rate measurements alone are unable to address the applicability goals of
confirmation of conversion product mass and isotopic composition and confirmation of
annual WGPu irradiation volume; however, assuming independent verification of the initial
isotopic inventory within the core addresses these two goals.
The notional procedure just outlined assumes, for simplicity, that the WGPu MOX
fuel is able to achieve the minimum burnup requirement within one fuel cycle. If, as is
likely, multiple cycles are used in order to achieve the required burnup standard,
verification becomes more complicated, since item accountancy and C/S techniques must
be added to the regime during reactor off periods, during which the antineutrino detector
has no sensitivity. Because the produced simulation must now extended beyond one cycle,
its precision on the burnup estimates for the individual fuel assemblies will significantly
degrade without further input. If, however, C&S or other techniques can ensure that the
reshuffled assemblies have not been tampered with, the sensitivity of antineutrino detection
is maintained, and may serve to verify declarations of burnup and of discharged isotopic
masses within the core.
147 If the minimum WGPu MOX assembly bumup through a typical reactor cycle is slightly larger (-10%)
than the PMDA-designated bumup requirement, the requirements on the precision of the antineutrino detector
data are not severe and can be achieved by a simple antineutrino detector with performance capabilities
similar to the SONGS 1 detector.
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5.5.3 Antineutrino Rate Measurement and Reactor Thermal Power
An antineutrino rate measurement coupled with an independent verification of the
reactor thermal power would allow for the attainment of confirmation of conversion
product mass and isotopic composition, partial confirmation of annual WGPu irradiation
volume, and maintenance of CoK. A verification approach implementing these two metrics
is essentially a complement to the previously described procedure above where the
confirmation of burnup was inferred from the antineutrino rate measurements and the goals
of mass and isotopic composition as well as annual WGPu irradiation volume were solely
verified through initial isotopic declarations. In this case, however, confirmation of burnup
is essentially inferred solely through the independent verification of the reactor thermal
power rather than in combination with the antineutrino rate measurement.
The reactor operational thermal power throughout a cycle and other reactor
parameters (e.g. fuel assembly geometry, positions, etc.), we argue, could potentially be
independently verified either by a domestic/international inspecting party or by the reactor
operator. It must be noted that if verification is achieved through the acceptance of operator
declarations, the independence and credibility of such a verification exercise is
dramatically reduced. As originally acknowledged from the inspected and operator
perspectives in Chapters 3 and 4, however, attaining an independent power measurement is
a relatively intrusive requirement and will increase the difficulty in implementing such an
approach. Nonetheless, it is also assumed in this case-although more unrealistic than the
approach assumed in the preceding section-that initial isotopic inventories are provided
by the inspected state and not verified by other means
Once again, following the same mechanisms outlined in the section 5.5.1, the
antineutrino rate could be measured continuously throughout reactor operation, where the
detector could be calibrated with radioactive sources or natural background radiation.
Given this initial knowledge regarding the detector efficiency, inspector and/or operator
declared thermal power measurement, and the antineutrino rate measurements, the core-
wide isotopic composition (with sensitivity to the MOX core concentration) as well as a
range of mass 14 8 compositions and can be inferred following the latter portion of the
procedure and equation described in section 5.3.3. Because the specified verification
procedure in the PMDA does not specify individual assembly verification, only total
amount of conversion product, a core-wide inference is sufficient. A validated core
simulation would additionally allow assignment of masses to individual assemblies. The
range of masses that yielded reactor simulation-produced antineutrino rate measurement
consistent with the actual antineutrino rate measurement serve as possible values of the
actual fissile inventory1 49. Such mass compositions can be extrapolated in order to partially
148 The specific fissile mass is a bit more difficult to determine since, as noted earlier, a unique solution does
not exist. However, this may potentially be combated through the implementation of additional constraints
arising from the reactor simulation. The reactor simulation, implementing the initial isotopic inventories
declared by the state as well as varying inputs, will yield a predicted antineutrino rate measurement, which
can then be compared to the actual antineutrino rate measurement in order to estimate the detector sensitivity
to deviations from the declared value.
149 A declaration of initial isotopic inventories by the state is considered false if it deviates significantly from
the ongoing actual antineutrino rate measurement.
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verify that the disposition campaign is consistent with the annual 1.3 MT WGPu
disposition requirement as outlined in the PMDA.
5.5.4 Antineutrino Energy Spectrum Measurement
An antineutrino energy spectrum measurement could, in principle, allow for the
attainment of all four of the applicability goals 150 stated above. The antineutrino energy
spectrum is acquired over the duration of the fuel cycle, where, again following the same
mechanisms outlined in the section 5.5.1, the detector could be calibrated with radioactive
sources or natural background radiation in order to gain insight about the detector
efficiency. Unlike the antineutrino rate measurement based verification approaches
described in the preceding sections, no additional independent verification of the fissile
isotopic mass or thermal power is required in order to determine the core-wide fissile
isotopic and mass compositions as well as the reactor power and fuel burnup151 . This
occurs because these factors are simultaneously constrained by the variation in the
antineutrino energy spectrum measured through the cycle. Although the knowledge gained
through this metric may be beneficial, in regards to the required annual WGPu throughput
as it applies to the PMDA, the designated accountable metric is the disposition plutonium
isotopic mass, which will likely constitute a subset of the core. Although only partially
verified through the spectrum measurement, if the disposition MOX fuel core fraction and
positions are independently verified by other means, full verification of this goal may
potentially be achieved 5 . Similar to the antineutrino rate measurement approach, CoK is
provided for WGPu MOX presence within the core as well as burnup of the fuel consistent
with the operational status of the reactor. Although the prospects associated with an
antineutrino energy spectrum measurement are promising, the following analysis only
considers the prospects of antineutrino rate measurements. Nonetheless, we acknowledge
that testing procedures implementing antineutrino energy spectrum measurements are vital
to analyzing the overall prospects of antineutrino detection and should be considered in
future work.
150 Only partial verification of the annual WGPu disposition throughput requirement goal is achieved
151 Experimental uncertainty resultant from the spectrum measurement is the only contributor to the expected
uncertainty for the reconstructed power and mass inventories of the individual fissile isotopes.
152 Bernstein argues that the declared WGPu MOX assembly positions can be incorporated into the reactor
simulation to predict the expected antineutrino spectrum throughout the reactor cycle. Performing a reactor
simulation produced antineutrino spectrum and comparing it to the actual antineutrino spectrum measurement
could establish the validity of WGPu MOX irradiation declarations by the State. Although promising,
sensitivity to ill-declared disposition fuel composition and location declarations still serve as a potential threat
to this approach. For example, Hayes et al. have performed simulations that have shown that substituting
WGPu MOX fuel with conventional RGPu MOX fuel may result in nearly identical antineutrino spectral
evolutions.
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Chapter 6: Will It Work (A Statistical Analysis)
6.1 Model Selection for Antineutrino Count Rates
Upon the extraction of the isotopic fission reaction rates from each of the assembly
fuel types, we then simulated the antineutrino count rates for both the LEU and WGPu
MOX fuel types over the course of the fuel cycle. We use a Helios-2 simulation of each
fuel assembly originally published in the OECD/NEA Working Party benchmark 15 3 [119]
which employed many of the characteristics of the NEACRP L-335 PWR benchmark
proposed by Finnerman 5 4 [127]. We then extrapolated the associated antineutrino count
rates for each fuel type to a simulated core consisting of various concentrations of these
fuel types for different cases for use in our hypothesis testing.
Following a similar procedure as outlined by Bulaevskaya et al. [4], we describe the
PWR core antineutrino count rate evolution N-(t) at time t in days of the fuel cycle as
N- (t) = R,(t)- V,- ip (6.1)
where Rfi(t) is the fission reaction rate as a function of time t for each fuel type f (LEU or
WGPu MOX) and each isotope i (23 5U, 2 3 8U, 2 39Pu, and 241Pu) ". The term Vf corresponds
to the core volume associated with a given fuel type. The term yV is a factor used to convert
fission rate to antineutrino production for a given isotope defined by the integral function
across all energies of interest156-
V, =af N-- or (E)- dE (6.2)
where a is a constant related to the detector mass, efficiency, and standoff distance 5 7
[128]. The terms N- and of(E) correspond to the number of antineutrinos produced per
fission for a given isotope and the isotope's fission cross-section at a specified energy,
respectively. The conversion factor for each isotope is found below in Table 6.1.
153 This benchmark adds the complexity of modeling a rod eject in a core fueled partially with WGPu MOX
basing the core simulation from a four-loop Westinghouse PWR power plant design.
154 The benchmark was designed to assess the ability of spatial kinetics codes to model rod ejection
transients.
155 It can be similarly argued that this term is related to the reactor thermal power simply because of its
neutron flux factor. This isotopic fission reaction rates are well approximated by a cubic and sextic
polynomial functions for WGPu MOX and LEU fuel types, respectively (note that polynomial regression of
data has an inherent danger of faulty extrapolation). At minimum, 95% of the variation of the reaction rates
are accounted for by these polynomial relationships with time (days).
156 We concern ourselves with the energy range of 1.8-8 MeV.
157 For purposes of this simulation, we assume a fully efficient detector with a mass of 0.64 MT at a standoff
distance of 25 m.
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Table 6.1: Isotopic Antineutrino Conversion Factor
Isotope Conversion Factor V/ (x 10~-)
_=U 5.16
238u 3.36
239Pu 7.25
21Pu 4.80
The estimated antineutrino counts associated with the variation in PWR core
concentrations being considered in this work are well approximated by a quadratic
function of time' 5 8:
N-(t) = #3 +#gt +#2t 2  (6.3)
Based on the statistical procedure performed in this analysis, the quadratic model appears
to be valid for PWR core with WGPu MOX fuel concentrations of up to 48.4%1 . The
coefficients Po, Pi, and P2 in (6.3) associated with our quadratic approximation will be used
to detect a potential departure from the baseline scenario, which will be described in further
detail.
6.1.1 Validity for Quadratic Response Function
In order to test the validity of the selection of a quadratic function as the best
approximation of the baseline and measured count rates, the effectiveness of the quadratic
effect coefficient, #2, was tested. The purpose of this testing was to determine whether or
not this term could be dropped from the model. In order to achieve this, the following
hypotheses were tested:
HO, :#2 =0
where HO implies the notion that no quadratic effect exists in the response function and Ha
implying the counter. A t-test was used for this hypothesis testing, such that the test statistic
was:
t* -
se(#2}
At a standard level of significance such as 0.05 for a 493-day cycle period [i.e. t(0.975,
492)=1.965], our decision rule is as follows:
If I t*I < 1.965, conclude Ho
158 Please note-although concerns arise regarding the implementation of complex polynomial models and
over-fitting the data and false extrapolation-for purposes of this analysis, we find this model to be sufficient
since the specific time period (one cycle) is only considered and we do not intend to predict estimated counts
past this time period (further detail regarding its validity can be found in the following section).
159 Please note that this limit is based on the design parameters of the MOX and LEU assemblies described in
this work below; this limit may change if these parameters are varied.
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If l t* > 1.965, conclude Ha
Although multiple iterations (100,000) were performed, resulting in the generation of t*
values, the overwhelming data set always resulted in I t* >> 1.965; providing credible
support in concluding Ha, that a quadratic effect does exist and that the quadratic effect
coefficient should be retained in the model6 0 .
6.1.2 Set-up for Testing of Diversion Activities
Following the model approximations described in (3), the true baseline evolution of
antineutrino count rate as a function of time t in the fuel cycle is given by
N (t) = AoB +AtAB B'
where the baseline evolution, described in equation 6.4 above (and for the remainder of this
work) with the superscript "B", is obtained from our reactor simulation. Because our
predicted baseline evolution is obtained from a reactor assembly simulation, subject to both
random and systematic errors, we modify the following equation so that pB(t) is the
baseline evolution antineutrino count rate value at time t predicted by the simulation.
pB W)=/A +AB0 t+p 2 ,t 2  (6.5)
We approximate the baseline count rate at time t as a Gaussian random variable with the
stated mean above equal to the predicted simulation value and standard deviation equal to
3%161
N-B (t) ~ Gaussian[pB(t),0.03pB(t)] (6.6)
The assumed 3% random error is the maximum random error for these and other HELIOS
simulations when scaling up to a total reactor capacity [119, 129]. In order to simulate the
measured count rate evolution, which will be tested against the baseline count rate
evolution, we approximate its count rate at time t as a Poisson random variable, based on
the statistical uncertainty associated with actual antineutrino count rate measurements of a
reactor core [126].
P(t)= #,, + , t + t2 (6.7)
N- (t) ~ Poisson[(p (t)] (6.8)
160 Similarly, as noted by Neter et al., a partial F test could also have been used, and was used in this
analysis, providing further fodder for the notion that the quadratic effect coefficient should be retained in the
response function.
161 Bulaevskaya et al. argue that simulations for these purposes are "limited in accuracy by systematic errors,
arising from bias in the input antineutrino spectral densities, as well as other factors... [and] can be removed
by a calibration procedure."
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By construction, the modeled baseline count rates are Gaussian, and the high Poisson
statistics of the measured count rates make them approximately Gaussian as demonstrated
by McCullagh [130] such that
N (t) -Gaussian[P(p, (6.9)
The linear effect coefficient, pi, and the quadratic effect coefficient, p2, of the estimated
response function for the regression model will often be highly correlated for a sample
because of the simple correlation between t and t2 ; meaning small values of t will be
associated only with small values of t2 and, similarly, large values of t only with small
values of t2. In order to remove such instability between these coefficient estimates, the
standard practice, as identified by Neter et al. [131], of performing the polynomial
regression on the independent variable as a deviation from its mean is used, such that
r = t-t (6.10)
Expressing the independent variable as a deviation from its mean reduces the
multicollinearity substantially. As such, the approximations for the baseline and measured
antineutrino count rates can be reparameterized as:
MB =YO +y,, + Y2, T2 (6.11)
yI YoM y, + + 2  (6.12)
6.1.3 Residual Analysis of Selected Approximations
In order to study the aptness of the polynomial regression models adapted for the
baseline and measured count rates, the residuals were plotted against both the estimated
evolution approximations [ p, (T) and m (r)] as well as the independent variable 'r, as an
exploratory analysis of our assumption. It was noted that no systematic departures from 0
were evident in the residuals as either P/B (T), PM (T), or T progressed suggesting that the
quadratic response function was a good fit. Furthermore, there was no tendency noted in
the analysis for the spread of the residuals to vary systematically, suggesting that a constant
error variance assumption is reasonable.
6.2 Testing Procedure
Based on the specifications of our testing set-up, the testing procedure consisted of
the following steps, where the subscript i is used to denote the subscripts 0, 1, and 2,
associated with each coefficient. Each of the aforementioned coefficients (y, and y,,) can
be compared to its counterpart through hypotheses testing following the process:
Ho : YiM = Ye
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where Ho implies the notion that the two coefficients are equal and Ha implying the
counter. In order to attain these coefficients, we first begin by generating the baseline {
N- (t) } and measured { N- (t) } evolutions according to equations (6.11) and (6.12)
above. We then perform a polynomial regression on the generated baseline and measured
evolutions in order to develop a modeled count rate and to obtain the coefficient estimates [
y and y, ] and their respective standard errors [se 2yB) and se yM)]. We then obtain
the test statistics from the respective function
= * YM -YiB
se( y)+se2(i)
And their corresponding p-value, given by
p1 =P(Ta t*)
We use a Student's t distribution with 2 (n - 3) degrees of freedom' 62 . Although it can be
argued that a one-tailed test should be used for purposes of this analysis-based on the
presumption that irradiating more WGPu MOX fuel than originally declared is not a
concern to the world audience-a two-tailed test is selected because of the potential safety
risks associated with the prospect of burning more WGPu MOX fuel than originally
intended. We propose that the selected statistical testing procedure is well adapted for
power and robustness providing a credible performance metric in our hypothesis testing
both "sensitive to change in the specific factors tested [and] insensitive to changes, of a
magnitude likely to occur in practice, in extraneous factors [132]."
6.2.1 Statistical Error
In statistical test theory the notion of statistical error is an integral part of hypothesis
testing, where the variation between two sample distributions, like those described above,
can be explained by chance or not. Hence, in order to test the validity of the
aforementioned null and alternate hypotheses, a level of significance, a, must be selected.
Essentially, the level of significance is a threshold value set by the user in order to accept
or reject Ho (the counter being to reject or accept H 1). Typical levels of significance are
10%, 5%, 1%, 0.5%, and 0.1%163.
Although our testing procedure, like any testing procedure, provides insight in
regards to the comparison of two sample distributions, the possibility of the test result
disagreeing with what is actually taking place does exist. For example, if a significant
162 Our selected degrees of freedom is allocated from the fact that we implemented a polynomial regression
(synomous with multiple regression) on our selected data with two variables following the function k*(n-k-1)
where k are the number of variables used. Please note that the implementation of more variables results in the
erosion of one's ability to test the model (i.e. the statistical power of the model declines).
163 The lower the significance level, the stronger the evidence required. Choosing the level of significance is
a somewhat arbitrary task, but for many applications, a level of 5% is chosen, for no better reason than that it
is conventional.
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difference is found in at least one of the tested coefficients when in actuality the coefficient
was yielded from the baseline scenario (which should result in the acceptance of Ho), our
testing procedure will result in a p-value that will fall below a (resulting in the rejection of
Ho). This error is known as a Type I Error 164 or False Positive. Its complement is the True
Negative, which is defined as the correct inference that none of the coefficients differed
from its baseline counterpart when the evolution being tested was yielded from the baseline
scenario. On the other hand, the potential counter is known as a Type II Error or False
Negative. This would occur if our testing procedure failed in perceiving a significant
difference in all three coefficients when in actuality the evolution spawned from a case
other than the baseline scenario. Its complement is the True Positive, which is defined as
the testing procedure's ability to determine a significant difference in at least one of the
coefficients from its baseline counterpart when the evolution being tested was in fact
different from the original baseline scenario. All four potential outcomes in a statistical
testing procedure can be described by a Contingency Table (Table 6.2 below).
Table 6.2: Contingency Table
Acce t Ho True Negative fType II Error
Acce t H1  Type I Error True Positive
As stated, the level of significance will determine the false positive rate resultant
from a statistical analysis. In order to determine the acceptable false positive rate, we
employ the false discovery rate procedure described by Benjamini and Hocherg [133] to
determine whether to reject the H0, in favor of Ha , where-following a similar procedure
as outlined by [4]-if at least one of the null hypotheses is rejected, we conclude that the
measured evolution deviates significantly from that of the baseline. However, generally
speaking, there is an inherent tradeoff associated with the goal of minimizing the false
positive rate; the true positive rate is also minimized. In order to analyze the tradeoff
associated with these two characteristic metrics of our statistical testing procedure, receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curves are generated for each case considered so that a true
positive rate (sensitivity) can be determined at an acceptable false positive rate (1-
specificity).
6.3 Cases Considered
As previously noted, we consider the antineutrino detector's ability as a potential
monitoring technology to be integrated in the monitoring regime as described by the
PMDA. The assumptions being considered in this analysis again are: (1) an independently
measured thermal power, (2) a core model using the declared (not actual) initial isotopics
provided in order to determine the baseline case to be analyzed, and (3) an antineutrino
detector with systematic error controlled at the 3% level 6 s. Under the PMDA, US LWR
164 In many practical applications, type I errors are more delicate than type II errors. In these cases, care is
usually focused on minimizing the occurrence of this statistical error.
165 Note: this assumption does not include detector and other related errors such as the error associated with
the antineutrino emitted energy spectrum. For this reason, this analysis is an optimistic, best-case scenario
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selected to operate with WGPu MOX fuel would only "insert a maximum of 40% of the
reactor core with [weapons-grade] MOX fuel 6 6 [46]." As noted, since current forecasts
generated by the NNSA expect produced MOX fuel assemblies to be implemented in
PWR, we only consider the irradiation of WGPu MOX fuel as it relates to the core
concentration of PWR core, which comprises of 193 total fuel assemblies. Therefore a
maximum of a 40% MOX PWR core concentration corresponds to 77 of the reactor's 193
total fuel assemblies being comprised of WGPu MOX fuel. Hence, if a state claims to have
irradiated 77 fuel assemblies, we seek to identify the potential capabilities of antineutrino
detection in uncovering diversion scenarios outside of this claim. Although a 40% MOX
equilibrium core appears to be the most likely reactor operational scenario given the
contemporary US MOX fuel usage forecasts and lack of US customer reactors as described
in Chapter 2, based on European and Japanese experience of burning reactor-grade MOX
fuel, often referenced by the NRC and NNSA in their safety analyses of the irradiation of
WGPu MOX fuel in LWR, we also consider the additional cases of irradiating one-third,
one-quarter, and one-fifth WGPu MOX core concentration cases (corresponding to 64, 48,
and 39 WGPu MOX fuel assemblies, respectively). The simulated antineutrino count rate
evolution for each of these cases along a one-cycle lifetime can be seen below in Figure
6.1.
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Figure 6.1: Antineutrino Count Rate Evolutions for Varying MOX Core
Concentrations
This plot depicts the antineutrino count rate evolutions expected for the irradiation of 0 (dashed purple line),
39 (blue line), 48 (green line), 64 (orange line), and 77 (red line) WGPu MOX fuel assemblies. The remaining
assemblies in each of these cases (193, 154, 148, 129, and 116, respectively) are assumed to be LEU.
which depicts the achievable prospects of antineutrino detection and limitations of rate-based measurements
(whether absolute or relative), without knowledge of the true initial core load. Bernstein et al. have generated
an analysis which indicates that verifying burnup with high confidence in the disposition campaign can be
achieved through independent verification of the initial core load, combined with a crude absolute
antineutrino rate measurement without an independent thermal power measurement.
166 The remainder of the fuel (60% or greater) is expected to be typical LEU fuel.
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6.4 ROC Curve Analysis
As previously noted, in order to study the inherent tradeoffs associated with the true
positive and false positive rates, a simulation was performed to estimate the true positive
rate at a given false positive rate. Consistent with the target goals of the IAEA safeguards
regime-which, as designated by the PMDA Article VII.3, is expected to "implement
verification measures with respect to each Party's disposition program"-we assume that a
credible and acceptable metric would be at least a 95% true positive rate at maximum false
positive rate of 5%.
For each of the specified scenarios, a simulation was conducted in order to estimate
the true positive rate at the 5% false positive rate limit, where 100,000 pairs of the baseline
and diversion scenario count rate measurements were generated, with the former from
Gaussian distribution and the latter from a Poisson distribution as referenced in equations
(6.6) and (6.8), respectively. As an example, Figure 4 below shows the baseline
antineutrino count rate evolution as well as its associated count rate measurements for the
case of the irradiation of 77 WGPu MOX fuel assemblies. The diversion scenario count
rate measurements were generated for the diversion case of irradiating one-less MOX
assembly than originally intended, or 76 WGPu MOX fuel assemblies.
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Figure 6.2: Antineutrino Count Rate Evolution and Measurements
This plot depicts the antineutrino count rate evolution (black line) as well as its associated count rate
measurements (blue points) for the case of the irradiation of 77 WGPu MOX fuel assemblies. The
corresponding diversion scenario count rate measurements (red points), associated with the irradiation of 76
WGPu MOX fuel assemblies, are also displayed.
Upon the generation of each of the pairs of count rate measurements associated with
the baseline and diversion scenario cases, the procedures as outlined in the "Set-up for
Testing of Diversion Activities," and the "Testing Procedure" were followed in order to
test the detector's capabilities and limits in identifying diversion cases from the original
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intended amount of MOX fuel to be irradiated. As stated, a 100,000 pairs 16 7 were generated
and tested at varying levels of significance in order to estimate both the true positive and
false positive rates. The false positive rates, and their corresponding true positive rates
found at each of these varying levels of significance, were then plotted against each other
in order to generate the ROC curve associated with the given baseline to diversion scenario
case comparison. Following the previous example, Figure 6.3 below explores the generated
ROC curve associated with the 77:76 baseline:diversion-scenario case comparison to
review the estimated true positive rate as the false positive rate varies. In addition, the
generated ROC curves associated with the 77:73 and 77:70 baseline:diversion-scenario
case comparisons are also constructed in order to show the transition, and better true
positive rate acquired, in the antineutrino detector's capability. As can be seen in Figure 5,
we do not achieve at least a 95% true positive rate at the 5% false positive rate limit until
the 77:70 baseline:diversion-scenario case comparison. A similar procedure was also
followed for the three additional cases (one-third, one-quarter, and one-fifth MOX cores) to
determine the true positive rate at the 5% false positive rate limit for the diversion-scenario
case of the irradiation of one-less WGPu MOX assembly than originally intended and the
diversion-scenario case of the irradiation of a lower concentration of WGPu MOX
assemblies in which the antineutrino detector is capable of achieving at least a 95% true
positive rate at the 5% false positive rate. The results of which can be seen in Table 6.3
below.
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Figure 6.3: ROC Curves for Baseline:Diversion-Scenario Case Comparison
This plot depicts the generated ROC curves associated with the 77:76 (red line), 77:73 (green line), and 77:70
(blue line) baseline:diversion-scenario case comparisons in order to review the estimated true positive rate as
the false positive rate varies.
167 Similar to the procedure implemented by Bulaevskaya et al., a 100,000 generated evolutions was selected
in order to ensure that every true positive rate estimate would be within 1% of the relevant "true" true positive
rate.
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Table 6.3: ROC Curve Analysis Results for Baseline:Diversion-Scenario Case
Comnrisons
*If minor reductions are allowed at the true positive rate level from our initial assumption of a true
positive:false positive rate comparison of 95%:5%, it may pose of some interest to note that at one assembly
number above those stated (i.e. six-less MOX assemblies from baseline case) true positive rates of 92.9%,
91.4%, 90.1%, and 89.9%, respectively, were all noted at the 5% false positive rate.
6.5 Effect of Non-Reactor Based Antineutrino Events
Bernstein et al. [126] have noticed that non-reactor based antineutrino events in the
detector, spurred by background radiation, can mimic actual antineutrino signals generated
from fission in the reactor core. Based on their measurement analyses, they show that
background radiation, measured during reactor-off periods, is distributed as a Poisson
random variable. These non-reactor based antineutrino events dilute the detector and test
sensitivity. In the previous simulation analysis, we depicted the sensitivity of our detector
for purposes of the PMDA in the absence of background. In these examples, it was found
that the detector was successful in identifying diversion scenarios up to a maximum of
approximately seven MOX fuel assemblies below the baseline scenario, or the amount
originally intended.
In order to study the effect of the background on the sensitivity of our testing
procedure, a Poisson-distributed background term is incorporated into the testing structure
with its mean proportional to the given evolution's initial count rate. The true positive rates
are then recalculated at the 5% false positive rate limit for the cases of backgrounds with
means equal to 5%, 10%, and 25% of the initial antineutrino count rate. Our maximum
background mean of 25% is comparable to the observed background rate as identified by in
the SONGS1 antineutrino detector "reactor-off' background measurement [134]. An
example in the variation of the true positive and false positive rates at the 77:70
baseline:diversion-scenario case comparison as a result of the addition of this background
can be seen in Figure 6.4 below.
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Case Baseline One-Less MOX Detectable
(Assembly Number) Assembly Diversion Assembly Number
TP (TP >95% and
(at 5% FP) <5% FP)*
1 77 7.5% 7
2 64 7.2% 7
3 48 6.9% 7
4 39 6.7% 7
False Pddy Rate (%)
Figure 6.4: ROC Curve for 77:70 Case Comparison at Varying Background Rates
This plot depicts the generated ROC curves associated with the 77:70 baseline:diversion-scenario case
comparison with no background term (red line) and including a background term with a mean equal to 5%
(orange line), 10% (green line), and 25% (blue line) of the initial antineutrino count rate.
The variation in the true positive rates at the 5% false positive rate limit for the
other baseline:diversion-scenario case comparisons conducted in this analysis can be seen
below in Table 6. It is interesting to note that at even at a background mean of 25% of the
initial antineutrino count rate, the test performance slightly degrades by a maximum of
approximately 2%. Similar to the results determined by Bulaevskaya et al., such success in
the test performance would be expected to degrade substantially when the background rate
increases and approaches that of the signal.
Table 6.4: ROC Curve Analysis Results for Baseline:Diversion-Scenario Case
Corparisons at Varying Background Rates
Background (% of signal) 0 5 10 25
Case Comparison (baseline:diversion-scenario)
77:70 100 98.8 98.6 98.1
64:57 100 98.6 98.5 98.1
48:41 99.9 98.4 97.9 97.5
39:32 99.8 99.4 98.1 97.9
6.6 Effect of Measurement Duration
As expected in any measurement exercise, for purposes of this analysis, the
estimates of the evolution coefficients, y,,, and the test performance are expected to
improve as longer durations of measurements are allowed. In the previous analyses, we
considered measurements accounted for along the entire lifetime of the cycle (493 days). In
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order to gain insight into the effect associated with the duration of measurement and the
capabilities of the antineutrino detector's ability to successfully identify diversion scenarios
at earlier periods, we investigate the following three duration periods outside of the
previously considered full cycle length: the first year (approximately 360 days), the first 6
months (approximately 180 days), and the first 3 months (approximately 90 days) of
operation. An exploration was conducted for the success of the testing procedure at the first
30 days, however, initial simulations depicted that the test performance is highly
unfavorable at such low measurement durations.
Still consistent with the designated credible and acceptable metric of a true positive
rate of at least a 95% at maximum false positive rate of 5%, the diversion-scenario cases
are found for each of these measurement duration periods and each MOX core
concentration case. The results of which can be seen in Table 6.5 below. Consistent with
the previous analysis associated with the effect of the background rate, it is interesting to
note that the test performance is largely maintained.
Table 6.5: ROC Curve Analysis Results for Baseline:Diversion-Scenario Case
Comparisons at Varying Measurement Durations
Baseline Case (Number of MOX Assemblies) 77 64 48 39
Duration Period
First 90 days 65 51 35 26
First 180 days 68 55 38 29a
First 360 days 70 1571 40 31
a Although not 95%, a true positive rate of 93.4% was reached at 30 WGPu MOX assemblies
b Although not 95%, a true positive rate of 93.7% was reached at 32 WGPu MOX assemblies
Excluding one-fifth WGPu MOX core case (39 WGPu MOX assemblies), it
appears that our test performance for the measurement duration of the first year (-360
days) is essentially identical to the test performance for the measurement duration of the
entire cycle (493 days). In addition, excluding the one-fifth WGPu MOX core case again,
our test performance for the case comparisons are only reduced by 5 WGPu MOX
assemblies when the measurement duration is reduced to the first 3 months (-90 days).
6.6.1 Sensitivity Analysis
To investigate the impact in the detector sensitivity associated with the
measurement duration, we investigate the sensitivity associated with our testing procedure
at the extremes of our measurement duration periods, 90 days and 493 days. In addition to
analyzing the sensitivity of our detector at the maximum MOX core concentration case (77
WGPu MOX assemblies), we also investigate the sensitivity of our testing procedure in
potentially identifying the introduction of WGPu MOX assemblies into a fuel core
expected to only be operating with LEU; a case that may prove beneficial for the IAEA not
only in its aspirations for successful verification mechanisms as related to the PMDA but,
more generally, in its continual aspirations to safeguard MOX fuel use.
As previously acknowledged, the selection of a level of significance (a) is an
extremely delicate task, where many tradeoffs emerge depending on its magnitude. A
relatively large a, like 5%, as compared to relatively small a, like 0.1%, allows the user the
benefit of successfully differentiating between various MOX core concentrations (true
positive rate), at the downfall of an increase in the rate of falsely differentiating between
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various MOX core concentrations (false positive rate). With a target false positive rate limit
of 5%, the associated level of significance was often found between 1-2%. In each of these
analyzed cases, 100,000 iterations are performed in which the testing procedure determines
the MOX core concentration that it perceives as being different from the baseline cases (77
and 0 WGPu MOX assemblies). In Figures 6.5 and 6.6, the sensitivity analyses for the case
of 77 WGPu MOX assemblies with the measurement duration periods of 90 and 493 days,
respectively, are presented. Similarly, Figures 6.7 and 6.8 depict the sensitivity analyses for
the case of 0 WGPu MOX assemblies with the measurement duration periods of 90 and
493 days, respectively. As can be seen in the each of these analyses, the determined case
comparisons appear to be Gaussian distributed, following the function:
-
x -)2
f(x;u,X)=e 22 (13)
where x, x, and u- correspond to the number of assemblies, the sample mean, and the
standard deviation, respectively. In addition, a corresponding 95% threshold value is
selected either below (for the 77 WGPu MOX assemblies case) or above (for the 0 WGPu
MOX assemblies case) for each of these cases. For the cases analyzed, this 95% threshold
value correlates to the minimum (for the 77 WGPu MOX assemblies case) or maximum
(for the 0 WGPu MOX assemblies case) limit in which our testing procedure can
successfully identify a potential diversion act outside of original core concentration as
designated by the state (assumed to be the baseline scenario).
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Figure 6.5: Sensitivity Analysis for 77 MOX WGPu Assemblies (90 days)
A histogram and corresponding Gaussian distribution approximation for the sensitivity analysis performed for
the 77 WGPu MOX assemblies case at a 90-day measurement duration period. With a level of significance
set at 1%, the false positive rate was 2.84% with a 95% threshold value set at 63.47 WGPu MOX assemblies.
The Gaussian distribution approximation has a mean of 68.2846 with a standard deviation of 2.9285.
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Figure 6.6: Sensitivity Analysis for 77 MOX WGPu Assemblies (493 days)
A histogram and corresponding Gaussian distribution approximation for the sensitivity analysis performed for
the 77 WGPu MOX assemblies case at a 493-day measurement duration period. With a level of significance
set at 1%, the false positive rate was 2.77% with a 95% threshold value set at 69.68 WGPu MOX assemblies.
The Gaussian distribution approximation has a mean of 72.3122 with a standard deviation of 1.6004.
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Figure 6.7: Sensitivity Analysis for 0 MOX WGPu Assemblies (90 days)
A histogram and corresponding Gaussian distribution approximation for the sensitivity analysis performed for
the 0 WGPu MOX assemblies case at a 90-day measurement duration period. With a level of significance set
at 1%, the false positive rate was 2.83% with a 95% threshold value set at 15.10 WGPu MOX assemblies.
The Gaussian distribution approximation has a mean of 9.6888 with a standard deviation of 3.2842.
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Figure 6.8: Sensitivity Analysis for 0 MOX WGPu Assemblies (493 days)
A histogram and corresponding Gaussian distribution approximation for the sensitivity analysis performed for
the 0 WGPu MOX assemblies case at a 493-day measurement duration period. With a level of significance
set at 1%, the false positive rate was 2.71% with a 95% threshold value set at 7.98 WGPu MOX assemblies.
The Gaussian distribution approximation has a mean of 5.1070 with a standard deviation of 1.7417.
6.7 Effect of Systematic Uncertainty and Operator Malfeasance
With any measurement exercise, the prospects of falling victim to systematic
uncertainty16 8 in the predicted and/or measured antineutrino count rate for our testing
procedure are quite likely to happen. Uncertainties in our predicted and/or measured count
rates have the potential to cause the measurements collected by the detector to deviate
significantly from the predicted baseline evolution. This has the potential to cause massive
increases in our false positive rate due to the increased prospects associated with large
deviations even in the absence of diversion scenario action. In our simulation, the absolute
count rate of reactor antineutrinos was predicted with 3% systematic uncertainty. In
similarly related reactor-based antineutrino measurement experiments, Bemporad et al.
determined that errors arising from detector-related systematic uncertainties169 are smaller
at around the 1.5% level 7 0 [135].
Beyond the scope of systematic uncertainties, the prospects of operator malfeasance
can also pose extreme threats to the associated predicted and measured antineutrino count
rate. As originally shown in equation (6.1), both thermal power of the operating reactor and
the fissile isotopic content in its fuel core can be altered and may result in dramatic effects
associated with the antineutrino count rate. For example, in an attempt to conceal the intent
to irradiate less WGPu MOX assemblies than originally stated, the reactor operator may
report a lower operating power than the power the reactor truly operated 1 . Such
168 Systematic uncertainty is inclusive of examples like instrumental effects, incorrect calibration, etc.
169 For example, this may relate to imperfect knowledge of the number of target atoms in the detector.
170 Note, this is the best-case scenario for the detector uncertainties. Spectral densities also have a 3%
systematic error as described in Bemporad et al. and later publications, which can't be neglected in this kind
of analysis unless we have a prior high statistical measurements of the baseline core for comparison.
The assumption is made that misreporting power is only a sensible strategy for the operator who is truly
irradiating less fuel than originally intended. Therefore, a false positive incident would only occur if the
operator were indeed operating the reactor at the reported power (but different from the original baseline
scenario), for example, in order to generate a different amount of electricity. However, it is vital to note that
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information introduced into the hypothesis testing procedure would cause the simulation to
incorrectly predict a systematic downward shift in the baseline evolution. Please note,
although fissile isotopic content of the fuel core can effect the associated antineutrino count
rate, the effect associated with fissile isotopic content (i.e. the irradiation of reactor-grade
MOX fuel or higher-burnup LEU fuel) is not considered in this analysis as this appears to
be too difficult of a task for any potential rate-based testing procedure to identify under the
limitations of antineutrino monitoring [136].
In order to address the impact of a misreported power history as well as systematic
uncertainty with the detector 7 , we considered the most extreme case in which the
operator-truly operating with a core composed of 0 WGPu MOX fuel assemblies despite
original statements that he/she would operate with a core composed of 77 WGPu MOX
fuel assemblies-published a lower operating power such that the antineutrino count rate
on the initial day was comparable to that of the antineutrino count rate associated with the
predicted baseline of a reactor operating with a core composed of 77 WGPu MOX fuel
assemblies. To totally eliminate the inconsistencies associated operator malfeasance or
systematic uncertainty for the hypothesis testing procedure, a relative comparison, as
compared to an absolute comparison, of the antineutrino count rate evolutions is proposed.
Although seeking to maintain consistency with prior analyses at the 77:70
baseline:diversion-scenario case comparison along a full cycle-length measurement
duration, Figure 6.9 depicts how similarly related these measurements are; such that the
measurement error associated with the diversion-scenario associated with the irradiation of
70 WGPu MOX assemblies resides within the error associated with the baseline evolution.
often times the state of each core is recorded hourly in a plant history file, among other places. In many of the
antineutrino detection experiments, this is how personnel monitored the state of the plant to extracted the
fission rates produced from the core.
172 We assume that this scenario addresses impacts associated with operator malfeasance and systematic
uncertainty based on the assumption that the error associated with operator malfeasance is much greater than
that associated with systematic uncertainty. In an analysis of the effect associated with systematic bias in
detector response, Bulaevskaya et al. considered the scenarios of false overall upward and downward
systematic shifts (at 1% of the original evolution). Both scenarios, generated in order to simulate
miscalibration of the detector (i.e. incorrectly estimating the detector volume or detector distance from the
reactor core), resulted with nearly equivalent effects. resulting from a miscalibration of the detector, such as
an underestimate of the detector volume. The directions of both shifts were chosen to undermine the
statistical power of the test. A 1% absolute systematic error was found to be more than sufficient to illustrate
the strong impact of such shifts, and the performance of both scenarios chosen to undermine the statistical
power of the test.
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Figure 6.9: Relative Antineutrino Count Rate Evolution and Measurements
This plot depicts the relative antineutrino count rate evolution (black line) as well as its associated count rate
measurements (blue points) for the case of the irradiation of 77 WGPu MOX fuel assemblies. The
corresponding diversion scenario count rate measurements (red points), associated with the irradiation of 70
WGPu MOX fuel assemblies, are also displayed.
For this reason, we analyze the capabilities of the hypothesis procedure in
successfully identifyring the diversion scenario of the aforementioned extreme case of the
70:0 baseline:diversion-scenario case comparison as seen in Figure 6.10 below. Figure 6.11
below highlights how the resulting baseline prediction is much less distinguishable from
the diversion scenario than their original counterparts as seen in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.10: Relative Antineutrino Count Rate Evolution and Measurements
This plot depicts the relative antineutrino count rate evolution (black line) as well as its associated count rate
measurements (blue points) for the case of the irradiation of 77 WGPu MOX fuel assemblies. The
corresponding diversion scenario count rate measurements (red points), associated with the irradiation of 0
WGPu MOX fuel assemblies, are also displayed.
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Figure 6.11: Relative Antineutrino Count Rate Evolutions
This plot depicts the relative antineutrino count rate evolutions expected for the irradiation of 0 (blue line)
and 77 (red line) WGPu MOX fuel assemblies. The remaining assemblies in each of these cases (193 and
116, respectively) is assumed to be LEU.
However, despite analyzing the most extreme (and least likely) case comparison
and the absence of other considered variables in the broader analysis such as background
count rate and/or reduced measurement duration periods, the false positive rate could only
be reduced to a minimum of 55.7%, resulting in a true positive rate of approximately
97.2%'73.
In an attempt to reduce the false positive rate further, the hypothesis testing was
reconfigured such that the latter days of the full cycle length measurement duration period
was only considered in hopes that the hypothesis testing procedure would be strengthened
by analyzing the count rate measurements where the two cases would differ the most. We
considered the cases of the last 90, 60, 30, and 10 day periods of the full cycle
measurement duration period. For the last 90 days of the measurement duration period, the
false positive rate could only be reduced to a minimum of 15.1%, resulting in a true
positive rate of 53.4%. For the last 60 days of the measurement duration period, however,
the 5% false positive rate was achieved with a true positive rate of 34.6%. Similarly, for the
last 30 and 10-day periods of the measurement duration period, a true positive rates of
35.7% and 26.9%, respectively, were achieved at the 5% false positive rate limit.
As can be seen, combating systematic uncertainty and operator malfeasance via a
relative analysis of the baseline and diversion-scenario cases proves to be an unpromising
tactic. Table 6.6 shows the percent decrease in the evolution count rate at the specified
measurement duration period relative to the count rate measurement at the beginning of the
fuel cycle. Given the slight decreases in the evolution count rate relative to the count rate
measurement at the beginning of the fuel cycle, more novel testing procedures and
analytical processes must be introduced to combat more specifically the small differences
173 The level of significance was reduced to the order of Ix102; well beyond the scope of traditional
statistical testing criteria.
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associated with the relative changes in each of these evolution's trajectories and more
broadly the consequences produced as a result of systematic uncertainty and/or operator
malfeasance.
Table 6.6: Relative to Beginning of Cycle evolution count rate
Measurement Duration Periods
Change at Specified
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Baseline Case 0 39 48 64 77
(Number of MOX Assemblies)
Duration Period
First 90 days -3.61% -3.01% -2.86% -2.58% -2.34%
First 180 days -6.33% -5.24% -4.97% -4.46% -4.03%
First 360 days -10.03% -8.21% -7.75% -6.90% -6.17%
Full Cycle Length (493 days) -12.06% -9.78% -9.21% -8.15% -7.24%
Chapter 7: Summary, Conclusions, and Future Work
7.1 Thesis Summary and Conclusions
As the 2018 start year for plutonium disposition exercises approaches, securing the
necessary multilateral verification measures needed to ensure proper and successful
disposition as outlined in the PMDA will be vital. In this thesis, an overview and
assessment was provide with regards to the US developmental process and current
customer landscape in its endeavor to fulfill its 2018 target start time for WGPu MOX fuel
irradiation. Although the PMDA states that both the US and Russia are to engage the IAEA
"to implement verification measures with respect to each Party's disposition program,"
discussions have yet to proceed beyond initial discussions in 2011 [41]. From current
estimates, it appears that the agreement will again face extreme delays as experienced in
early engagements with the original agreement in 2000. Nonetheless, in an attempt to
characterize the role of the IAEA as a neutral, objective party to the prospective
multilateral verification regime to be constituted through the PMDA, an exploration into
the underlying policy and technical concepts in achieving such a regime was pursued
through a brief case study of relevant initiatives. Furthermore, and specifically tailored to
the interests of this thesis, the expected safeguards landscape under such a multilateral
regime within the US was also explored, revealing many promising attributes with regards
to the UMS characteristics of antineutrino detection. All in all, the purposes of this thesis
was intended to increase access to available information regarding this topic and subjects
relevant to the contemporary strategy concerning disposition of surplus military plutonium
via US LWR irradiation.
The principle accomplishment of this thesis was the introduction of a testing
procedure that sought to determine whether a given antineutrino rate evolution'
significantly deviates from that of the baseline, in an attempt to analyze the prospects of
antineutrino detection as a tool in identifying potential diversion scenarios from declared
specifications under the PMDA. Not only were the specific applications of antineutrino
detection to potential verification and confirmation goals outlined within the text of the
PMDA introduced, but the practical viability of such an approach was also assessed. It is
vital to note that the results of this thesis, which implemented credible reactor simulations
[119, 136], are resultant of only a preliminary investigation. I acknowledge that further
research, both from technical (further reactor simulations, actual demonstration of WGPu
MOX irradiating LWR, etc.) and policy (state and IAEA perspectives, etc.) standpoints,
will be required in order to fully appreciate the applicability of such a detector for PMDA-
related verification purposes. The analysis shows that antineutrino rate based measurements
in which the thermal power is well known by independent means, and for which the
measurement uncertainty from all sources is at the level of 3%, would reveal substitution of
as few as 7 LEU assemblies for MOX assemblies with high confidence. It further revealed
174 It is vital to note again that the antineutrino rate evolution in these simulations were represented by an
analytic function of time. Similarly, a function of burnup also follows the same procedure. The procedure
described in this work, initially implemented by Bulaevskaya et al., implemented least squares estimation
procedures for the identified analytic model for the antineutrino rate measurement evolution. This, in turn,
was used in the hypothesis testing procedure in order to discover the specified false discovery rate, which in
turn was used to determine whether or not the given scenario differed significantly from the baseline scenario.
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that rate based measurements seeking to identify a switch in MOX and LEU assemblies
that do not include the independently measured thermal power are subject to spoofing if the
operator misreports the power.
Current studies of antineutrino-based verification methods for PMDA are focused
on making use of a validated initial MOX inventory and core map, combined with an
absolute measurement of the antineutrino rate (i.e. without reference to a previously
measured value) in order to specify the burnup of the MOX assemblies at discharge. The
measured thermal power would not be required as an input, and the precision requirements
on the antineutrino rate measurement are relaxed considerably compared to the
assumptions used here. This method evades the weaknesses of the method analyzed in the
present work, which depends on an operator input (thermal power) that is relatively
difficult to otherwise control or verify, as well as an antineutrino detector at the limit of
absolute precision (-3%) achieved so far.
The work performed in this thesis serves as an element to an integrated effort to
analyze the practicality of antineutrino detection as an IAEA verification metric primarily
as it relates to the PMDA, but also possible similar future plutonium disposition campaigns
conducted by other NPT NWS as well as domestic and international LWR and other
reactor-type safeguarding practices. The results of which will be combined with a
continued effort and the ongoing work being conducted by Adam Bernstein and the rest of
the LLNL Advanced Detectors Group. Therefore, it is possible that not all of the
calculations and evaluations documented in this work may carry significant relevance and
meaning when viewed alone. The end product of this continuing effort, however, seeks to
reveal crucial knowledge regarding the expected performance and overall efficacy of the
multiple antineutrino detection verification approaches. Although the antineutrino detection
system proposed in this thesis for PMDA multilateral verification purposes has yet to be
fully designed and deployed, the analysis performed revealed many interesting findings;
disclosing many of the technology's inherent strengths and weaknesses as they relate to
contemporary verification mechanisms.
The antineutrino detection's independent capability of successfully identifying
potential diversion scenarios-at a threshold of seven WGPu MOX assemblies less than
original declarations-appears to be somewhat promising. From an IAEA perspective, this
is the identification of 17.5 SQ over the entire cycle lifetime and, for most of the
considered cases in this exercise, within the first year of operation7 . Quite obviously, the
high counting statistics expected with a fully efficient detector176 over the longer periods of
time-the maximum in this exercise being the full cycle length-resulted in the best
detector performance in attaining the 95% true positive rate at a 5% false positive rate
limit. Although this 17.5 SQ identification over a 360-day period is well beyond IAEA
175 Although other cases were considered, the 40% WGPu MOX core concentration case (an implementation
of 77 PWR WGPu MOX fuel assemblies) serves as the most important case considered. We argue this
perspective not only because of it serves as the maximum WGPu MOX fuel fraction as designated by the
NRC [46], but also since it is the most likely LWR operating scenario that will be needed in order for the US
to maintain the annual PMDA-required WGPu MOX throughput given the likely customer landscape as
outlined in Chapter 2.
176 The results of the simulation 'highlighted the effective capabilities associated with a 100% effective
detector-of similar scope, design, and demonstration parameters as the SONGS 1 experiment-as an
important characteristic in ensuring and promoting the viability of such a potential verification approach.
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timeliness goals for plutonium [95], it is highly probable that minor adjustments will be
made to such requirements due to IAEA's scope and expected roles within the PMDA. As
acknowledged in Chapter 5, coupling the detection capabilities with contemporary
safeguard and/or verification procedures antecedent, during, and subsequent to WGPu
MOX irradiation however, will significantly strengthen the technology in achieving many
of the specified applicability goals.
Beyond the considered WGPu MOX core concentrations and measurement duration
periods, the simulation revealed the efficiency costs resultant from, non-reactor based
antineutrino events constituent to the overall antineutrino rate measurement, detector
systematic uncertainty, and potential operator malfeasance scenarios, all as they relate to
WGPu MOX implementation in LWR operation. The effect associated with non-reactor
based antineutrino events did not appear to significantly deter the effectiveness of
antineutrino detection capability. Unfortunately, however, the effects associated with
detector systematic uncertainty and/or potential operator malfeasance scenarios proved to
be extremely detrimental. When implementing a testing procedure considering the
antineutrino rate evolutions from the baseline and measured scenarios relative to their
initial day measurement to combat such effects, the procedure proved futile. Based on the
results of this exercise, it appears that antineutrino rate measurements alone are unable to
provide significant means in combating such scenarios. However, beyond the prospects of
antineutrino rate measurements coupled with additional independent verification means, we
acknowledge that future research in this endeavor should consider direct measurement of
the antineutrino spectrum, as initially described in Chapter 5 and by Huber and Schwetz
[2]. Such a measurement would provide sufficient information that would simultaneously
constrain both power and fissile isotopic content; significantly minimizing and even
eradicating the prospects of thermal power misreporting by the operator177 .
All in all, given the simulation-provided capabilities presented with regards to the
antineutrino rate measurements from an operating LWR, it becomes evident that
antineutrino detection cannot exclusively resolve the probable PMDA verification goals at
the US LWR site. As demonstrated from a qualitative perspective, this technology's
primary strength when operating as a purely independent verification metric is maintenance
of CoK. However, in conjunction with other safeguard and security procedures, this
technology can enhance knowledge regarding numerous variables associated with the US
plutonium disposition campaign, no matter the party responsible (IAEA or Russia) for
verification. As noted earlier in this thesis, a hybrid system incorporating a validated core
simulator, an independent mechanism to verify the initial isotopics of the incoming WGPu
fuel, WGPu fuel positions within the reactor fuel core, or independent verification of the
reactor thermal power, coupled with antineutrino rate measurements has the prospect of
confirming that the WGPu MOX fuel achieves the minimum bumup criterion, that the
discharged fuel possesses the declared mass and isotopic composition criterion, and that the
US or Russia are meeting the total annual WGPu mass throughput requirements outlined in
the PMDA.
Additionally, as a UMS, this technology would aid in achieving RSI at the site
177 Bulaevskaya et al. argues that the statistical power of the testing procedure implementing antineutrino
energy spectrum measurements, however, may be compromised due to the expected reductions in the
antineutrino rate per energy bin. Such pitfalls could be combated however by more efficient detectors (i.e.
larger detector mass/volume).
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during the entire fuel cycle by maintaining CoK in near real-time. Assuming that the IAEA
will be responsible for the verification procedures at the time of initial operations in 2018,
such a technology will prove extremely beneficial from a cost-reductions perspective with
expected growth in IAEA safeguarded LWR and MOX fuel. Furthermore, such a
technology will not inhibit or retard normal operation-as was demonstrated with SONGS 1
[5]-at the reactor site, significantly reducing the expected domestic or international
PMDA-related inspections required during reactor operation. From an operator's
perspective, such attributes may possibly serve as additional advantageous features; aiding
NNSA interests in appealing to potential and future customer reactors to assist in the US
disposition campaign.
7.2 Recommendations for Future Work
An obvious and primary recommendation that should be considered towards
attaining support of the applicability of antineutrino rate measurements towards PMDA-
related verification purposes would be similar testing procedures applied to the
identification of potential diversion scenarios at the Russian-selected disposition reactor
types (i.e. the BN-600 and BN-800 fast neutron reactors). Similarly, verifying the PMDA
specified burnup levels178 for Russian WGPu MOX fuel will also be essential. The number
of fuel cycles as well as the cycle duration needed to achieve PMDA verification
specifications associated with WGPu MOX fuel in both US and Russian designated
reactors must also be determined and will require further research.
In order to make more practical simulation and supporting testing procedures for
the discussed targets, it will be necessary to couple such computational methods with more
actual demonstrations of antineutrino rate measurements at varying reactor sites and types,
detector designs, and detector parameters (mass, distance, efficiency, etc.). For purposes of
the analysis performed in this thesis, a 100% efficient detector was considered. Although
considered from a theoretical standpoint, we acknowledge that this assumption is however
highly unlikely given the scope of various antineutrino detector experiments that have been
demonstrated. Related detector experiments to the SONGS 1 experiment [112], of similar
scintillator design, that have been demonstrated and may are at Rovno 2 [137], CHOOZ
[138], Palo Verde [139], and Bugey [140] depict the variability in such reactor and detector
characteristics and have been summarized below [4]:
178 Section II of the Annex of Technical Specifications of the PMDA defines the bumup level required for
Russian WGPu MOX fuel assemblies as a minimum burnup criterion of "five (5) percent of heavy-metal
atoms for assemblies from the BN-600 reactor; three and nine-tenths (3.9) percent of heavy-metal atoms for
assemblies from the BN-800 reactor during the two-to-three year reactor commissioning stage; and four and
one-half (4.5) percent of heavy-metal atoms for assemblies from the BN-800 reactor during the stage of
operation of the reactor with rated parameters," must be achieved. Moreover, it states that the "average fuel
bumup level of any batch of such spent plutonium fuel assemblies discharged during the same refueling
outage from the reactor core is no less than: six and one-half (6.5) percent of heavy-metal atoms for the BN-
600 reactor; five (5) percent of heavy metal atoms for the BN-800 reactor during the two-to-three year reactor
commissioning stage; and six (6) percent of heavy metal atoms for assemblies from the BN-800 reactor
during the stage of operation of the reactor with rated parameters."
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Table 7.1: Reactor Characteristics and Detector Parameters for Previous
Antineutrino Detection Experiments
Demonstration Reactor Detector Detector E Background:Signal
Power Mass Distance (%) (%)
(GWt) (MT) (m)
SONGS1 3.4 0.64 25.0 11 18.6
Rovno 2 1.375 -0.2 18 30 35.2
CHOOZ 4.1 5.0 1000 69.8 5
Palo Verde 11.6 11.3 800 10 150
Bugey* 3.4 0.60 15.0 30 3.8
* Although the referenced antineutrino detectors are all based on scintillator detector designs, we Bugey
implemented a Li-doped scintillator detector design whereas the rest implemented a Gd-doped scintillator
design.
As a more practical exercise, design decisions that aim to increase the expected
detection range and capabilities at the expense of financial and operational costs should be
vigorously examined as it relates to multilateral verification measures. If the IAEA is to be
responsible for the verification measures at the reactor site as it relates to the plutonium
disposition campaign, an important future exercise that experts within the organization
should conduct is a fuller analysis of implications associated with this technology. From a
financial perspective, all considered parties (US, Russia, and IAEA) should employ a cost-
benefit analysis with regards to an actual system of verification techniques employing
antineutrino rate based, and potentially spectrum based, measurements.
Finally, applications of a hypothesis testing procedures, similarly performed in this
work, should also be applied to antineutrino spectrum based measurements, including
realistic statistical and systematic uncertainties, in an endeavor to quantify any additional
sensitivity attributes inherent in a spectral analysis. From a qualitative perspective, it has
already been acknowledged that an antineutrino energy spectrum measurement would
allow for the attainment of all four of the applicability goals stated above. Furthermore,
as proposed for rate based measurements, the number of fuel cycles as well as the cycle
duration needed to achieve PMDA verification specifications associated with WGPu MOX
fuel in both US and Russian designated reactors must also be determined and will also
require further research.
179 Only partial verification of the annual WGPu disposition throughput requirement goal is achieved
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Appendix A: The WGPu MOX Conversion Approach
A.1 Associated Technologies And Construction Status
In order to fulfill the requirements of MOX fuel fabrication as designated to the US
by the PMDA, construction of a series of facilities'80 to carry out these roles is taking place
at the Savannah River Site (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. MFFF construction began in
August 2007, where significant process has been made achieving completion of eleven of
the auxiliary buildings needed to support construction and operation of the MOX facility.
Current expectations for operations start-up of MFFF are October 2016 with a 20-year
operating license'81 [141].
Although SRS contains many facilities, the three most crucial facilities in fulfilling
the US plutonium disposition program are the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility
(PDCF), which will convert both surplus weapons plutonium pits and plutonium metal into
plutonium oxide; the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF), which will covert plutonium
oxide into MOX fuel; and Waste Solidification Building (WSB), which will process
radioactive wastes from PDCF and MFFF [44].
Extensive delays have occurred with regards to the construction and start-up time
frames associated with these facilities (See Table A.1 , which is a joint-ventured
collaboration called Shaw AREVA MOX Services LLC 1 2 that was intended to begin
construction in October 2003 [142]. Furthermore, PDCF, with an expected start-up time by
March 2006 has been delayed until December 2021, as revised in the in the PMDA.
However, more recently due to unforeseen safety issues, inadequate oversight, insufficient
management resources, and ill-prepared required technologies, DOE suspended
construction of PDCF and is now assessing considerations to incorporate the intended
capabilities of PDCF into the Plutonium Preparation Project facility also at the Savannah
183River Site' .
Table A.1: Changes in Estimated Operating Dates for Savannah River Site Facilities
Facility Approximate Operating Current Approximate
Date in 2000 Operating Date
Pit Disassembly and 03/2005 TBD (previously 12/2021)
Conversion Facility
MOX Fuel Fabrication 04/2006 10/2016
Facility
Waste Solidification N/A 09/2013
Building a
Courtesy of updated PMDA, "Annex on Schedules and Milestones"
180 These infrastructure projects serve as one of the largest construction projects in the southeastern US,
employing more than 1,800 construction workers, designers, and engineers providing a massive economic
impact to domestic national security and energy policy.
181 MFFF will help provide a pathway out of South Carolina for the surplus plutonium brought to SRS for
disposition
182 Shaw and AREVA will split responsibility for the project 70:30.
183 The effects of PDCF's uncertain status and continued delays of sites in SRS on progression of the US
disposition plan are still uncertain.
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A.2 Benefits of MOX Conversion Approach
NNSA in selection of the MOX conversion approach argue that the MOX fuel
fabrication is a well-established and mature technology-the fuel is used in more than 30
commercial reactors worldwide. MFFF in SRS is based on a French technological approach
implemented at the MELOX and LaHague facilities and is "literally turning swords into
plowshares," as stated by MFFF advocate Senator Lindsey Graham of South Caroline
[143]. The facilities being developed and built at SRS have met domestic conventions,
codes, standards, and regulatory requirements, and were authorized for construction by the
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 2005. Although delays in the review of the
contractor's application for an operating license proceeded, the NRC officially overrode its
own Atomic Safety Licensing Board'8 4 , who recommended that additional security of the
facility be required [144].
NNSA further argue that the MFFF will aid in reducing security and storage costs
associated with WGPul85 . Nonetheless, the nonproliferation benefits attributed to this
approach support the missions of DOE, holistically, and its subsidiary NNSA, by
facilitating efforts to reduce the size of the NNSA security enterprise by consolidating
materials to SRS from national laboratories and other sites', establishing capabilities for
future efforts of WGPu weapon dismantlement, and adhering to our domestic
nonproliferation commitments through dismantlement of our nuclear arsenals in a
transparent, irreversible manner [44]. DOE evaluations reveal that despite the delays in
operation, disposition through MOX conversion still proves to be the fastest method of
disposing of surplus WGPu (See Table A.2) [145]. However, this has often been debated
prompting opponents to claim that the DOE's own data reveals that "even under the most
optimistic scenario for MOX disposal, immobilization could begin sooner, complete the job
more rapidly, and require fewer facilities to manage and safeguard' 8 7 [146]."
Table A.2: 2002 DOE WGPu Disposition Option Completion Date Estimates
Disposition Option Disposition Completion
MOX Conversion ONLY FY 2019
MOX Conversion and Immobilization FY 2020
Immobilization ONLY FY 2021 or 2023
Courtesy of NNSA Report to Congress: Disposition of Surplus Defense Plutonium at SRS
[145]
184 The NRC determined, however, that MOX expected to be encased in heavy assemblies, would not be
attractive to potential terrorists and other nuclear proliferation threats as pure plutonium, and hence does not
require the same level of security.
185 Estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars annually, associated with surplus WGPu
186 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Pantex Plant, the
Hanford Site, and the Rocky Flats Site
187 Furthermore, the technical and environmental risks associated with immobilization are far smaller than
those associated with MOX and that spreading limited resources through pursuing a dual track could delay
disposal.
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A.3 Pitfalls of MOX Conversion Approach
The recent signing of the Plutonium Disposition Protocol in April 2010, reaffirmed
the US and Russian commitments to nuclear disarmament and an "aspiration for global
zero" through goals of disposing 68 MT of WGPu 88 . In this section, the pitfalls, risks, and
feasibility of the MOX conversion approach to WGPu disposition are discussed.
Nonetheless, in the process of identifying the weaknesses attributed to this approach, the
strengths of the previously considered immobilization through vitrification (VHLW)
strategy are also highlighted.
A.3.1 Nuclear Proliferation Risks
Prior to the US decision to dispose of 34 MT of WGPu through MOX conversion,
the studies produced by NAS in comparing risk factors (risk of theft, risk of reversal, and
impact on arms reduction) associated with the many disposition options, found the MOX
conversion approach to be extremely risky.
The MOX conversion option presents a greater risk of diversion primarily because
of the fuel fabrication stage, a process that is particularly difficult to safeguard effectively
in view of plutonium's characteristic of sticking to the surfaces of processing equipment,
and of the large, unavoidable uncertainties in the measurements of this "held-up" material.
This stage is susceptible to systematic diversion schemes by state operators of the plants, or
by individual plant workers in collaboration with outside states or groups; a stage avoided
entirely with the VHLW option, making it a proliferation risk unique to the MOX option.
Difficulties at the Plutonium Fuel Processing Facility (PFPF) in May 1994 in Japan
suggest that even purportedly state-of-the-art MOX fabrication plants are difficult if not
impossible to safeguard effectively. It was disclosed that a major plutonium inventory
discrepancy had been building up at the PFPF since the plant began operating in 1988
[147]. The IAEA, which identified that the unaccounted amount was a significant quantity
(SQ) 189, requested that Japan physically produce the held-up plutonium for the purpose of
establishing the plant's inventory [148]. This controversy over the plutonium holdup
problem at MOX fuel fabrication plants holds valuable lessons for WGPu disposition
because of unacceptable uncertainties and risks associated with accountability and
verification of the material.
The transportation of WGPu-MOX fuel from MFFF to reactor customers also poses
risks of theft, susceptible to hijackings and attacks by terrorists. VLHW, on the other hand,
does not require a fuel transportation stage, and does not pose a commensurate risk.
Through a VHLW approach, WGPu is only vulnerable to diversion prior to placement in
the smelter. After that, it is mixed with molten glass and highly radioactive fission
products, making it inaccessible for all practical purposes. Under this approach, safeguards
efforts should be focused on preparation of WGPu for the smelter 90. Numerous VHLW
methods have been identified, one most promising being a strategy that allows WGPu to be
added in an unaltered, metallic form [149]. This would avoid the conversion stage entirely
and eliminate the potential diversion vulnerability.
188 Enough material for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons
189 8 kg of plutonium, capable of constructing a nuclear weapon
190 Preparation includes conversion from metallic or pit form to oxide form
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The proliferation resistance of the final waste forms largely determines the potential
reversibility of plutonium disposition, and is a function of the amount of residual or
isotopic concentration of 2 3 9Pu remaining in the final waste form and its retrievability.
In the first factor, MOX would leave less 23 9 Pu in the final waste form than in the
VHLW approach, prompting assurance for NNSA's decision. However, under the MOX
approach, all of the WGPu is not consumed during the irradiation process-no more than
25-30% of the total plutonium present in the fresh MOX would be fissioned [150]. From a
retrievability perspective, separation of Pu from MOX fuel is a fairly straightforward
chemical process based on a proven technology, like PUREX. Chemical separation from
immobilized WGPu, is also possible through similar chemical process, however, it is
roughly more difficult in comparison. From an isotopic concentration perspective, the
MOX conversion approach reigns supreme in that it contains a significantly smaller
proportion of 2 3 9 Pu after irradiation whereas the VHLW approach leaves the WGPu in its
original form.
However is this criterion appropriate? Hans Blix, former director general of the
IAEA, declared that even high bum-up reactor-grade plutonium is weapons-usable [151], a
claim further strengthened upon the DOE release of details involving a 1962 nuclear device
test using reactor-grade plutonium [152]. Hence, even with lower isotopic concentrations,
the US could reconfigure weapons designs and reconstitute a large arsenal from Pu
isotopically degraded to reactor-grade by irradiation in MOX 19 1. Therefore, isotopic
degradation may not constitute a compelling criterion for the MOX-option reigning
supreme over immobilization.
Most important, the MOX conversion option sends a fuel cycle policy signal
contrary to those administered since the Carter administration [143]. In its nonproliferation
policy statement, the Clinton administration declared that "the United States does not
encourage the civil use of plutonium and, accordingly, does not itself engage in plutonium
reprocessing for either nuclear power or nuclear explosive purposes [153]." However,
previous worries regarding plutonium recycling and its contribution to the nuclear
proliferation have appeared to diminish since the 2000 PMDA and more recently with the
Obama administration considering whether to recommend a return to recycling through his
Blue Ribbon Commission [154]. Though it does not necessarily involve further
reprocessing through additional fuel cycles, the MOX conversion option clearly encourages
the civil use of plutonium and legitimizes the use of MOX in civil nuclear power programs,
confusing and complicating US nonproliferation diplomacy. At this time, it becomes more
difficult and reduces US credibility in denying other nations the right to use civil nuclear
plutonium. In the 1994 report, NAS emphasized the importance of the "Fuel Cycle Policy
Signal1 92". Although selection of the MOX option appears to reverse long-standing US
policy of not burning plutonium in commercial power plants, the US has said use of this
191 Additional methods of reversibility like laser-isotope separation discussed in The MOX and Vitrification
Options Compared: A Non-Proliferation Perspective, P. Leventhal
192 "[P]olicymakers will have to take into account the fact that choosing to use weapons plutonium in
reactors would be perceived by some as representing generalized US approval of separated plutonium fuel
cycles, thereby compromising the ability of the US government to oppose such fuel cycles elsewhere.
Conversely, choosing to dispose of weapons plutonium without extracting any energy from it could be
interpreted as reflecting a generalized US government opposition to plutonium recycling. Either choice could
have an impact on fuel cycle debates now underway in Japan, Europe, and Russia." See NAS Management
and Disposition of Excess Nuclear Plutonium, 1994
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option would not represent such a change in its policy against civilian reprocessing and
recycling of plutonium1 9 3 [155].
A.3.2 Safety and Health Risks
The introduction of MOX fuel into civil LWR reduces the effectiveness of the
materials used to absorb neutrons in the core' 94 and increases the likelihood of a severe
accident [156].
The 1999 DOE Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) [48] performed an analysis depicting the consequences resultant of four severe
reactor accident scenarios at three different reactors sites' using two different reactor core
assumptions: (1) a reference case with a 100% LEU fuel core and (2) a case with a mixed
core of approximately 40% MOX fuel and 60% LEU fuel. With the severe accident
assumed to progress for each case in the same manner, the consequences to the public
estimated ranged from 4% lower to 22% higher'9 6 relative to the reference case and
dependent on the reactor studied for the specified accident scenario. The higher
concentration of radioactive actinides present in the WGPu MOX fuel were postulated to
be the prime cause for the higher estimated consequences, however, the differences were
modest compared to the uncertainty associated with such low probability events.
In 2000, when customer changes resulted in the DOE awarding a contract to a
consortium including Duke Cogema Stone and Webster (DCS) to dispose of 33 MT of
WGPu MOX fuel in four US commercial PWR, Lyman [157] estimated the increase in risk
to the public from use of WGPu MOX fuel at these reactors and determined that they
exceeded recently established NRC guidelines. This supported initial propositions by the
NRC with technical basis for prohibiting the use of MOX fuel at these sites unless the risk
experienced in the event of a severe accident can be significantly reduced. In comparison to
PWR implementing LEU cores, Lyman noted the number of latent cancer fatalities
resultant from a meltdown accident and early containment failure of reactors with WGPu
MOX cores could be as high as 131% (depending on the fraction of released actinides)
proposing particular concern to the DCS consortium, Catawba and McGuire.
Although these results have not been ignored or disputed by NNSA and other
related officials, they argue that the true health consequences are less severe than actually
predicted. Kenneth Bromberg, the assistant deputy administrator of NNSA, stated "[the
risk] is not that significant-10% or less [143]." In any event, officials argue, a major
release of plutonium would require an accident so severe that the additional health effects
would amount to a "sliver on top of a mountaintop [143]."
The recent events at the Fukushima Daiichi plant can provide some insight into the
severity of such incidents. Officials of AREVA, who supplied the MOX fuel used in the
193 According to US officials, any MOX facilities built for the disposition purposes of surplus Pu are to be
dismantled upon completion of their mission
194 These include control rods and the boron dissolved in the coolant. The reduction in effectiveness of these
materials makes controlling nuclear reactions more difficult, reducing the margin of availability to shut down
the reactor and giving reactor operators less control over reactor transients and the time available to respond.
195 These were the Catawba and McGuire sites of Duke Power and the North Anna site of Virginia Electric
Power Company
196 Most cases resulted in consequence increases of 10% or less.
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core of Reactor Number 3, argue that "MOX was not the cause of that accident, and the
consequences of [the accident] have not been impacted by MOX" during on-ground
assistance to Japan during this time. Reactor Number 3 is one of three at the Fukushima
Daiichi site that was judged to have undergone at least partial meltdown [158]. At the time
of the earthquake, Unit 3 was operating with 32 MOX fuel assemblies 97 compared to 516
LEU fuel assemblies in its reactor core (totaling an approximate 6% MOX fuel core). No
other new, in operation, or used MOX assemblies were present at the Fukushima Daiichi
plant at the time of the accident. The American Nuclear Society Special Committee on
Nuclear Non-Proliferation [159] argues that:
MOX fuel has been used safely in nuclear power reactors for decades. The
presence of a limited number of MOX fuel assemblies at Fukushima Daiichi
Unit 3 has not had a significant impact on the ability to cool the reactor or
on radioactive releases from the site due to damage from the earthquake
and tsunami.
As of now, no clear evidence exists of plutonium release due to the MOX-loaded reactor.
Full meltdowns, high heat, and rupture of the containment vessel would be necessary to
release substantial plutonium into the environment. Although the dangers associated with
an accident depend on its chain of events, meltdown of a MOX-loaded reactor would
indeed result in more deaths than one using only LEU. If similar accident scenario
calculations were performed on Unit 3 as was implemented in the 1999 Surplus Plutonium
Disposition EIS, assuming the reactor implemented a 40% reactor-grade MOX fuel core, as
currently used in Europe and Japan, the estimated consequences to the public would have
been significantly higher than those cited for the WGPu MOX fuel core cases'9 8 . The much
larger consequence estimates can again be attributed to the higher concentrations of
radioactive actinides present-more radioactive actinides are present in reactor-grade MOX
fuel than in WGPu MOX fuel [159].
AREVA, part of the venture constructing MFFF, designed and fabricated the MOX
fuel assemblies that will be tested in the US However, these tests faced mishaps because of
inherent design defects [160]. The Union of Concerned Scientists, as well as other critics of
the MOX conversion approach, have requested that AREVA repair what they describe as
the "potentially serious defect" in the design of the fuel assemblies and hence, repeat and
perform additional testing to verify its suitability [161]. Nonetheless, AREVA argued that a
repeat testing was not needed, and that the US should continue to progress in their already
delayed process of WGPu disposition [162].
A.3.3 Costs and Economic Feasibility
In March 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report
197 These were loaded into the plant for the first time in the Fall of 2010; they were used for less than 5
months after at the time of the accident
198 With a 40% reactor grade MOX core, and applying a bounding factor of four increase relative to weapons
grade MOX, Raap et al. estimate the overall increase in severe accident consequences to be on the order of
40% relative to the all LEU fuel case. However, Unit 3 was loaded with only 32 MOX fuel assemblies and
516 LEU fuel assemblies-less than a 6% MOX fuel core-during refueling operations in the fall of 2010.
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criticizing the DOE's oversight of key parts of the current US plan 99, especially its plans to
acquire customers due to delays200 [163]. In another complication, the MOX conversion-
only approach of the current US plan has suffered massive cost over-runs. When the DOE
conducted a cost-estimate of different plutonium disposition options in 2002, this approach
was projected to cost roughly twice as much as immobilization-only option (See Table
A.3).
Table A.3: 2002 DOE Total Life-Cycle Cost Estimates
Disposition Options 2002 USD (Estimated 2007 USD)
MOX Conversion ONLY 3.8-5.0 Billion (4.0-6.0 Billion)
MOX Conversion and Immobilization 4.6-5.4 Billion (5.6-6.5 Billion)
Immobilization ONLY 2.0-3.2 Billion (2.4-3.9 Billion)
Courtesy of NNSA Report to Congress: Disposition of Surplus Defense Plutonium at SRS
[145]
Despite its price being higher than an Immobilization ONLY approach, DOE
deemed the MOX Conversion ONLY approach as supremely better because it was more
advantageous in engaging Russian interests and commitment, fulfilling domestic
commitments, and fulfilling international and nonproliferation objectives [145]. Five years
later, however, the DOE's total life cycle cost estimate of the MOX conversion-only
approach to US plutonium disposition tripled2 0 1. As of March 2010, cost estimates of the
MOX Conversion approach have leveled off to those seen in previous years (See Table
A.4) [45]. However, Shaw and AREVA as well as others argue that a true economic
comparison cannot be made simply because each approach has different impacts on the
environment that are difficult, if not impossible, to characterize and assess [164].
Table A.4: Escalation of DOE Total Life-Cycle Cost Estimates
Disposition Option 2002 DOE Cost- 2007 DOE Cost- Current Cost
Estimate (Constant Estimate (Constant Estimate
2007 USD) 2007 USD)
MOX Conversion 4.6-6.0 Billion 14.0 Billion Still Pending
ONLY __ _ _ _ _ _ _
Courtesy of NNSA Report to Congress: Disposition of Surplus Defense Plutonium at SRS
[145]
199 "The [MFFF's] schedule, in addition to other problems, does not adhere to a key practice that is
fundamental to having a sufficiently reliable schedule-specifically, MFFF project staff have not conducted a
risk analysis on their current schedule using statistical techniques.... Consequently, NNSA cannot adequately
state its level of confidence in meeting the MFFF project's completion date, and NNSA's schedule for the
project therefore may not be reliable." See GAO, Department of Energy: Contract and Project Management
Concerns at the National Nuclear Security Administration and Office of Environmental Management, March
2009
200 "Utilities are nervous if their need for a reliable schedule for fuel delivery can be met."
201 Moreover, in the face of the current plan's delays and cost overruns, the DOE has not issued a current
estimate of the extent to which a programmatic shift to partial immobilization or immobilization-only
approaches would implement the PDMA's terms any faster and cheaper than the current US plan.
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, Current costs estimates cannot yet be assessed since NNSA has yet to determine
whether or not it will proceed with the PDCF facility at SRS, or pursue other alternatives to
obtain the PDCF's intended conversion capability. However, Zarate argues that if the
Immobilization ONLY approach were to escalate at a comparable rate as the MOX
Conversion ONLY approach, the Immobilization ONLY approach would still be the
cheapest of the two options [142]. Nonetheless, from the cost perspectives associated with
reactor-grade MOX, MOX fuel offers an advantage over LEU in that its fissile
concentration can be increased easily by the addition of more plutonium, whereas higher
uranium enrichments is relatively expensive. With reactor operators seeking to burn fuels at
higher levels and longer time scales, increasing burnup from around 30 GWd/MTHM a few
years ago to over 50 GWd/MTHM now, MOX use becomes more attractive. Assuming
increasing uranium prices, plutonium reprocessing for MOX fabrication becomes
increasingly attractive from an economic perspective as well as from the perspective of
reducing the volume of spent fuel. It is estimated that seven LEU fuel assemblies produces
one MOX fuel assembly (in addition to vitrified high-level waste) resulting in only about
35% of the volume, mass and cost of disposal [68].
However, although it appears that an economic benefit could be derived from using
WGPu as a substitute to LEU in conventional civilian reactors, under the assumption that
the plutonium would be essentially free (paid for through deference spending), MOX is not
economically competitive at present and is unlikely to become so in the near future [155].
Bunn et al. performed an assessment of the capabilities of a plutonium market where they
found that reprocessing and recycling plutonium in LWR was more expensive than direct
disposal of spent fuel 2 0 2 . Unless the price of uranium, currently approximately $40/kg, were
to increase to over $360/kg, reprocessing is not economically ideal in the near [165].
Furthermore, contrary to the DOE's earlier assumption that the utilities would reimburse
the government at a rate equivalent to the cost of conventional fuel (fuel displacement
credit), it now appears more likely that utilities would expect to receive an incentive for
using MOX.
202 Under the assumption that uranium has a price of $40/kgU (comparable to current prices), reprocessing
and recycling at a reprocessing price of $1000/kgHM would increase the cost of nuclear electricity by 1.3
mill/kWh. Since the total back-end cost for the direct disposal is in the range of 1.5 mill/kWh, this represents
more than an 80% increase in the costs attributable to spent fuel management (after taking account of
appropriate credits or charges for recovered plutonium and uranium from reprocessing).
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Appendix B: Data, Functions, and Simulators
B.1 Data
Table B.1: LEU Assembly Fission Reaction Rates (cm-3_sJ ______
Irradiation Time
(days) _235 U238 U 231PU 241U
................................0  . - 1 ...........6....... 4 + 1 .................... - 0 ........... 6 ..................0...E -0 4 .
1 9.6709E+ 12 6.4076E+11I 5.5430E+09 5.7569E+04
2 9.6579EI12 6.4081E+11 1.1086E+10 1. 1514E+05
3 9.6450E+12 6.4085E+11I 1.6629E+10 1.7271E+05
4 9.6322E+12 6.4090E+1I1 2.2172E+10 2.3027E±05
5 9.6193E+12 6.4095 E±1I1 3.6448E+10 2.9647E+06
6 9.6066E+ 12 6.4100OE+1 1 4.8165E+10 4.9147E±06
7 9.5938E+I12 6.4105 E±1I1 5.9883E±10 6.8647E±06
8 9.581113-112 6.4110OE+1I1 7.1600E±10 8.8147E3+06
9 9.5685E3+12 6.4115 E+11 8.3317E±10 1.0765E±07
10 9.5559E4-12 6.4120E+11I 9.5034E+10 1.2715E+07
S11 9.5433E+112 6.4125 E+ 11 1.0675E+11I 1.4665E+07
12 9.5308E+I12 6.4130E+11I 1.1847E3±11 1.6615E+07
13 9.5183E3+12 6.4135E+11I 1.3122E+11 2.0743E+07
14 9.5058E±12 6.4140E+ 11 1.43 86E+ 11 2.6192E+07
15 9.4934E3±12 6.4146E+11I 1.5644E+11 3.3088E+07
16 9.48 1OE± 12 6.415 1E+1I1 1.6896E+11I 4.1489E+07
17 9.4687E±12 6.4156E+11I 1.8142E+11 5.1453E±07
18 9.4564E±12 6.4162E+1 1 1.93 82E+±11 6.3038E+07
19 9.4442E+12 6.4167E3+11I 2.0617E3+11 7.6302E3+07
20 9.4320E3+12 6.4173E±1 1 2.1 846E+ I 9.1303E3+07
21 9.4198E+12 6.4178E3+11I 2.3069E3+11 1.0810E+08
22 9.4077E3+12 6.4184E+1 1 2.42 86E+1I1 1.2675E3+08
23 9.3956E+12 6.4189E+1 1 2.549 8E3+11 1.4731E3+08
24 9.3835E-12 6.4195E1 1 2.6 704E3+11 1.6984E3+08
25 9.3715E+12 6.4200E3+1 1 2.7 904E3+11 1.9440E3+08
26 9.3595E3+12 6.4206E1 1 2.9099E3+11 2.2105E+08
S27 9.3476E+12 6.4212E+1 1 3.02 88E+ 11 2.4983E3+08
28 9.3357E+I12 6.4218E+1 1 3.147 11E+11 2.8082E+08
29 9.323 8E+ 12 6.4224E3+11 3.2649E3+11 3.1407E3±08
S30 9.3 120E-l-12 6.4229E1 1 3.3 822E3+11 3.4964E3+08
45 9.1391E+12 6.4323E+11I 5.0770E+ 11 1.2008E3+09
60 8.9740E+ 12 6.4425E+1 1 6.65 82E13±11 2.7827E3+09
75 8.8162E+ 12 6.4537E±11 8.1361E3+11 5.2744E+09
90 8.6652E+-12 6.4659E3+11I 9.525013+1 1 8.699 113+09
180 7.8745E412 6.5570E+11I 1.6449E3+12 5.1545E3+10
270 7.224 1E+ 12 6.6765E±11I 2.1725E3+12 1.2904E+11I
360 6.6572E+12 6.8186E+11I 2.5976E3+12 2.3356E+11I
493 5.9039E+12 7.0573E+11 3.1060E+12 I4.2104E+11
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Table B.2: LEU Assembly Fission Rates (s-1) ____________
Irradiation Time
(days) U 23u28U 231Pu 21Pu
0 5.3195EA-19 3.5195E+18 1.4605E+03 1.4727E±03
2 5.3053E+19 3.5201E±18 6.0897E+16 6.3247E+11I
3 5.2982E+19 3.5203E+18 [9.1345E+16 9.4870E+11I
4 5.2911 E±19 3.5206E+18 1.2179E+.17 1.2649E±12
5 5.2841E+19 3.5208E+18 2.0022E+ 17 1.6286E+13
6 5.2770E+19 3.5211 E+ 18 2.6458E+17 2.6997E-F13
7 5.2700E+ 19 3.5214E+18 3.2 894E+ 17 3.7709E+ 13
8 5.2631E+19 3.5217E1-18 3.9331E+17 4.8420E+ 13
9 5.2561E+19 3.5219E+I18 4.5767E+17 5.9132E+13
10 5.2492E± 19 3.5222E+F18 5.2204E+17 6.98.43E±13
11 5.2423E+19 3.5225E1-18 5.8640E+17 8.05.55EA-13
12 5.2354E+19 3.5228EI-18 6.5076E±17 9.1266E.+1.3
13 5.2285E+19 3.5230E±18 7.2079E+f17 1.1394E+14
14 5.2217E+19 3.5233E±18 7.9022E+ 17 1.4388E+14
15 5.2149E+ 19 3.5236E±18 8.5932E+t17 1.8176E+14
16 5.2081E+19 3.5239E±18 9.2811E+17 2.279.1B.+ 14
17 5.2013E+19 3.5242E+18 9.9656E+17 2.8264E+14
18 5.1946E+ 19 3.5245E+18 1.0647E+ 18 3.4628E+14
19 5.1878E+19 3.5248E±18 1.1325E+18 4.1914E+14
20 5.1811 E+ 19 3.5251E±18 1.2000E+ 18 5.0154E+I14
21 5.1744E+ 19 3.5254E±18 1.2672E+ 18 5.9381E±14
22 5.1678E+19 3.5257E+18 1.3341E+18 6.9626E+14
23 5.1611 E+ 19 3.5260E±18 1.4006E+ 18 8.092 1E± 14
24 5.1545E+19 3.5263E+18 1.4669E+ 18 9.3297E±14
25 5.1479E+ 19 3.5266E+18 1.5328E+18 1.0679E±15
26 5.1413E+ 19 3.5269E+18 1.5984E+18 1.2142E+15
27 5.1348E+ 19 3.5273E+18 1.6638E-F18 1.3724E+15
28 5.1282E+ 19 3.5276E+18 1.7288E+18 1.5426E+15
29 5.1217E+ 19 3.5279E+18 1.95+8 1.7253E+15
30 5.115 2E+ 19 3.5282E+18 1.8579E+18 1.9206E+15
45 5.0202E+ 19 3.5333E+18 2.7888E+18 6.5964E+15
60 4.9296E± 19 3.5390E+18 3.6574E+18 1.5286E±16
75 4.8429E± 19 3.5451E+18 4.4693E+18 2.8973E+16
90 4.7599E+ 19 3.55 18E+18 5.2322E+18 4.7786E+16
180 4.3256E+19 3.6019E+ 18 9.0354EI18 2.8314E±17
270 3.9683E+ 19 3.6675E+1 8 1. 1934E+ 19 7.0885E+17
360 3.6569E+19 3.7455E+18 1.4269E+ 19 1.2830E±18
493 13.2431E+19 3.8767E+18 1.7062E±19 I2.3128E+18
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Table B.3: MOX Assembli Fission Reaction Rates (cm _________
Irradiation Time
(days) 235U j 238 U 239 Pu 241 P
................................0  ........................ 0 +  ........-6 ....+ 1 ...........................8...........I........................... ............I ..................
1 2.2703E+1I1 7.7683E+11I 9.0164E+ 12 4.7173E+10
3 2.2696E+1I1 7.7698E+1 1 9.013 1E+ 12 5.0095E±10
4 2.2692E+1I1 7.7705E+11 9.0114E±12 5.1560E+19
5 2.2688E+11I 7.7712E+11I 9.0098E+12 5.3026E+10
6 2.2684E+1I1 7.7720E+11I 9.0082.+12 5.4495E+10
7 2.2680E+11I 7.7727E+11I 9.0065E+12 5.5966E±10
8 2.2677E+1I1 7.7734E+11I 9.0049E+ 12 5.7439E+10
9 2.2673E+ 11 7.7741 E±11 9.0032E+12 5.8914E± 10
10 2.2669E+1I1 7.7744h9E±..1...1 ... 9.001 *6E+1*2 6. 0-3 2 E+ ..... 1O
11 2.2665 E+1I1 7.7756E±11I 8.9999E+ 12 6.1872E+10
12 2.266 1E+1 1 7.7763E+1 1 8.9982E+12 6.3354E+10
14 2.265 3E+ I11 7.7778E+1 1 8.9949E+ 12 6.6325E+10
15 2.2650E+1I1 7.7785E±11I 8.9933E-F12 6.7814E+10
16 2.2646E+1I1 7.7792E+11I 8.9916E+ 12 6.9305E+10
17 2.2642E+1I1 7.7799E+11I 8.9899E±12 7.0798E+10
18 2.263 8E+1I1 7.7806E+1 1 8.9883E±12 7.2293E+10
19 2.2634E-F11 7.7814E+11I 8.9866E+12 7.3791E±10
20 2.2630E+11I 7.7821E+11I 8.9849El-12 7.5290E±10
21 2.2626E+1 11 7.7828E+1 1 8.9832E+12 7.6792E±10
22 2.2622E+I- 7.7835E+11I 8.9816E+ 12 7.8296E±10
23 2.2619E+1I1 7.7842E+11I 8.9799E+ 12 7.9803E+10
24 2.2615 E II 7.7850E±11I 8.9782E+12 8.131 1E±10
25 2.2611 E+ I1I 7.7857E+11I 8.9765E±12 8.2821E±10
26 2.2607El-I 1 7.7864E+1 1 8.9749E+ 12 8.43 34E± 10
27 2.2603E+1I1 7.7871E+11I 8.9732E+12 8.5849E±10
28 2.2599E+1I1 7.7878E+11 I8.9715E±12 8.7366E±10
29 2.2595E+1 1 7.7885E+1 1 8.9698E+12 8.8885E+10
30 2.2591E+11I 7.7892E+11I 8.9681E±12 9.0407E+10
45 2.2533E+11I 7.7999E+1I1 8.9426E+12 1.1348E+11
60 2.2474E+11 7.8104E+1I1 8.9167E+12 1.3702E±11I
75 2.2415E+11I 7.8207E+11I 8.8905E+12 1.6102E+11I
90 2.2355E+1 1 7.83 10E±I1 8.8639E±12 1.8546E+1 1
180 2.1989EA I1 7.8901E±+1 .97E1 3.4064E+1I1
270 2.1607E+ 11 7.945 8E+ 11 8.5212E±12 5.0845E+11I
360 2.1209E+1I1 7.9989E+11I 8.3363E±12 6.8623E+11I
493 12.0588E+11 8.0746E+1 1 I8.0518E+12 9.6174E±11
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Table BA4: MOX Assembly Fission Rates (s-) _____ _____
Irradiation Time
(days) U3 u28U 239 Pu 21Pu
0 8.2798E+17 2.8323E±18 3.2883E+19 1.6670E+17
1 8.2784E+17 2.8326E+18 3.2877E+19 1.7201E±17
2 8.2770E+ 17 2.8328E+18 3.2871E±19 1.7733E±17
3......................................... .................. 7 ................ .... 3...E........ ......................... .......1 .....................................6.6...................... +I.
4 8.2756E+17 2.8331E+18 3.2865E+19 1.8.80.E+17
5................................... .................... . 27..E.. ..........2 ..................I..... .....+ 1 ........3 ......................... .....E+  ..1 ........................3....I...........................I7 
......
6 8.274E+ 17 2.8334E+18 I3.2859E+19 1.800E+17
7 8.2728E+17 2.8336E+18 328E±9 247+1
9 8.2724E+ 17 2.8339E+1 8 3.2847E+19 2.98148E+1 7
11 8.2700E+ 17 2.8342E+18 3.2841E+19 2.0407E+17
13 8.2686E+ 17 2.8344E±18 3.2835E+19 2.0944E+ 17
14 8.265 8Ei17 2.8350E+18 3.278E+19 2.2014E+ 17
16 8.2644E+ 17 2.835E±18 3.287E+19 2.25671E+17
17 8.2630E+17 2.8355E±18 3.280E+19 2.511E+17
18 8.2545E+7 2.8371E+ I 3.2804E+19 266E1
19 8.261E+ 17 2.8358E+18 3.78±9 2.36426E17
1 8.2602E+ 17 2.8360E±18 3.2798E±19 2.4840E+17
23 8.2587E+17 2.8363E+18 3.2792E+ 19 2.4727E+17
24 8.2573E+17 2.836E+18 3.2786E+19 2.5271E+17
25 8.2559E+17 2.8368E+18 3.2780E+ 19 2.5815E±17
27 8.25458E+17 2.8371E±18 3.2774E+19 2.63603E+17
29 8.25391E+ 17 2.8373E+18 3.2768E+19 2.6490E±17
30 8.2517E+17 2.8376E±18 3.2762E+ 19 2.745E±17
45 8.2503E+417 2.8379E+18 3.276E+19 2.80019E+17
60 8.148E+17 2.8381E+18 3.27503E±19 2.8549E±17
75 8.24735E17 2.83584E+ 18 3.2744E+19 2.9099E+17
180 8.2460E+ 17 2.8386E±18 3.2737E+19 2.9649E+17
270 8.2446E±17 2.83989E+ 18 3.271E±19 3.0199E+17
360 8.24324E±17 2.8926E±18 3.2372E±19 3.0512E+17
493 8.2418E+17 2.894E+18 327139E+19 3.13063E+17
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B.2 Functions
The following functions were generated using MATLAB 7.12.0 (R201 la)
B.2.1 Expected Counts Function
function [ y I = expectedcounts( x )
%EXPECTEDCOUNTS provides the simulated antineutrino expected counts
% This function simply simulates the expected counts for a given
% trajectory by taking a random sampling of the given expected point
% from a Gaussian PDF. The character '?' is used here to correspond to
% the percentage multiplier of the mean which corresponds to the
% expected standard deviation value. For purposes of this analysis, a 3%
% multiplier was used.
n=size(x);
y=zeros(n);
mu=x;
sigma=?*mu;
y=round(normrnd(mu,sigma));
end
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B.2.2. Observed Counts Function
function [ y ] = observedcounts( x )
%OBSERVEDCOUNTS provides the simulated observed counts
% This function simply simulates the observed counts for a given
% trajectory simply by taking a random sampling of the given expected
% point from a Poisson PDF, where for large samples, which is
% considered for this analysis, follows a Gaussian PDF with a
% standard deviation equal to the square root of the mean.
n=size(x);
y=zeros(n);
mu=x;
sigma=sqrt(mu);
y=round(normrnd(mu,sigma));
end
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B.2.3 Trajectory Function
function [ y I = trajectory( MOXCorePercent, timespan, TotalAssemblies,
FuelAssemblyVol )
%TRAJECTORY calculates the expected antineutrino trajectory
% This function calculates the expected antineutrino trajectory given the
% MOX core concentration percentage (MOXCorePercent), the measurement
% duration lifetime in days (timespan), the number of assemblies in the
% core (TotalAssemblies) which, for purposes of this analysis, was always
% 193, and the fuel assembly volume in cm3 (FuelAssemblyVol)
% Designated Constants--Antineutrino Rate per day converters for each
% isotope
U235_Anti=5.16336E-17;
U238_Anti=7.25345E-17;
Pu239_Anti=3.36024E-17;
Pu241_Anti=4.79755E-17;
% Initiate Testing Procedure
% Measure array length for considered MOX core concentrations array
n=length(MOXCorePercent);
% The measurement duration lifetime variable must allow for 2 additional
% rows to include core composition column and day 0 column
y=zeros((timespan+1),n);
y(1,:)=MOXCorePercent;
for k=1:n
% Determine the actual number of MOX and LEU assemblies in core
MOXAssemblies=round(MOXCorePercent(k)*(0.01)*TotalAssemblies);
LEUAssemblies=TotalAssemblies-MOXAssemblies;
% LEU Antineutrino Rate generated per day (for each isotope and total)
% The referenced file corresponds to the LEU fuel isotopic fission rates
% for the four considered isotopes: U-235, U-238, Pu-239, and Pu-241
values=importdata('Data Values/UOX_42.mat');
U235_AntiLEU=values(:,1)*U235_Anti*FuelAssemblyVol*LEUAssemblies;
U238_AntiLEU=values(:,2)*U238_Anti*FuelAssemblyVol*LEUAssemblies;
Pu239_AntiLEU=values(:,3)*Pu239_Anti*FuelAssemblyVol*LEUAssemblies;
Pu241_AntiLEU=values(:,4)*Pu241_Anti*FuelAssemblyVol*LEUAssemblies;
LEUAntiTotal=U235_AntiLEU+U238_AntiLEU+Pu239-AntiLEU+Pu241_AntiLEU;
% MOX Antineutrino Rate generated per day (for each element and total)
% The referenced file corresponds to the MOX fuel isotopic fission rates
% for the four considered isotopes: U-235, U-238, Pu-239, and Pu-241
values=importdata('Data Values/MOX_43.mat');
U235_AntiMOX=values(:,1)*U235_Anti*FuelAssemblyVol*MOXAssemblies;
U238_AntiMOX=values(:,2)*U238-Anti*FuelAssemblyVol*MOXAssemblies;
Pu239-AntiMX=values(:,3)*Pu239_Anti*FuelAssemblyVol*MOXAssemblies;
Pu241-AntiMOX=values(:,4)*Pu241_Anti*FuelAssemblyVol*MOXAssemblies;
MOXAntiTotal=U235_AntiMOX+U238_AntiMOX+Pu239_AntiMOX+Pu241_AntiMOX;
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% Total Antineutrino Rate for Core
AntiTotal=LEUAntiTotal+MOXAntiTotal;
% Store values in resultant y matrix
y((2:(timespan+1)),k)=AntiTotal(2:(timespan+1));
end
end
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B.2.4 Trajectory with Background Function
function [ y ] = trajectoryWbackground( MOXCorePercent, timespan,
TotalAssemblies, FuelAssemblyVol,
BackgroundPercent )
%TRAJECTORY calculates the expected antineutrino trajectory including a
%background effect associated with non-reactor based antineutrino events
% This function calculates the expected antineutrino trajectory given the
% MOX core concentration percentage (MOXCorePercent), the measurement
% duration lifetime in days (timespan), the number of assemblies in the core
% (TotalAssemblies) which, for purposes of this analysis, was always 193,
% the fuel assembly volume in cm3 (FuelAssemblyVol), and a background effect
% (between 0 to 1) associated with non-reactor based antineutrino events
% (BackgroundPercent)
% Designated Constants--Antineutrino Rate per day converters for each
% isotope
U235_Anti=5.16336E-17;
U238_Anti=7.25345E-17;
Pu239_Anti=3.36024E-17;
Pu241_Anti=4.79755E-17;
% Initiate Testing Procedure
% Measure array length for considered MOX core concentrations array
n=length(MOXCorePercent);
% The measurement duration lifetime variable must allow for 2 additional
% rows to include core composition column and day 0 column
y=zeros((timespan+1),n);
y(1,:)=MOXCorePercent;
for k=1:n
% Determine the actual number of MOX and LEU assemblies in core
MOXAssemblies=round(MOXCorePercent(k)*(0.01)*TotalAssemblies);
LEUAssemblies=TotalAssemblies-MOXAssemblies;
% LEU Antineutrino Rate generated per day (for each isotope and total)
% The referenced file corresponds to the LEU fuel isotopic fission rates
% for the four considered isotopes: U-235, U-238, Pu-239, and Pu-241
values=importdata('Data Values/UOX_42.mat');
U235_AntiLEU=values(:,1)*U235_Anti*FuelAssemblyVol*LEUAssemblies;
U238_AntiLEU=values(:,2)*U238_Anti*FuelAssemblyVol*LEUAssemblies;
Pu239_AntiLEU=values(:,3)*Pu239_Anti*FuelAssemblyVol*LEUAssemblies;
Pu241_AntiLEU=values(:,4)*Pu241_Anti*FuelAssemblyVol*LEUAssemblies;
LEUAntiTotal=U235_AntiLEU+U238_AntiLEU+Pu239_AntiLEU+Pu241_AntiLEU;
% MOX Antineutrino Rate generated per day (for each element and total)
% The referenced file corresponds to the MOX fuel isotopic fission rates
% for the four considered isotopes: U-235, U-238, Pu-239, and Pu-241
values=importdata('Data Values/MOX_43.mat');
U235_AntiMOX=values(:,1)*U235_Anti*FuelAssemblyVol*MOXAssemblies;
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U238_AntiMOX=values(:,2)*U238_Anti*FuelAssemblyVol*MOXAssemblies;
Pu239_AntiMOX=values(:,3)*Pu239_Anti*FuelAssemblyVol*MOXAssemblies;
Pu241_AntiMOX=values(:,4)*Pu241_Anti*FuelAssemblyVol*MOXAssemblies;
MOX-AntiTotal=U235_AntiMOX+U238_AntiMOX+Pu239_AntiMX+Pu241_AntiMOX;
% Total Antineutrino Rate for Core
AntiTotal=LEUAntiTotal+MOXAntiTotal;
% Calculate randomized background signal which is expected to follow
% Poisson statistics as identified by Bernstein et al.
muBackground=BackgroundPercent*AntiTotal(2);
stdevBackground=sqrt(muBackground);
BackgroundLength=length(y);
Background=zeros(BackgroundLength,1);
Background=round(normrnd(muBackground,stdevBackground,
BackgroundLength,1));
% Store values in resultant y matrix
y((2:(timespan+1)),k)=AntiTotal(2:(timespan+1))+
Background(2:BackgroundLength);
end
end
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B.2.5 t-Test of Evolution Coefficients Function
function [ result ] = tTestforCoeff( days, measured, baseline, power, alpha )
% Performs a t Test for the coefficients of the polynomial regression of the
% antineutrino measurement evolution as outlined in "Detection of Anomalous
% Reactor Activity Using Antineutrino Count Evolution over the Course of a
% Reactor Cycle" by V. Bulaevskaya and A. Bernstein
% In order to compute the vector of standard errors associated with the
% coefficients determined for the polynomial regression of measured data
% perform the following calculation.
[BETAmeasured,SE]=polyfit(days,measured,power);
R=SE.R;
d=(R'*R)\eye(3);
d=diag(d)';
MSEmeasured=(SE.normrA2)/SE.df;
semeasured=sqrt(MSEmeasured*d);
% In order to compute the vector of standard errors associated with the
% coefficients determined for the polynomial regression of baseline data
% perform the following calculation.
[BETAbaseline,SE]=polyfit(days,baseline, power);
R=SE.R;
d=(R'*R)\eye(3);
d=diag(d)';
MSEbaseline=(SE.normrA2)/SE.df;
sebaseline=sqrt(MSEbaseline*d);
% Determine the t test statistic for the following coefficients and their
% associated standard errors
t=(BETAmeasured-BETAbaseline)./sqrt(semeasured.^2+sebaseline.A2);
% Find the length of the time period (i.e. number of counts) so that the
% degrees of freedom can be determined
n=length(days);
% Determine the p-value for the selected data
p=2*(1-tcdf(abs(t),(2*(n-3))));
% If at least one of the null hypotheses is rejected, conclude that the
% observed (measured) evolution deviates SIGNIFICANTLY from that of the
% expected (baseline) data
MINp=min(p);
if MINp>=alpha
result=0;
else
result=1;
end
end
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B.3 Simulators
The following simulators were generated using MATLAB 7.12.0 (R201 1a)
B.3.1 ROC t-Test of Fitted Coefficients Simulator
%% ROC t-Test of Fitted Coefficients Simulator
% This simulator aims to generate the ROC curve for the comparison of a
% baseline and a measured scenario over a designated number of iterations
%% Initial values
% 1. Designate the number of iteration cycles for simulation
numiter=100000;
TotalAssemblies=193;
% 2. Designate the measured scenario number of fuel assemblies
MeasuredPercent=100*(M/193);
% M: number of fuel assemblies
% 3. Designate the baseline scenario number of fuel assemblies
BaselinePercent=100*(B/193);
% B: number of fuel assemblies (i.e. 77, 64, 48, 39, & 0)
% 4. Duration Period
TotalDays=494; % Corresponds to the fuel cycle lifetime including day 0
TimePeriodPercent=100*(D/494);
% D: if n is duration period to be analyzed, D=n+1, to include for day 0.
% This equation simply converts the duration period to be analyzed into a
% percentage of the total fuel cycle lifetime
timespan=round(TotalDays*TimePeriodPercent*0.01);
% calculates the duration period to be analyzed (in days) by taking the
% product of two above metrics rounded to nearest integer
days=transpose([0:(timespan-1)]);
% generates a matrix of the duration period to be analyzed
days=days-mean(days);
% in order to eliminate the correlation and instability between the linear
% effect and quadratic effect coefficients, the standard practice, as
% identified by Neter et. al, of redefining the independent variable (time
% duration in days) as a deviation from its mean
% 5. Statistical Testing Threshold
alphaS=0.01*[0.01:0.01:0.1,0.2:0.1:1,2:1:10,20:10:100];
% an array of values corresponding to level of significance threshold,
% alpha, to be used in each iterative step of the statistical testing
% procedure
scale=length(alphaS);
% corresponds to the length of the array alphaS in order to designate the
% number of levels of threshold values to be analyzed in this simulation
131
% 6. Fissile Fuel Volume
FuelAssemblyVol=47354.80664;
% Calculated based on the schematics of provided in this work, where the
% fuel assembly is composed of 264 fuel pins with a pin radius of 0.3951 cm
% and length of 365.76 cm
% Additional Constants for Power and Antineutrino Rate Calculations,
% although not needed in this because they are either unnecessary for
% purposes of this simulation or are implemented elsewhere from generated
% functions used in this simulation:
% Energy/Fission in J
% U235EnergyPerFission=3.23512E-11; %201.92 MeV
% U238EnergyPerFission=3.29279E-11; %205.52 MeV
% Pu239EnergyPerFission=3.36441E-11; %209.99 MeV
% Pu24lEnergyPerFission=3.42225E-11; %213.6 MeV
% Antineutrino Rate per day converters
% U235_Anti=5.16336E-17;
% U238_Anti=7.25345E-17;
% Pu239_Anti=3.36024E-17;
% Pu241_Anti=4.79755E-17;
%% Observed LEU Values Calculated
% Calculates and determines the resultant array length of the simulated
% baseline antineutrino measurement evolution given the following inputs
% designated for this function
BaselineExpected=trajectory(BaselinePercent,timespan,TotalAssemblies,
FuelAssemblyVol);
BaselineExpectedLength=length(BaselineExpected);
%% Expected MOX Values Calculated
% Calculates and determines the resultant array length of the simulated
% measured antineutrino measurement evolution given the following inputs
% designated for this function
MeasuredExpected=trajectory(MeasuredPercent,timespan,TotalAssemblies,
FuelAssemblyVol);
MeasuredExpectedLength=length(MeasuredExpected);
%% Length of Baseline and Measured Arrays are Equal
% Simply confirms that the length of the baseline and measured
% antineutrino measurement evolutions are equal ensuring a proper
% comparison analysis to generate the ROC curve
if MeasuredExpectedLength==BaselineExpectedLength
lengthcheck=1;
else
lengthcheck=0;
end
%% t-Test of Baseline and Measured Scenarios for ROC Curve Generation
% 1. Initialize arrays that will be used to store the calculated true
% positive (alphaTP), false negative (alphaFN), true negative (alphaTN),
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% and false positive (alphaFP) arrays at the designated level of
% significance
alphaTP=zeros(2,scale);
alphaFN=zeros(2,scale);
alphaTN=zeros(2,scale);
alphaFP=zeros(2,scale);
% 2. Store level of significance values analyzed in the first rows of the
% true positive (alphaTP), false negative (alphaFN), true negative
% (alphaTN), and false positive (alphaFP) arrays
alphaTP(1,:)=alphaS;
alphaFN(1,:)=alphaS;
alphaTN(1,:)=alphaS;
alphaFP(1,:)=alphaS;
% 3. Begin calculating the TP, FN, TN, and FP values at the varying levels
% of significance
for k=1:1:scale
alpha=alphaS(k);
% alpha corresponds to the tested level of significance at this
% iterative loop
% Initialize TP, FN, TN, and FP variables at the beginning of each
% iterative loop
TP=0;
FN=0;
TN=0;
FP=0;
% Displays a figure corresponding to the progress of the simulation as
% a percentage of the total number of analyzed levels of significance
wait=waitbar(k/scale,'Processing Data');
% At each level of significance, conduct the designated number of
% iterations (numiter)
for i=1:numiter
Baseline~bserved=expectedcounts(BaselineExpected(2:BaselineExpectedLength));
% Generate the simulated expected values for the baseline scenario
% antineutrino evolution
MeasuredObserved=observedcounts(MeasuredExpected(2:MeasuredExpectedLength));
% Generate the simulated observed values for the measured scenario
% antineutrino evolution to be used in the TP-FN testing
MeasuredObserved2=observedcounts(BaselineExpected(2:BaselineExpectedLength));
% Generate the simulated observed values for the baseline scenario
% antineutrino evolution to be used in the FP-TN testing
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% True Positive and False Negative Testing
% Conduct a t-Test of the coefficients generated from a
% polynomial regression of the baseline expected and measured
% observed values for the designated level of significance
h=tTestforCoeff(days,MeasuredObserved,BaselineObserved,2,alpha);
if h==1
TP=TP+1;
else
FN=FN+1;
end
%False Positive and True Negative Testing
% Conduct a t-Test of the coefficients generated from a
% polynomial regression of the baseline expected and baseline
% observed values for the designated level of significance
h=tTestforCoeff(days,MeasuredObserved2,BaselineObserved,2,alpha);
if h==1
FP=FP+1;
else
TN=TN+1;
end
end
% Close the wait bar figure generated so that a revised figure can be
% generated upon initiation of the following iterative cycle
close(wait);
% Store the updated TP, FN, FP, and TN values as a fraction of the total
% number of iterations simulated (numiter) in the following matrices
alphaTP(2,k)=TP/numiter;
alphaFN(2,k)=FN/numiter;
alphaFP(2,k)=FP/numiter;
alphaTN(2,k)=TN/numiter;
end
%Plot the FP vs. TP ROC curve
loglog(alphaFP(2,:),alphaTP(2,:),'o');
set(gca,'XTick',(alphaS*100));
set(gca,'YTick',(alphaS*100));
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B.3.2 ROC t-Test of Fitted Coefficients with Background Simulator
%% ROC t-Test of Fitted Coefficients with Background Simulator
% This simulator aims to generate the ROC curve for the comparison of a
% baseline and a measured scenario over a designated number of iterations
% given a specified background effect associated with non-reactor based
% antineutrino events
%% Initial values
% 1. Designate the number of iteration cycles for simulation
numiter=100000;
TotalAssemblies=193;
% 2. Designate the measured scenario number of fuel assemblies
MeasuredPercent=100*(M/193);
% M: number of fuel assemblies
% 3. Designate the baseline scenario number of fuel assemblies
BaselinePercent=100*(B/193);
% B: number of fuel assemblies (i.e. 77, 64, 48, 39, & 0)
% 4. Duration Period
TotalDays=494; % Corresponds to the fuel cycle lifetime including day 0
TimePeriodPercent=100*(D/494);
% D: if n is duration period to be analyzed, D=n+1, to include for day 0.
% This equation simply converts the duration period to be analyzed into a
% percentage of the total fuel cycle lifetime
timespan=round(TotalDays*TimePeriodPercent*0.01);
% calculates the duration period to be analyzed (in days) by taking the
% product of two above metrics rounded to nearest integer
days=transpose([0:(timespan-1)]);
% generates a matrix of the duration period to be analyzed
days=days-mean(days);
% in order to eliminate the correlation and instability between the linear
% effect and quadratic effect coefficients, the standard practice, as
% identified by Neter et. al, of redefining the independent variable (time
% duration in days) as a deviation from its mean
% 5. Statistical Testing Threshold
alphaS=0.01*[0.01:0.01:0.1,0.2:0.1:1,2:1:10,20:10:100];
% an array of values corresponding to level of significance threshold,
% alpha, to be used in each iterative step of the statistical testing
% procedure
scale=length(alphaS);
% corresponds to the length of the array alphaS in order to designate the
% number of levels of threshold values to be analyzed in this simulation
% 6. Fissile Fuel Volume
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FuelAssemblyVol=47354.80664;
% Calculated based on the schematics of provided in this work, where the
% fuel assembly is composed of 264 fuel pins with a pin radius of 0.3951 cm
% and length of 365.76 cm
% Additional Constants for Power and Antineutrino Rate Calculations,
% although not needed in this because they are either unnecessary for
% purposes of this simulation or are implemented elsewhere from generated
% functions used in this simulation:
% Energy/Fission in J
% U235EnergyPerFission=3.23512E-11; %201.92 MeV
% U238EnergyPerFission=3.29279E-11; %205.52 MeV
% Pu239EnergyPerFission=3.36441E-11; %209.99 MeV
% Pu24lEnergyPerFission=3.42225E-11; %213.6 MeV
% Antineutrino Rate per day converters
% U235_Anti=5.16336E-17;
% U238_Anti=7.25345E-17;
% Pu239_Anti=3.36024E-17;
% Pu241_Anti=4.79755E-17;
%% Observed LEU Values Calculated
% Calculates and determines the resultant array length of the simulated
% baseline antineutrino measurement evolution given the following inputs
% designated for this function
BaselineExpected=trajectoryWbackground(BaselinePercent,timespan,
TotalAssemblies,FuelAssemblyVol,BP);
BaselineExpectedLength=length(BaselineExpected);
%% Expected MOX Values Calculated
% Calculates and determines the resultant array length of the simulated
% measured antineutrino measurement evolution given the following inputs
% designated for this function
MeasuredExpected=trajectoryWbackground(MeasuredPercent,timespan,
TotalAssemblies,FuelAssemblyVol,BP);
MeasuredExpectedLength=length(MeasuredExpected);
%% Length of Baseline and Measured Arrays are Equal
% Simply confirms that the length of the baseline and measured
% antineutrino measurement evolutions are equal ensuring a proper
% comparison analysis to generate the ROC curve
if MeasuredExpectedLength==BaselineExpectedLength
lengthcheck=1;
else
lengthcheck=0;
end
%% t-Test of Baseline and Measured Scenarios for ROC Curve Generation
% 1. Initialize arrays that will be used to store the calculated true
% positive (alphaTP), false negative (alphaFN), true negative (alphaTN),
% and false positive (alphaFP) arrays at the designated level of
% significance
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alphaTP=zeros(2,scale);
alphaFN=zeros(2,scale);
alphaTN=zeros(2,scale);
alphaFP=zeros(2,scale);
% 2. Store level of significance values analyzed in the first rows of the
% true positive (alphaTP), false negative (alphaFN), true negative
% (alphaTN), and false positive (alphaFP) arrays
alphaTP(1,:)=alphaS;
alphaFN(1,:)=alphaS;
alphaTN(1,:)=alphaS;
alphaFP(1,:)=alphaS;
% 3. Begin calculating the TP, FN, TN, and FP values at the varying levels
% of significance
for k=1:1:scale
alpha=alphaS(k);
% alpha corresponds to the tested level of significance at this
% iterative loop
% Initialize TP, FN, TN, and FP variables at the beginning of each
% iterative loop
TP=0;
FN=0;
TN=0;
FP=0;
% Displays a figure corresponding to the progress of the simulation as
% a percentage of the total number of analyzed levels of significance
wait=waitbar(k/scale, 'Processing Data');
% At each level of significance, conduct the designated number of
% iterations (numiter)
for i=1:numiter
Baseline~bserved=expectedcounts(BaselineExpected(2:BaselineExpectedLength));
% Generate the simulated expected values for the baseline scenario
% antineutrino evolution
Measured~bserved=observedcounts(MeasuredExpected(2:MeasuredExpectedLength));
% Generate the simulated observed values for the measured scenario
% antineutrino evolution to be used in the TP-FN testing
MeasuredObserved2=observedcounts(BaselineExpected(2:BaselineExpectedLength));
% Generate the simulated observed values for the baseline scenario
% antineutrino evolution to be used in the FP-TN testing
137
% True Positive and False Negative Testing
% Conduct a t-Test of the coefficients generated from a
% polynomial regression of the baseline expected and measured
% observed values for the designated level of significance
h=tTestforCoeff(days,MeasuredObserved,BaselineObserved,2,alpha);
if h==1
TP=TP+1;
else
FN=FN+1;
end
%False Positive and True Negative Testing
% Conduct a t-Test of the coefficients generated from a
% polynomial regression of the baseline expected and baseline
% observed values for the designated level of significance
h=tTestforCoeff(days,MeasuredObserved2,BaselineObserved,2,alpha);
if h==1
FP=FP+1;
else
TN=TN+1;
end
end
% Close the wait bar figure generated so that a revised figure
% generated upon initiation of the following iterative cycle
close(wait);
can be
% Store the updated TP, FN, FP, and TN values
% number of iterations simulated (numiter) in
alphaTP(2,k)=TP/numiter;
alphaFN(2,k)=FN/numiter;
alphaFP(2,k)=FP/numiter;
alphaTN(2,k)=TN/numiter;
end
%Plot the FP vs. TP ROC curve
loglog(alphaFP(2,:),alphaTP(2,:),'o');
set(gca,'XTick',(alphaS*100));
set(gca,'YTick',(alphaS*100));
as a fraction of the total
the following matrices
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B.3.3 Detector Sensitivity Simulator
%% Detector Sensitivity Simulator
% This simulator aims to determine the detector sensitivity by analyzing
% detector failure over a large number of iterations for designated
% baseline and a measured scenarios
%% Initial values
% 1. Designate the number of iteration cycles for simulation
numiter=100000;
TotalAssemblies=193;
% 2. Designate the measured scenario bounds to be compared to baseline
% scenario
MinFuelAss=MLOW;
% MLOW: minimum number of MOX fuel assemblies for lowest measured scenario
% bound
IncrementAss=INC;
% INC: incremental assembly number
MaxFuelAss=MHIGH;
%MHIGH: maximum number of MOX fuel assemblies for highest measured
%scenario bound
minmix=100*(MinFuelAss/193);
% This equation simply converts the designated minimum number of MOX fuel
% assemblies into a fraction core concentration
increment=100*(IncrementAss/193);
% This equation simply converts the designated incremental assembly number
% into a fraction core concentration
maxmix=100*(MaxFuelAss/193);
% This equation simply converts the designated maximum number of MOX fuel
% assemblies into a fraction core concentration
scale=((MaxFuelAss-MinFuelAss)/IncrementAss)+1;
% Corresponds to the number of measured scenarios to be compared to the
% baseline scenario as designated by the user input of bounds
% Generate arrays corresponding to the MOX fuel fractional core
% concentration and number of MOX fuel assemblies in core, respectively
MeasuredPercents=[minmix:increment:maxmix];
MeasuredPercentsAss=[MinFuelAss: Inc rementAss: MaxFuelAss];
% 3. Designate the baseline scenario number of MOX fuel assemblies
BaselinePercent=100*(B/193);
% B: number of fuel assemblies (i.e. 77, 64, 48, 39, & 0)
% 4. Duration Period
TotalDays=494; % Corresponds to the fuel cycle lifetime including day 0
TimePeriodPercent=100*(D/494);
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% D: if n is duration period to be analyzed, D=n+1, to include for day 0.
% This equation simply converts the duration period to be analyzed into a
% percentage of the total fuel cycle lifetime
timespan=round(TotalDays*TimePeriodPercent*0.01);
% calculates the duration period to be analyzed (in days) by taking the
% product of two above metrics rounded to nearest integer
days=transpose([0:(timespan-1)]);
% generates a matrix of the duration period to be analyzed
days=days-mean(days);
% in order to eliminate the correlation and instability between the linear
% effect and quadratic effect coefficients, the standard practice, as
% identified by Neter et. al, of redefining the independent variable (time
% duration in days) as a deviation from its mean
% 5. Statistical Testing Threshold
alpha=0.01; %designate the threshold value for statistical testing
% 6. Fissile Fuel Volume
FuelAssemblyVol=47354.80664;
% Calculated based on the schematics of provided in this work, where the
% fuel assembly is composed of 264 fuel pins with a pin radius of 0.3951 cm
% and length of 365.76 cm
% Additional Constants for Power and Antineutrino Rate Calculations,
% although not needed in this because they are either unnecessary for
% purposes of this simulation or are implemented elsewhere from generated
% functions used in this simulation:
% Energy/Fission in J
% U235EnergyPerFission=3.23512E-11; %201.92 MeV
% U238EnergyPerFission=3.29279E-11; %205.52 MeV
% Pu239EnergyPerFission=3.36441E-11; %209.99 MeV
% Pu24lEnergyPerFission=3.42225E-11; %213.6 MeV
% Antineutrino Rate per day converters
% U235_Anti=5.16336E-17;
% U238-Anti=7.25345E-17;
% Pu239_Anti=3.36024E-17;
% Pu241_Anti=4.79755E-17;
%% Observed LEU Values Calculated
% Calculates and determines the resultant array length of the simulated
% baseline antineutrino measurement evolution given the following inputs
% designated for this function
BaselineExpected=trajectory(BaselinePercent,timespan,TotalAssemblies,
FuelAssemblyVol);
BaselineExpectedLength=length(BaselineExpected);
%% Expected MOX Values Calculated
% Calculates and determines the resultant array length of the simulated
% measured antineutrino measurement evolution given the following inputs
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% designated for this function
MeasuredExpected=trajectory(MeasuredPercent,timespan,TotalAssemblies,
FuelAssemblyVol);
MeasuredExpectedLength=length(MeasuredExpected);
%% Length of Baseline and Measured Arrays are Equal
% Simply confirms that the length of the baseline and measured
% antineutrino measurement evolutions are equal ensuring a proper
% comparison analysis to generate the ROC curve
if MeasuredExpectedLength==BaselineExpectedLength
lengthcheck=1;
else
lengthcheck=0;
end
%% Detector Sensitivity Procedure
% 1. Initialize recorder array that will be used to record the
% measured MOX fuel assembly number as compared to the baseline MOX fuel
% assembly number in order to determine the detector failure for each
% iterative step and recorderFP array that will be used to record the
% result of the t-Test comparison of the baseline MOX fuel assembly number
% measurement to itself
recorder=zeros(numiter,1);
recorderFP=zeros(numiter,1);
% 2. Begin simulation process for detector sensitivity performance
for i=1:numiter
% Displays a figure corresponding to the progress of the simulation as
% a percentage of the total number of simulation iterations
wait=waitbar(i/numiter,'Processing Data');
Baseline~bserved=expectedcounts(BaselineExpected(2:BaselineExpectedLength));
% Generate the simulated expected values for the baseline scenario
% antineutrino evolution
Measured~bserved2=observedcounts(BaselineExpected(2:BaselineExpectedLength));
% Generate the simulated observed values for the baseline scenario
% antineutrino evolution to be used in the FP-TN testing
recorderFP(i)=tTestforCoeff(days,MeasuredObserved2,BaselineObserved,2,alpha);
%Record the result of the t-Test for the baseline measurement as
%compared to itself
% Perform the t-Test comparison of the antineutrino measurement
% evolutions produced from the measured MOX fuel assembly number and
% baseline MOX fuel assembly number, iterating across the entire
% sample of measured MOX fuel assembly numbers as designated above. The
% measured MOX fuel assembly number achieved prior to the testing
% procedures failure will be recorded in the recorder array.
for k=1:1:scale
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MeasuredObserved=observedcounts(MeasuredExpected(2:MeasuredExpectedLength,k));
% Generate the simulated observed values for the measured scenario
% antineutrino evolution to be used in the TP-FN testing
h=tTestforCoeff(days,Measured~bserved,BaselineObserved,2,alpha);
if h==0
break
end
recorder(i)=MeasuredPercentsAss(k);
end
% Close the wait bar figure generated so that a revised figure can be
% generated upon initiation of the following iterative cycle
close(wait)
end
% Calculate the False Positive Rate (FPR) for the given test statistic
% based on the level of significance value, alpha, designated above.
FPR=sum(recorderFP)/numiter;
% Plot a histogram of the performed data
hist(recorder,MeasuredPercentsAss);
xlabel('Number of Assemblies');
ylabel('Counts');
% Plot a Gaussian fit on the generated histogram
hold on
Multiplier=max(histc(recorder,MeasuredPercentsAss));
STDEV=std(recorder);
xbar=mean(recorder);
y=Multiplier*gaussmf(MeasuredPercentsAss,[STDEV xbar]);
plot(MeasuredPercentsAss,y);
hold off
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B.3.4 Relative ROC t-Test of Fitted Coefficients Simulator
%% Relative ROC t-Test of Fitted Coefficients Simulator
% This simulator aims to generate the ROC curve for the relative
% comparison of a baseline and a measured scenario over a designated
% number of iterations. The start day has also offers the ability to be
% manipulated in an attempt to strengthen the results of the test
% comparison
%% Initial values
% 1. Designate the number of iteration cycles for simulation
numiter=100000;
TotalAssemblies=193;
% 2. Designate the measured scenario number of fuel assemblies
MeasuredPercent=100*(M/193);
% M: number of fuel assemblies
% 3. Designate the baseline scenario number of fuel assemblies
BaselinePercent=100*(B/193);
% B: number of fuel assemblies (i.e. 77, 64, 48, 39, & 0)
% 4. Duration Period
TotalDays=494; % Corresponds to the fuel cycle lifetime including day 0
TimePeriodPercent=100*(D/494);
% D: if n is duration period to be analyzed, D=n+1, to include for day 0.
% This equation simply converts the duration period to be analyzed into a
% percentage of the total fuel cycle lifetime
timespan=round(TotalDays*TimePeriodPercent*0.01);
% calculates the duration period to be analyzed (in days) by taking the
% product of two above metrics rounded to nearest integer
days=transpose([0:(timespan-1)]);
% generates a matrix of the duration period to be analyzed
days=days-mean(days);
% in order to eliminate the correlation and instability between the linear
% effect and quadratic effect coefficients, the standard practice, as
% identified by Neter et. al, of redifining the independent variable (time
% duration in days) as a deviation from its mean
startday=TotalDays-SD;
% SD: number of days prior to the end of the cycle/duration period that the
% user would like to begin the test comparison. As stated in the simulator
% definition above, in an attempt to strengthen the results of the test
% comparison, the user can manipulate the start day for the analysis to
% commence based on the notion that by beginning the analysis toward the
% end of the measurement duration period, one can strengthen the result of
% the test comparison by maximizing the difference between the baseline and
% measured antineutrino measurement evolutions
% 5. Statistical Testing Threshold
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alphaS=0.01*[0.01:0.01:0.1,0.2:0.1:1,2:1:10,20:10:100];
% an array of values corresponding to level of significance threshold,
% alpha, to be used in each iterative step of the statistical testing
% procedure
scale=length(alphaS);
% corresponds to the length of the array alphaS in order to designate the
% number of levels of threshold values to be analyzed in this simulation
% 6. Fissile Fuel Volume
FuelAssemblyVol=47354.80664;
% Calculated based on the schematics of provided in this work, where the
% fuel assembly is composed of 264 fuel pins with a pin radius of 0.3951 cm
% and length of 365.76 cm
% Additional Constants for Power and Antineutrino Rate Calculations,
% although not needed in this because they are either unnecessary for
% purposes of this simulation or are implemented elsewhere from generated
% functions used in this simulation:
% Energy/Fission in J
% U235EnergyPerFission=3.23512E-11; %201.92 MeV
% U238EnergyPerFission=3.29279E-11; %205.52 MeV
% Pu239EnergyPerFission=3.36441E-11; %209.99 MeV
% Pu24lEnergyPerFission=3.42225E-11; %213.6 MeV
% Antineutrino Rate per day converters
% U235_Anti=5.16336E-17;
% U238_Anti=7.25345E-17;
% Pu239_Anti=3.36024E-17;
% Pu241_Anti=4.79755E-17;
%% Observed LEU Values Calculated
% Calculates and determines the resultant array length of the simulated
% baseline antineutrino measurement evolution given the following inputs
% designated for this function
BaselineExpected=trajectory(BaselinePercent,timespan,TotalAssemblies,
FuelAssemblyVol);
BaselineExpectedLength=length(BaselineExpected);
%% Expected MOX Values Calculated
% Calculates and determines the resultant array length of the simulated
% measured antineutrino measurement evolution given the following inputs
% designated for this function
MeasuredExpected=trajectory(MeasuredPercent,timespan,TotalAssemblies,
FuelAssemblyVol);
MeasuredExpectedLength=length(MeasuredExpected);
%% Length of Baseline and Measured Arrays are Equal
% Simply confirms that the length of the baseline and measured
% antineutrino measurement evolutions are equal ensuring a proper
% comparison analysis to generate the ROC curve
if MeasuredExpectedLength==BaselineExpectedLength
lengthcheck=1;
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else
lengthcheck=0;
end
%% t-Test of Baseline and Measured Scenarios for ROC Curve Generation
% 1. Initiate arrays that will be used to store the calculated true
% positive (alphaTP), false negative (alphaFN), true negative (alphaTN),
% and false positive (alphaFP) arrays at the designated level of
% significance
alphaTP=zeros(2,scale);
alphaFN=zeros(2,scale);
alphaTN=zeros(2,scale);
alphaFP=zeros(2,scale);
% 2. Store level of significance values analyzed in the first rows of the
% true positive (alphaTP), false negative (alphaFN), true negative
% (alphaTN), and false positive (alphaFP) arrays
alphaTP(1,:)=alphaS;
alphaFN(1,:)=alphaS;
alphaTN(1,:)=alphaS;
alphaFP(1,:)=alphaS;
% 3. Reevaluate days provided the user
days=(startday:TotalDays);
days=transpose(days);
days=days-mean(days);
% 3. Begin calculating the
% of significance
inputted startday
TP, FN, TN, and FP values at the varying levels
for k=1:1:scale
alpha=alphaS(k);
% alpha corresponds to the tested level of significance
% iterative loop
% Initiate TP, FN, TN, and FP variables at the beginning
% iterative loop
TP=0;
FN=0;
TN=0;
FP=0;
% Displays a figure corresponding to the progress of the
% a percentage of the total number of analyzed levels of
wait=waitbar(k/scale, 'Processing Data');
at this
of each
simulation as
significance
% At each level of significance, conduct the designated number of
% iterations (numiter)
for i=1:numiter
BaselineObserved=expectedcounts(BaselineExpected(2:BaselineExpectedLength));
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% Generate the simulated expected values for the baseline scenario
% antineutrino evolution
Baseline~bserved=BaselineObserved./BaselineObserved(1);
% Redefine the baseline simulated expected values relative to the
% measurement collected on the initial day
BaselineObserved=BaselineObserved(startday:TotalDays);
% Redefine the given array to just the measured values from the
% designated start day to the last day of the duration period
MeasuredObserved=observedcounts(MeasuredExpected(2:MeasuredExpectedLength));
% Generate the simulated observed values for the measured scenario
% antineutrino evolution to be used in the TP-FN testing
MeasuredObserved=MeasuredObserved./MeasuredObserved(1);
% Redefine the measured simulated observed values relative to the
% measurement collected on the initial day
MeasuredObserved=MeasuredObserved(startday:TotalDays);
% Redefine the given array to just the measured values from the
% designated start day to the last day of the duration period
MeasuredObserved2=observedcounts(BaselineExpected(2:BaselineExpectedLength));
% Generate the simulated observed values for the baseline scenario
% antineutrino evolution to be used in the FP-TN testing
MeasuredObserved2=MeasuredObserved2./Measured~bserved2(1);
% Redefine the baseline simulated observed values relative to the
% measurement collected on the initial day
MeasuredObserved2=MeasuredObserved2(startday:TotalDays);
% Redefine the given array to just the measured values from the
% designated start day to the last day of the duration period
% True Positive and False Negative Testing
% Conduct a t-Test of the coefficients generated from a
% polynomial regression of the baseline expected and measured
% observed values for the designated level of significance
h=tTestforCoeff(days,MeasuredObserved,BaselineObserved,2,alpha);
if h==1
TP=TP+1;
else
FN=FN+1;
end
%False Positive and True Negative Testing
% Conduct a t-Test of the coefficients generated from a
% polynomial regression of the baseline expected and baseline
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% observed values for the designated level of significance
h=tTestforCoeff(days,MeasuredObserved2,BaselineObserved,2,alpha);
if h==1
FP=FP+1;
else
TN=TN+1;
end
end
% Close the wait bar figure generated so that a revised figure can be
% generated upon initiation of the following iterative cycle
close(wait);
% Store the updated TP, FN, FP, and TN values as a fraction of the total
% number of iterations simulated (numiter) in the following matrices
alphaTP(2,k)=TP/numiter;
alphaFN(2,k)=FN/numiter;
alphaFP(2,k)=FP/numiter;
alphaTN(2,k)=TN/numiter;
end
%Plot the FP vs. TP ROC curve
loglog(alphaFP(2,:),alphaTP(2,:),'o');
set(gca,'XTick',(alphaS*100));
set(gca,'YTick',(alphaS*100));
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